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Abstract
The combined effects of economic globalization, development of transport sys-
tems and new communication techniques have had a profound influence on
world development. The expansion of transport systems favors the increase
of geographic mobility so that the existence of a complete highways network,
adequately managed and maintained and with sufficient capacity, is essential
for the good progress of the national economy.
The expansion of transport systems is coupled with the rise in land prices
and the increase of air and noise pollution. In this development, we observe that
dangerous goods are used in many processes in industries all over the world and
this has been justified by the economic revenue which is generated by their use.
A dangerous good is any solid, liquid, or gas that can harm people, other liv-
ing organisms, property, or the environment. They are often subject to chemical
regulations. An equivalent term, used almost exclusively in the United States,
is hazardous material (hazmat or HAZMAT).
Due to its nature, every production, storage, and transportation activity
related to the use of HAZMAT has many risks for both society and the envi-
ronment. HAZMAT are transported throughout the world in a great number of
road shipments.
In spite of HAZMAT accidents being rare events, the commercial transport of
HAZMAT can be catastrophic in nature and poses risks to life, health, property,
and the environment due to the possibility of an unintentional release. In this
scenario, a new factor has acquired more and more importance: sustainability.
As a consequence, it is necessary to integrate risk mitigation and prevention
measures into transport management in order to avoid the risks turning into
real events.
Three different topics are developed within the above framework.
• A business approach, named corporate sustainability, that creates long-
term shareholder value by exploiting opportunities and managing risks
deriving from economic, environmental and social developments.
• An assessment of risk and accident impacts related to dangerous goods
transport with particular attention paid to HAZMAT on the road in a
motorway environment.
• A DSS (Decision Support System) model for the management of the HAZ-
MAT transportation.
Keywords: motorway, sustainable organization, balanced scorecard, hazardous
material transportation, risk assessment.
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Prefazione
Lo sviluppo avvenuto a livello mondiale negli ultimi anni, e` stato fortemente
condizionato da processi pervasivi e profondi quali quello di globalizzazione, di
espansione dei mercati, di diffusione dei sistemi di trasporto e di nuova comuni-
cazione grazie anche alle nuove tecnologie elettronico-informatiche introdotte.
Peraltro, il sistema trasportistico favorisce, con il suo evolversi, l’incremento
della mobilita` geografica ed il progresso delle varie economie nazionali. Ne
discende, soprattutto nel caso del trasporto su “gomma” che e` la modalita` di
gran lunga piu` usata, la necessita` di sistemi stradali e reti autostradali di suffi-
ciente capacita` ma, nel contempo, adeguatamente gestiti ed oggetto di costante
manutenzione.
L’espansione dei trasporti, oltre alle ripercussioni sui territori in termini eco-
nomici, comporta un lento ma progressivo incremento del grado di inquinamento
dell’aria ed ambientale piu` in generale. Peraltro, e` riscontrabile nel modello di
sviluppo appena descritto un impiego, sistematico e diffuso a livello planetario,
di sostanze pericolose nei vari processi produttivi, sia per la loro indispensalita`
nei processi stessi sia per i ritorni economici legati al loro utilizzo.
In funzione della natura di tali sostanze, lo stoccaggio e specialmente il
trasporto di materiali pericolosi comporta dei rischi, spesso notevoli, di natura
sociale ed ambientale. Secondo dati statistici, i rischi maggiori risiedono pro-
prio nella fase di trasporto, che puo` avvenire secondo le tradizionali modalita`
terrestri, (“gomma”, “rotaia”), marine ed aeree, con l’assoluta prevalenza delle
prime.
Pur essendo contenuto il numero degli incidenti che avvengono, le ripercus-
sioni ed i danni in caso di accadimento sono generalmente catastrofici per la
perdita di vite umane, per i riflessi a livello di salute pubblica nonche` ambien-
tale. Ne derivano la necessita`:
• di definire modelli di gestione che assicurino la sostenibilita` economica,
sociale e ambientale nel settore trasportistico ed in specie autostradale,
• l’importanza di poter valutare, individualmente e socialmente, il rischio
associato al trasporto di merci pericolose, soprattutto su strada, al fine
di definire idonei sistemi preventivi e di adeguato intervento in caso di
accidentale rilascio delle sostanze stesse.
Tali studi e misure devono essere integrati nel sistema di gestione dei trasporti
per far s`ı che i rischi si trasformino il meno possibile in eventi.
Al riguardo, nella presente tesi sono sviluppate le seguenti tre tematiche:
• un nuovo modello di sviluppo economico/manageriale, denominato “sosteni-
bilita` aziendale”, che pur creando valore a lungo termine per l’azionariato
v
d’impresa, fornisce gli strumenti per rendere compatibile lo sviluppo stesso
sotto il profilo economico, sociale, ambientale;
• un’adeguata valutazione sul rischio e sulle conseguenze possibili connesse
al trasporto di sostanze pericolose su strada, analizzando il caso specifico
autostradale;
• la definizione di un modello a supporto della presa delle decisioni che i
vari responsabili ed operatori devono assumere nelle operazioni di ges-
tione/intervento connesse al trasporto su gomma di sostanze pericolose.
Parole chiave: autostrada, organizzazione sostenibile, balanced scorecard, trasporto
di sostanze pericolose, valutazione del rischio.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic analysis identifies comparative, rather than absolute, advantage as
the basis of international trade. The Law of comparative advantage [60] is
a principle that states that every nation, worker, or production entity has a
production activity that incurs a lower opportunity cost than that of another
nation, worker, or production entity, which means that trade between the two
can be beneficial to both if each specializes in the production of a good with
lower relative opportunity cost.
This law is most often studied within the confines of international trade, but
it also applies to labor and other types of production. Over the last century,
the strong economic growth experienced was just based on international com-
parative advantage and it has been accompanied by gains in material welfare in
all parts of the world [226]. Public services and goods have provided necessary
inputs into private productive activities and modern states finance these inputs
through taxes collected from the community.
The reduction and removal of barriers between national borders in order
to facilitate the flow of goods, capital, services and labour and the process of
transformation of local or regional phenomena into global ones have given life
to globalization.
Globalization is a combination of economic, technological, sociocultural and
political forces and it can be described as a process by which the people of the
world are unified into a single society and function together. Moreover, economic
globalization is the integration of national economies into the international econ-
omy through trade, foreign direct investment, capital flows, migration, and the
spread of technology.
Nowadays, the combined effect of economic globalization, development of
transport systems and new communication techniques has had a profound in-
fluence on the world development [178].
In this scenario, a new factor has acquired more and more importance: sus-
tainability. Sustainability [167] is a systemic concept that relates to the con-
tinuity of economic, social, institutional and environmental aspects of human
society . It is intended to be a mean of configuring civilization and human ac-
tivity, so that, society, its members and its economies, are able to meet their
needs and to express their greatest potential in the present but, at the same
time, to preserve biodiversity and natural ecosystems.
Pursuing sustainable development, Governments face the challenge of dis-
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cerning how best to balance the challenges and opportunities of growth and to
decouple economic growth from environmental and social pressures.
Various schools of research in public policy (the literature on “governance”
and its continental counterparts) are converging to focus on the growth of policy
styles based on cooperation and partnership in networks, instead of on vertical
control by the state [186].
Consequently, firms should not consider sustainable development as an ad-
ditional requirement imposed by Governments, but as an overarching principle,
which governs all the development processes. Sustainability requires new man-
agement approaches to improve policy coherence, to increase the role of knowl-
edge in the formulation and implementation of policies, and to devise better
communication between civil society and business [13].
For example, the timing of the replacement of equipment is dependent on
factors like replacement costs, discount factors and differences in productivity,
reliability and safety of existing and new equipment.
Although predictions related to these factors are normally subject to un-
certainties, successful corporate sustainability leaders achieve long-term share-
holder value by replacing old equipment and gearing their strategies and man-
agement to harness the market’s potential for sustainability products and ser-
vices while reducing, if not avoiding, sustainability costs and risks.
Economic globalization favors the increase of geographic mobility involving
the expansion of transport systems that is coupled with the rise in land prices
and the increase of air and noise pollution. According to the life cycle theory,
technological innovations are related to the development phase of a transport
system (introduction, growth, maturity and decline).
Technological innovations can contribute to the reduction of emissions in
the international transport sector, but it will be a long term process to generate
significant results.
As a consequence, it is essential that there exists a complete highways net-
work with sufficient capacity, but adequately managed and maintained and with
the right ratio of technological innovations for the good progress of the sustain-
able national economy. In the development just described, we observe that haz-
ardous materials are used in many processes in industry all over the world and
this has been justified by the economic revenue which is generated by their use.
A dangerous good is any solid, liquid, or gas that can harm people, other living
organisms, property, or the environment. They are often subject to chemical
regulations.
An equivalent term, used almost exclusively in the United States, is haz-
ardous material (hazmat or HAZMAT). Due to its nature, every production,
storage, and transportation activity related to the use of HAZMAT has many
risks for both society and environment.
HAZMAT are transported throughout the world in a great number of road
shipments. While HAZMAT accidents are rare events, the commercial transport
of HAZMAT could be catastrophic in nature and poses risks to life, health,
property, and the environment due to the possibility of an unintentional release.
In order to avoid the risks turning into real events, it is necessary to integrate risk
mitigation and prevention measures into the transport management. HAZMAT
has received considerable attention since the 1980’s, mainly due to growing
safety concerns in most developed countries, but in recent years HAZMAT has
acquired new importance because of sustainability.
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In this thesis, an original approach is developed on an idea of the author, who
was also Director of Operations of S.p.A. Autovie Venete. This idea consists in
making an attempt to encompass both professional experience and theoretical
knowledge with application-oriented studies from disparate areas related to the
commercial transport of hazardous materials.
S.p.A. Autovie Venete is an important Italian motorway concessionaire and
safety is its main priority. Its operators manage HAZMAT transportation fol-
lowing different strategies and using different technologies to detect vehicles, to
give the alarm and to properly intervene in case of accidents. Three different
topics are developed within the above framework.
• A business approach, named corporate sustainability, that creates long-
term shareholder value by exploiting opportunities and managing risks
deriving from economic, environmental and social developments.
• An assessment of risk and accident impacts related to dangerous goods
transport with particular attention paid to HAZMAT on the road.
• A DSS (Decision Support System) model for the management of the
HAZAMAT transportation.
Following this introduction, the work continues with Chapter 2, which briefly
discusses different approaches for quantifying sustainability and the issues about
environmentally sustainable transport.
We illustrate some important aspects such as the productivity effects of
road investment, regulation and licensee motorways companies in Europe and
in the Italian highways network, especially in the North-East. Furthermore, into
Section 2.5 we examine more deeply the process of formulating an Sustainability
Balanced Scorecard for a motorways concessionaire. Before doing so, the basic
conventional approach of the Balanced Scorecard is outlined.
In this context, we developed an original idea to use the Balanced Score-
card model [129] for the specific sector of motorway concessionaires in order to
estimate its corporate efficiency and to evaluate environmental and social per-
formance. The core work presented is currently being published, as a scientific
paper, by International Journal Of Environment And Sustainable Development
[46].
Concession systems are in widespread use in the road sector in Europe:
concessions differ from public contracts in the transfer of the responsibilities of
operation that they entail [14]. The mission of most of concessions holders is
just to plan, build, expand and manage a motorway network.
Chapter 3 covers aspects as hazard identification, risk evaluation (i.e. evalu-
ation of the acceptability of the risk) and risk reduction, quantified risk assess-
ment (QRA) and risk management.
In order to get a clearer understanding of hazardous materials transportation
and to describe a community’s/region’s hazardous materials transportation risk
problem, in Chapter 6 we present models for a quantitative risk assessment of
HAZMAT on the road that takes into consideration the length of time in transit,
the probability of a collision and the risk of population exposure in the event of
an incident.
We also present a bibliographic survey on the hazardous material trans-
portation and particular attention is paid to HAZMAT on the road. The core
3
work presented is currently being published, as a scientific paper, in the book
Advanced Technologies And Methodologies For Risk Management in the Global
Transport Of Dangerous Goods [47].
In the following Chapter 6, we present a methodology for assessment of
HAZMAT transport risk in a motorway network and we also propose a method-
ology for assessment of the HAZMAT transportation risk in a motorway network
sustainably oriented.
The model developed also assists decision makers to take the right policies
to reduce the risk posed, due to the shipment of hazardous materials to life and
environment. The final Chapter summarizes the findings and conclusions of this
research work.
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Chapter 2
Social responsibility and
sustainability in motorway
corporate governance
In this section, we propose a brief discussion of different approaches for quan-
tifying sustainability. The investors have an investable corporate sustainabil-
ity concept so that the corporate sustainability performance can be financially
quantified [104].
2.1 Environmentally Sustainable
A growing number of investors are convinced that sustainability is a catalyst
for enlightened and disciplined management. In effect, the development of sus-
tainability is driven by the two following crucial success factors.
• The concept of corporate sustainability is attractive to investors because
it aims to increase long-term shareholder value: since corporate sustain-
ability performance can be financially quantified, the investors have an
investable corporate sustainability concept.
• The sustainability leaders are increasingly expected to show superior per-
formance and favorable risk/return profiles.
As this benefit circle strengthens, it will have a positive effect on the soci-
eties and economies of both the developed and developing world. Increasingly,
investors are diversifying their portfolios by investing in companies that set
industry-wide best practices with regard to sustainability [145].
What private and institutional investors need is a global, rational, consistent,
flexible and, most important, investable index (like the Dow Jones Sustainabil-
ity Index World) [48], to benchmark the performance of their sustainability
investments.
Investors also need an independent and reliable index as a basis for deriva-
tives and funds focused on sustainability companies [15].
With adequate market signals and incentives to modify behavior in line with
sustainability, policy makers can secure more efficient resource use, which in turn
5
implies higher overall welfare and equity today and in the future. In particular,
it is important to define sustainability indicators to anticipate the fickleness of
human-environmental interaction.
The development of environmental indicators is dominated by the so-called
Pressure-State-Response (PSR) model of the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) [159]. The PSR contains a set of indicators
measuring:
• the anthropogenic pressure (P) on the environment,
• the state (S) of the environment resulting from such pressure, and
• the societal response (R) to ease the pressure.
Over the past 30 years, environmental policies and related reporting activities
adopted by OECD countries have steadily evolved. This evolution has been
largely driven by increased public awareness of environmental issues, their in-
ternational aspects and their linkages with economic and social issues.
Initially the demand for environmental information was closely related to
the definition and implementation of environmental policies and their effects on
the state of the environment.
Over the years, policy priorities evolved, as did demands for reliable, harmo-
nized and easily understandable information, not only from the environmental
community but also from other public authorities, businesses, the general pub-
lic, environmental non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders. At
the same time, international activities and co-operation on the environment
continued to grow.
The strength of the PSR is its ability to take into account the causal rela-
tionship between the state of the environment and human activity. Its major
weakness, however, is the lack of sophistication of the mathematical and cogni-
tive models representing the causal relationship. As a result, current indicator
systems based on the PSR fail to consider contingencies in human-environmental
interaction that make the future state of the system difficult to ascertain.
Recognizing the fickleness of human beings and nature will result in indica-
tors very different from the traditionally developed ones. They can be identified
in the following important areas of indicator development:
a) indicators for the sustainability ecosystem impacts of production, which
measure changes in production outputs and environmentally significant
inputs [121];
b) indicators of bounded carrying capacity, which use alternative scenarios of
human-environmental interaction to specify the ecosystem-specific limits
that societies might impose on industrial production [229];
c) indicators of congruence between ecosystems, institutions and production,
which measure the compliance between the functions of an ecosystem and
the institutional rules governing its management [121];
d) indicators of technological and institutional path dependence, which ob-
serve and potentially strengthen lock-ins in human-environmental inter-
action [193];
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These development challenges imply that sustainability indicators should be
considered more as tools for improving communication between different com-
munities of experts on the sustainability of a particular system of human-
environmental interaction, rather than as universal measures of sustainabil-
ity [17].
2.2 Environmentally Sustainable Transport
In this section we consider sustainability, with its indicators, in the transport
sector. In order to integrate and communicate knowledge in the assessment of
the environmentally sustainable aspects of transport technologies and policies, it
is necessary to adopt a systemic approach to environmental and transportation
issues by pursuing four main objectives:
• designing harmonized methods to build environmental indices to be ap-
plied to the transport sector in the different countries;
• assessing the level of environmental sustainability of transport systems
and exploring new transport scenarios;
• assembling scientific knowledge between disciplines and countries through
common research projects, for discussion, congresses and exchange of sci-
entists;
• disseminating the knowledge and the sustainability assessment tools among
decision makers, consultants and the public, especially by high level teach-
ing.
The core of this approach is to integrate the different environmental impacts
of the transport system into sustainability indices or other reporting mecha-
nisms, taking into account the physical and biological impacts and the public
perception of the environment.
But it is also necessary to assess the level of sustainability of the trans-
port system in the past, present and future times with a long term approach,
to develop long-term scenarios based on possibilities and constraints, and to
identify tools and strategies capable of achieving the scenarios themselves, in
terms of transport technologies and policies [94]. Significant improvement can
be achieved in the short to medium term in the environmental performance of
current transport arrangements.
2.3 Aggregate productivity effects of Road In-
vestment
In this section, we suggest some answers to these policy questions:
• Has the development of the transport sector been a driver of globalization?
• Does transport policy underrate its role to support international trade and
foreign direct investment?
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• Does transport policy action have substantial income effects by facilitating
trade?
• Do transport infrastructure investments reduce international trade costs?
• Which domestic policies have strong trade cost reducing effects?
Knowledge about the productivity effects of infrastructures would allow more
informed decisions to be taken on the overall budget allocation for infrastructure
investment in general and transport infrastructure in particular. The strong role
assigned to transport infrastructure investment as a vehicle for economic growth
appears to be worth critical examination for at least two reasons.
1. There is no strong growth theory foundation for the hypothesis that an
increase in transport infrastructure investment would lead to an immediate
and lasting increase in growth rates of economic activity; rather, according
to the exogenous growth theory, an increase in the investment rate (which
does not necessarily result from an increase in transport infrastructure
investment) leads to an increase in the income level.
2. There is no clear, empirical evidence that transport infrastructure invest-
ment leads to higher growth or even to a higher level of income.
Aschauer [14] started the discussion on the productivity effects of public in-
vestment followed by Gramlich [105]; moreover, Kopp [142] found large positive
productivity effects being caused by public investment. Kopp reviewed the
previous attempts to measure the macroeconomic effects of infrastructure in-
vestment which often suffer from an unresolved endogeneity problem and in
this perspective he investigates the productivity effects of national road infras-
tructure investment in Western Europe.
Considering the i-th of n countries, the relation between economic growth
and road infrastructure development is shown in (2.1). This relation, named
national production function [223], shows that, omitting time subscripts, the
countries which have relatively transport-intensive industries benefit from an
increase in road infrastructure investment more than countries with relatively
low transport intensity from an increase in road infrastructure investment:
Qi = UiF i(Ki, Hi, Li, Ti[Gi, Vi]) (2.1)
where:
n is a set of countries;
Qi is the production of gross output for each country i;
Ki is the non-transport capital stock for each country i;
Li is the employment for each country i ;
Ti is the transport services level for each country i;
Ui is the economy’s technological level for each country i
which is assumed to progress in a Hicks-neutral way;
Gi is the services of road stock for each country i and
Vi is the national stock of transport equipment for each country i.
An interesting aspect is that the production of gross output Qi, for each of the
i-th of n countries, depends on non-transport capital stock Ki, employment Li
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and transport services Ti. Transport services depend on the services of road
stock Gi as well as the national stock of transport equipment Vi. Output also
depends on the economy’s technological level Ui, which is assumed to progress
in a Hicks-neutral way.
Hicks-neutral is an attribute of an effectiveness variable in a production
function [19]. The attribute is that it does not affect labor differently from the
way it affects capital. The canonical example is the Solow model production
function Y = AF (K,L) [150]. There Y is output, L labor, K capital, F a
production variable, and A represents some kinds of effectiveness variable. In
Y = F (AK,L) the effectiveness variable affects capital but not labor. In Y =
F (K,AL) it affects labor but not capital. These two cases can be described as
Hicks-biased. In Y = AF (K,L) it is Hicks-neutral.
Equation (2.1) represents the gross production function of the representative
firm using the primary inputs, capital Ki, labor Li and transport services Ti,
as the only intermediate input.
The transport services are produced using road services Gi and the services
of the vehicle stock Vi. The firms do not choose input Gi but the number of
vehicles, which is Vi. From gross output function 2.1 taking logarithm and total
differential yields
dQ
Q
=
dU
U
+
FKK
F
dK
K
+
FLL
F
dL
L
+
FV V
F
dV
V
+
FGG
F
dG
G
(2.2)
where:
Fj denotes the derivative of the production function with respect to input j;
FjJ
F are coefficients indicate production elasticities, i.e. the percentage
increase of gross output if the input J is increased by one per cent.
Consequently, output elasticity with respect to road services is not directly
observable and firms do not take input decisions with respect to road services.
However, input decisions with respect to vehicles are not independent of the
road services provided by the existing road capital stock. The output elasticity
with respect to road services can be expressed relative to the elasticity with
respect to vehicles:
FGG
F
=
(
FGG
F
FV V
F
)
·
(
FV V
F
)
= φ ·
(
FV V
F
)
(2.3)
where the parameter φ equals the ratio of output elasticities of roads and vehicles
and is expected to be positive because economies which are relatively transport-
intensive probably are also relatively road-intensive.
The production elasticity of vehicles measures the transport elasticity of the
national economy. Hence the parameter links the observed transport intensity
of the economy to the indirect input road use.
It is important to point out that the production theory framework explic-
itly includes the modeling of national transport intensities and the fact that
transport services depend on private capital investment and government invest-
ment in roads. The endogeneity bias is addressed by introducing an estimation
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breakdown which combines national productivity effects with overall productiv-
ity effects for the country group as a whole, to make residuals of the estimation
orthogonal to the explanatory variables.
Productivity is measured by the Toernquist productivity index [41]. Index
numbers try to avoid deficiencies of partial cost indices. They aim at indicating
the ratio between output variables and a bundle of inputs. The most frequently
used productivity index is just the Toernquist index. The Toernquist total
factor productivity index is defined in its simpler logarithmic form as follows,
comparing two entities, s and t:
lnTFPst = ln
OutptIndexst
InputIndexst
= lnOutptIndexst − ln InputIndexst =
=
1
2
N∑
I=1
(ωit + ωis) (ln yis − ln yis)− 12
K∑
j=1
(νjt + νjs) (lnxjt − lnxjs) (2.4)
where:
y denotes outputs, indexed by i,
x denotes inputs, indexed by j,
ω denote the shares of goods in i in total real output,
ν denote the shares of inputs j in total costs.
The productivity effects depend on the sign of the ratio of vehicle stock to the
road stock elasticity of production.
Kopp [143] calculated the expression for the national growth rate of produc-
tivity and developed an empirical analysis including western European countries
for which data were available. The largest gaps in the data were found for trans-
port infrastructure investment, and for the real value of vehicle stock.
The countries in the sample were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Moreover, Kopp shows that investment in road infrastructure indeed
has positive macroeconomic productivity effects, even if the results of the paper
[143] do not justify as a general conclusion that national road infrastructure
investment levels should be increased.
In conclusion, the fixed effects panel data analysis shows that transport
infrastructure has a positive effect on macroeconomic productivity. The variance
of road infrastructure investment in the panel explains, however, only a small
part of the macroeconomic productivity development.
2.4 Regulation and licensee motorway compa-
nies
In this section we present the lines of polity in Europe to develop a sustainable
transport. We also propose an overview of the application of motorway con-
cession contracts in Europe and specifically in Italy, of the difficulties currently
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encountered by the European and Italian road administrations in the utilization
of the concession option and of the public-private partnership in the motorway
field with its key-factors of success.
2.4.1 The development of Build-Operate-Transfer
The search for a new way to promote and finance infrastructure projects led to
the introduction of a technique originally used in the 19th and 20th centuries,
known as concessions.
Concessions were used in many parts of the world to develop infrastruc-
ture. The Suez Canal is one of the many examples of a privately financed
concession and this method was also used to build canals, railroads, tram-ways,
water works, electric utilities and similar projects in both industrialized and
less-developed countries.
The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) formula adds to the old system of con-
cessions, providing new possibilities [107] for reducing or eliminating the direct
financial burden which states would otherwise bear. The objective is to trans-
fer as much borrowing risk as possible to the private-sector promoter and the
project itself . Therefore the BOT promoter must finance the project entirely
or partially.
Financing is made available on the strength of the project’s projected revenue
stream and its other assets, including the promoter’s quality. Normally the
lenders would have limited or no recourses to the promoter or shareholder of the
promoting company. BOT projects are part of the Public Private Partnership
that have been adopted by various governments in recent years [113] .
PPPs generally take the form of a long-term (e.g. 30 years) agreement
between public and private entities. At the end of the concession the project is
transferred back to the state or the public body. In the European countries, the
public authorities of the member states often have sought the recourse of PPP
arrangements to undertake infrastructure projects, in particular in sectors such
as transport, public health, education and national security.
At European level, it was recognized that recourse to PPPs could help to put
in place Trans-European networks, which had fallen very much behind schedule,
mainly owing to a lack of funding. As part of the Initiative for Growth, the
Council has approved a series of measures designed to increase investment in
the infrastructure of the Trans-European transport network and also in the fields
of innovation, research and development through forms of PPPs.
According to Halkias et al.(2007) [110], the key benefits of PPPs are the
following.
• Infrastructure created through PPP can improve the quality and quantity
of basic infrastructure such as water, energy supply, telecommunications
and transport.
• Value for money PPP projects deliver greater value for money compared
with that of an equivalent asset procured conventionally. The combination
of design, construction and operation outweigh the higher cost of finance.
PPP focuses on the procurement process of the whole life cost of the
project not simply on its initial construction cost. It identifies the long
term costs and assesses the suitability of the project.
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• Transfer the risk of performance of the asset to the private sector. The
private sector only realizes its investment if the asset performs according
to its contractual obligations. As the private sector will not usually re-
ceive any payment until the facility is available for use, the PPP structure
encourages efficient completion on budget and without defects.
• Buildings and services which would not otherwise be affordable can be
under a PPP and this is a major benefit that helps public authorities to
take a long-term strategic view of the services they require over a long
period.
• The concept helps to reduce public debt and frees up public capital to
spend on other public services.
• Innovation and best practice. The expertise and experience of the private
sector encourages innovation, resulting in reduced cost, shorter delivery
times and improvements in the construction and facility management pro-
cesses. Developing these processes aids best practice.
• Repairs and maintenance-assets and services will be maintained at a pre-
determined standard over the full length of the concession.
• Enable investment decisions to be based on fuller information as it requires
a defined analysis of project risks by both the public sector and the lenders
at the outset.
• The tax payer benefits by avoiding paying higher taxes to finance infras-
tructure development.
• The government or public authority still retains strategic control of the
overall project and service.
• The process can assist in the reform of the public sector.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the main justification for the adoption of a PPP
is the possibility of exploiting the management qualifications and the efficiency
of the private sector without giving up quality standards of outputs, thanks to
appropriate control mechanisms from the public party.
This result is achieved by setting up complex contractual arrangements with
private sector operators where the public sector acts as principal and the private
operator as agent. In principal-agent relationships, the most complex issues are
the following:
• the precise definition of the tasks assigned to each party;
• the measure of the agent’s performance;
• the extent to which the principal can control and monitor the agent’s
performance for the whole duration of the contractual relationship.
The definition of the tasks assigned to each party is the subject of the risk
allocation between the two parties: well designed PPPs redistribute the risk
to the party that is best suited to control and or bear the risk. The measure
of the agent’s performance and the extent to which the principal can control
12
and monitor the agent’s performance are subject to the objectives set by the
principal.
Social objectives play a major role in the incentives of the players and they
are linked with the quality of the output. The extent to which the principal can
control and monitor the agent’s performance varies in the various stages of the
contracting.
During the tendering phase, the best way to ensure that output quality is
at least comparable with what would be expected in case of in-house public
provision is to clearly set out quality standards and indicators, so that the
private party is aware of such contractual requirements when submitting the
offer.
During the building phase, reliance on past experience and use of accurate
output indicators are the only means of control of the public entity in the build-
ing stage of any PPP contract.
At the operational phase, the greater the risk allocated to the private party,
the smaller is the public involvement in the operation phase. The public sector
however can use output indicators to monitor the private agent’s performance.
Therefore PPPs can be successfully applied only where service quality can be
clearly specified, measured and guaranteed through performance indicators.
2.4.2 The Transport White Paper
We all know that mobility is essential to Europe’s prosperity and to the freedom
of movements of its citizens. But transport is a key policy area which not only
determines how efficiently and at what cost goods and people move around the
world and in Europe particularly, but also has a major impact on a series of
other areas such as energy and environmental policy and, of course, on the
operation of the Single Market which underpins the economy.
We must take into consideration the question: is mobility an intermediate
good or a final one?
There is evidence that mobility of intermediate as a good: minimize mobility
subject to a desired level of personal, production and consumption exchanges
to be assured. But there is also evidence of mobility as a final good: maximize
mobility subject to a desired level of congestion, emissions, safety, energy. The
key issue remains the reconciliation of mobility and sustainability.
In the Transport White Paper (TWP) [70] and in keeping with the sustain-
able development strategy adopted by the European Council in Gothenburg in
June 2001, the Commission proposes some 60 measures aimed at developing a
European transport system capable of shifting the balance between modes of
transport, revitalising the railways, promoting transport by sea and inland wa-
terways and controlling the growth in air transport. The 2001 TWP suggested
these lines of policy to solve the problem:
• transport demand management = trying to decouple economic growth
from transport growth;
• modal shifts from road and air transport to rail, sea and inland waterways;
• better and smarter infrastructure charging
• new technologies for reducing energy consumption and negative transport
side-effects like emissions and accidents
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Sustainable transport is serving Europe’s prosperity through building the single
enlarged market (and making it operational) and increasing economic and social
cohesion. A single transport market is to be built and maintained along three
lines of policy:
• technical interoperability;
• market access liberalization;
• physical network interconnection.
Other 2001 Transport White Paper (TWP) lines of policy:
• Consumer protection;
• Europe in the global transport setting.
Modal shift is essential for reducing the environmental impact of transport.
2.4.3 The Revised Transport White Paper
The changes in scenario to be considered in the revision are:
• European Union is welcoming its 27th member state;
• globalization phenomena - both positive and negative, such as global
warming - are winning ground;
• concern about security problems due to terrorism is growing;
• constraining all transport activities;
• new powerful Information Technologies are available.
Moreover, road transport is mostly responsible for congestion (mainly in urban
and metropolitan areas), air pollution, transport casualties and transport energy
consumption.
As a consequence, the TWP need a revision to be able to guarantee a better
sustainable mobility: the revision must consist in a change in focus from man-
aging transport demand and supply (decoupling and modal shift) to addressing
negative side effects.
A modest modal shift can reduce road congestion: a 5% decrease in road
traffic through modal shift would get a more than proportional reduction (10-
20%) in road congestion, accidents, fuel waste, and so on.
We do not need any dramatic change or any punitive policy against cars and
trucks. In this scenario the role of motorways concessionaires is as a cornerstone
of every transport system with Concessions as
14
2.4.4 Regulation and licensee motorway companies in Eu-
rope
The first directive on the public works contracts of 1971 gives the definition
of the concessions of public works. Currently the Green Paper (2004) [111] on
the public-private partnership (PPP) refers to contractual agreements formed
between a public agency and private sector entity that allow for greater private
sector participation in the delivery of transportation projects proposing broad
lines of ”forms of cooperation between public authorities and the world of busi-
ness which aim to ensure the funding, construction, renovation, management or
maintenance of an infrastructure or the provision of a service”.
The Green Paper also explains how to face the challenge for the Internal
Market to facilitate the development of PPPs under conditions of effective com-
petition and legal clarity.
The diversity of the concession systems introduced by the various European
road administrations deals with the respective roles of the concession company
and the public authorities. In particular, in the risk sharing between concession
authority and Concession Company, various situations exist:
• risks borne by the governmental concession authority;
• risks borne by the concession company, but substantially supported/ lim-
ited;
• risks taken by the concession company.
The issue of risk sharing represents one of the major difficulties for road admin-
istrations when setting up concession projects [89]. There are also differences
with respect to concession company selection criteria [67].
The criteria most frequently quoted by road administrations are:
• the amount of the public subsidy required,
• the credibility of the financial arrangement,
• the technical quality of the project,
• operating strategy and price policy, and
• the reputation of the concession company (the inclusion of a construction
company amongst its shareholders, etc.).
The introduction of an agency, an autonomous public, or semi-public or private
entity in the context of a concession or franchise arrangement, frequently has
the primary advantage of making it possible to impose a management discipline
[85].
Finally, a toll system can just serve to optimize utilization of the trans-
port network (traffic spread, intermodal sharing of traffic load, etc.). In this
case, however, charge systems must meet a number of different and sometimes
contradictory objectives [16] such as, for example:
• marginal cost charging;
• cost recovery;
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• maximised profit.
Formulas for determining toll charges also differ throughout Europe (“price
cap” method in Italy, traffic band method or availability payment in the United
Kingdom, etc.). Each of these formulas corresponds to a particular level of risk
sharing, and it is consequently of genuine interest for all concession authorities
in this regard [37].
The notion of toll a system is often confused with concession and private
financing: in a toll system the user is charged and not the tax payer [35].
Moreover the European situation differs from American one where there are so
few toll motorways (“toll road” or “turnpike”) and mainly built and operated
by public authorities [180].
2.4.5 Regulation and licensee motorway companies in Italy
Before the Second World War, in 1921, the word “Autostrada” was used for
the first time in Italy in the Puricelli relation, which presented a plan for a new
kind of road, and it was translated literally in other languages as “Aautoroute”,
“Aautopistas”, “Aautobahn” [38].
In 1922 the first highway was opened (Milano - Laghi): from the Second
World War and after the end of the reconstruction, in 1955 law 463 states that
highways should finance themselves with a public contribution of between 20%
and 36%, a contribution updated to 52% in 1961 with law 729 but with an
unexpected income that should be given to the government after the 5th year
and financial costs fixed at 6.5%.
New highways (3600 km) were opened by 1970 and with law 492 in 1975
the construction of new highways was forbidden. In Italy, the prohibition of
construction of new highways was partially abrogated in 1978 and legal limits
slowed down new construction.
The construction of a toll motorways network in Italy started in the 50s,
and was undertaken partly directly by A.N.A.S. (Azienda Nazionale Autonoma
delle Strade), the State Department for toll and non-toll motorways, and partly
under the terms of franchise contracts.
Franchise’s costs were assessed by means of the so-called “Piano Finanziario”,
the financial plan (PF henceforth) which was to be presented at the beginning of
the concession period, and included a detailed forecast for all costs and revenues
for the whole period of the concession.
The object of the franchise contract is usually the motorway maintenance
and the provision of motorways services. In some cases, the franchise contract
has also included the construction of new motorways or the enlargement of
existing ones. Nowadays, motorways services are provided in Italy by about
20 different concession holders, with the exact number depending on the used
definition of “motorway” used.
Mostly for historical reasons, concession holders are very different in nature
and size, whatever working definition of size and nature is adopted. During the
90s, a radical reform of the sector was undertaken.
The two most important changes relate to the ownership of the franchises
and the regulatory framework. As to the change in ownership, many franchises
were privatized, i.e. changed from governmental or public ownership or control
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to private enterprise, with the most evident example being the privatization of
Autostrade (now A.S.P.I. - Autostrade per l’Italia), which took place in 1999.
However, this was not the only change of ownership for motorway conces-
sionaires in recent years: the number of privately owned franchises increased
from 2 in 1992 (or 8, according to the working definition of private ownership)
to 12 in 2003 (16, respectively).
The other important change refers to the reform of the regulatory regime:
the new regulatory framework was defined in December 1996 with the CIPE
Directive, which concluded a process that lasted several years.
This Directive provided for the renegotiation of all the existing franchise
contracts. The new contracts had to adhere to the principles laid out in the
Directive, amongst which the main ones are the price regulation based on a
price cap formula, a X offset productivity factor and grants that the price level
follows any change in productivity, the cost observation based on the PF. We
should consider also that cost observation basis is provided by the franchise at
the beginning of the franchise contract and being part of the contract itself. In
addition, the PF is meant to be valid for the whole period of the concession
and has to be updated only in special circumstances. The price cap mechanism
(2.5) has been introduced as new regulatory framework:[ ∑
i p
t
iq
t−1
i∑
i p
t−1
i q
t−1
i
− 1
]
· 100 ≤ ∆RPI −X + β∆Q (2.5)
where:
∆RPI is the expected change in the Retail Price Index;
X is the offset productivity factor and grants that
the price level follows any change in productivity;
∆Q is the composite quality index (in % variation);
β is a scaling positive factor;
pti is the (per Km) price paid
by a vehicle of type i in year t;
pt−1i is the (per Km) price paid
by a vehicle of type i in year t− 1;
qti is the total number of Km price traveled
by vehicles of type i in year t;
qt−1i is the total number of Km price traveled
by vehicles of type i in year t− 1.
It is important to notice that to avoid reducing the power of the incentives to
cost reduction, the X factor should be set equal to expected rather than realized
productivity gains and this feature of price cap regulation, with the related fact
that the X factor is predetermined for a given number of years, differentiate
this form of regulation from rate of return (ROR) regulation, where, at least in
principle, prices follow closely realized costs.
The initial price of tolls has been the result of the initial conditions in the
concession, so that it has been set on an individual basis and the variation ∆T
of tool of motorways is calculated with the Price Cap Formula (2.6).
∆T ≤ ∆P −∆X + β∆Q (2.6)
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where:
∆P is the next year expected inflation;
∆X is the capital remuneration;
β is the value related with the quality of the highways in the last 5 years;
∆Q = (Ipav)(0.60) + (Is)(0.40);
Ipav = (Ia1)(0.60) + (Ia2)(0.40);
Ia1 is the roughness;
Is is the number of accidents;
Ia2 is the regularity.
The Price Cap Formula adopted in the new contracts is applied to the prices
charged by the concessionaire to each vehicle belonging to a given class for
each Km traveled on the motorway. An interesting aspect is that the capital
remuneration ∆X is different in the following cases:
• future investment plan (uncertain in income and time of construction);
• objective of productivities variation (different for each licensee);
• expected variation in demand (new alternative).
The price cap formula limits the increases of a Laspeyres index of these prices
to the rate of inflation, adjusted for expected productivity gains and changes in
the quality of services provided [65].
The Laspeyres Index is a price index following a particular algorithm. It is
calculated from a set (“basket”) of fixed quantities of a finite list of goods. It is
assumed that we know the prices in two different periods. Let the price index
be one in the first period, which is then the base period. Then the value of the
index in the second period is equal to this ratio: the total price of the basket
of goods in period two divided by the total price of exactly the same basket in
period one. As for any price index, if all prices rise the index rises, and if all
prices fall the index falls.
2.5 An Application of the Balanced Scorecard
to Motorway System Performance Assess-
ment
In this section we describe how the balanced scorecard model, originally de-
veloped for use in the private sector, could be adapted for use in a modern
motorway concessionaire to estimate its corporate efficiency and to evaluate en-
vironmental and social performance. We also propose a re-modulation of the
tariff adjustment formula and a system to appreciate quality in a motorway
environment.
2.5.1 Performance indicators
Performance indicators can be defined as variables whose purpose is to measure
changes in a process or a function. Indicators used by the principal must be
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clearly defined, accessible and transparent. Indicators may be quantitative or
qualitative.
For example, the cost and the time taken to achieve a particular item are
quantitative indicators. By contrast, the users’ perception of his or her satis-
faction is essentially qualitative in nature.
For comparison purposes, it is necessary to find some way of placing some
quantitative value on such qualitative indicators. A common response to the
need to quantify indicators is the use of ranking scales in which, for instance,
a person’s satisfaction with a process, activity or situation, might be ranked
on a scale ranging from very happy, through happy, indifferent and unhappy to
very unhappy. Such ranking scales must be set up at the time that indicators
are identified and introduced to the overall monitoring and evaluation system.
When selecting performance measures to evaluate a road network, the following
should be taken into account:
• they should be truly representative of the quantities and characteristics
that they are intended to represent;
• they should be verifiable: in other words, it should be possible to check
that the values of the data or indicators presented are reported accurately;
• they should provide information that can be used by decision-makers. This
will often mean that they are presented quantitatively;
• the information must be available in time to influence decisions;
• they should be linked into systems that allow feedback of information into
the decision-making process.
Other issues that should be considered when selecting performance measures to
evaluate a road network include the following.
• Forecastibilty: is it possible to compare future alternative projects or
strategies using this measure?
• Clarity: is it likely to be understood by transportation professionals, policy
makers and the public?
• Usefulness: Does the measure reflect the issue or goal of concern? Is it an
indicator of condition, which could be used as a trigger for action? Does
it capture cause-and-effect between the agency’s actions and conditions?
• Ability to diagnose a problem: Is there a connection between the measure
and the actions that affect it? Is the measure too aggregate to be helpful
to agencies trying to improve performance?
• Temporal effects: Is the measure comparable across time?
• Relevance: Is the measure relevant to planning and budgeting processes?
Will changes in activities and budget levels affect a change in the measure
that is apparent and meaningful? Can the measure be reported with a
frequency that will be helpful to decision makers?
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The preferred approach for regulating quality of service is for the regulator
to specify and monitor performance outputs rather than inputs (for example
to specify an indicator of drinking water quality rather than the treatment
methodologies and equipment to be used to achieve the desired water quality).
Regulating outputs promotes innovation and efficiency improvements - but only
if the service provider also has an incentive to reduce costs. As a result, this
approach goes hand-in-hand with other regulatory mechanisms, such as the price
cap approach to tariffs (which motivates cost savings).
Specifying and monitoring a limited number of outputs helps to minimize
regulation and avoid costly and bureaucratic regulatory practices and interfer-
ence in day-to-day operations. The ultimate purpose of measuring performance
in the road sector is to improve transportation service for customers and this is
the reason that an increasing importance is given to it by transportation agen-
cies. In the road sector, performance measures have long been used as part
of pavement management and bridge management systems. Now many agen-
cies are extending the process to applications in construction and maintenance
systems, operations and safety, and administrative structures and processes.
An important observation from the 1997 OCDE [182] report was that much
less emphasis must be put on quantitative analysis, compared to qualitative
assessment of the purposes served by the road programme and whether these
reflect the views of the public. The objective is to widen the views of road
managers and planners in order to reflect the vision of an integrated transport
system. Furthermore, in an OECD review of performance indicators for the
road sector [183], the authors observed that in the past, the expectations for
road administrations were fairly straightforward. The dominant objective was
to deliver services to the public at minimum cost.
However, road agencies are now expected to meet service level targets at
reduced costs and to develop mechanisms for customer feedback. In general,
road agencies now operate in an environment in which there is a much greater
emphasis on customers. Meeting customers’ needs drives business for the public
sector as well as private sector agencies. That focus on customers has made the
assessment of agencies’ performance more complex and has been a trigger for
the study and application of objective performance measurement.
It is interesting to note that the use of performance measurement is con-
sidered useful not only for reporting to the public but also for communicating
with the public. In the literature, performance measures are needed to evaluate
the state of assets, which is a first step in developing priorities and allocating
resources amongst competing priorities. Consequently, performance measures
have been called the “backbone” of asset management systems to be used for
planning and programming.
In the modern era of sustainability, performance measurement is also seen as
key to measuring progress on that front. Transportation systems are recognized
for the benefits they provide to the economy in terms of access and mobility but
are also recognized as putting pressure on our environment. Widely held pol-
icy goals are to make progress toward sustainability while increasing economic
prosperity and quality of life. In order to understand whether our systems are
becoming more or less sustainable, measurement of performance against related
indicators is necessary [109]. However, the type of performance measures used
and the implementation practices vary significantly between jurisdictions.
OECD [183] has selected 15 performance indicators for road agencies, which
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were tested in various countries and are the following:
• average road user costs;
• level of satisfaction regarding travel time and its reliability and quality of
road-user information;
• protected road-user risk;
• unprotected road-user risk;
• environmental policy/programme;
• processes in place for market research and customer feedback;
• long-term programmes;
• allocation of resources to road infrastructure;
• quality management/audit programmes;
• forecast values of road costs vs. actual costs;
• overhead percentage;
• value of assets;
• roughness;
• state of road bridges;
• satisfaction with road system.
In order to compare and understand why particular indicators are used and the
reasons for their values, the indicators have to be viewed in the perspective of
the role of the road agencies - Concessionaire/Operator for a BOT project - in
the road transport system. The key issues facing the road transport system and
road agencies include (8):
• decreasing road budget;
• demand for greater transparency in performance;
• separation of the production and administration;
• change to customer focus instead of “expert knows best” attitude;
• demand for greater efficiency in operation;
• demand for better results and quality;
• demand for more co-ordination and co-operation across the transport sec-
tor;
• demand for performance improvements to be implemented more rapidly
than in the past;
• new management aspects, demand for an open and broad understanding
of the mobility problems facing society;
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• demand for more data and more efficient management.
In Figure 2.1 the conceptual model of a BOT within the road transport system is
presented. The Concessionaire allocates to the road operator the tasks relative
to operation and maintenance of the road project defined in the Concession
Contract. The road operator will be responsible for producing the required
level of service and quality standards as defined in the Concession agreement.
Figure 2.2 presents the conceptual model of road operator performance. The
performance indicators in a road BOT project, are a tool enabling:
• the effectiveness of the operation and maintenance to be measured;
• an achieved result to be gauged or evaluated in relation to a set objective.
The risk allocation between the involved parties - Grantor/Concessionaire - as
reflected in the Concession Contract is predominant in order to define the tasks
allocated to each party. Furthermore it should be kept in mind that the different
players, i.e. the Grantor, Concessionaire and the user have different views, when
choosing the indicators.
The increase of the level of service was one prime objective in state expec-
tations for the developments of motorway concession projects in EU. The level
of service has a direct impact on safety, uninterrupted operation, maintenance
of the motorway and the structures (bridges, tunnels) and users’ satisfaction.
Theoretically, the level of service should be defined narrowly, specifically and
without forethought. For instance, it could be resolved through a measure of
the number and rate of unresolved service requests and complaints or through
an indicator of reliability measured by the functioning time - the number of
days in a month or year when the service is functioning.
For almost all the concession projects performance requirements regarding
the level of service were inserted in the concession contracts.
Road user 
needs and 
political goals
Economy
Society
Environment
Objectives of the 
road
development
Grantor
Implementing 
the road BOT
Concessionaire
Road Performance 
measurement
User 
conditioned
generating
stimulating
Consequences
Figure 2.1: Conceptual model of a BOT within the road transport
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Inputs
Objectives
Financing
Personnel
Equipment
Processes
Planning
Procurement
Follow up
Evaluation
Output
Products and services
Assets (road, structures)
Routine maintenance
Winter maintenance
Traffic Management
Toll collection
Customer service
Outcome in road 
transport system
Congestion
Safety
Pollutants
Riding comfort
User’s satisfaction
Figure 2.2: Model of a road operator performance
Dimension Agent Operator Road user
Accessibility and
mobility
Average road
user costs
Level of
satisfaction
regarding travel
time
Safety Enforcement Technical
enforcement
Behavior
Environment Legal framework Environmental
policy /
programme
Program
development
Establish long
term programs
Allocation of
resources to road
infrastructure
Quality
management
/audit program
Program delivery Forecast values
vs. actual costs
Program
performance
Value of assets Roughness Satisfaction with
road system
State of road
bridges
Table 2.1: Taxonomy of performance indicators
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2.5.2 What is the Balanced Scorecard
The balanced scorecard is a strategic management system that links perfor-
mance measurement to strategy using a multidimensional set of financial and
non financial performance metrics. The term “balanced scorecard” refers to
the frameworks first described by Kaplan and Norton in 1992 [129] and in 1993
[130] and further expanded in The Balanced Scorecard (1996) [131] and The
Strategy-Focused Organization (2001) [132]. In practice, many managers use
the term ”balanced scorecard” to refer to any set of financial and non financial
measures that link performance indicators to corporate objectives. The four per-
spectives in the balanced scorecard in Figure 2.3 represent four key components
of creating and sustaining corporate value.
Figure 2.3: Adapted from ”The Balanced Scorecard”, Kaplan and Norton,
HBS Press, 1996
In addition to the balance achieved by including both financial and non
financial performance indicators, the balanced scorecard helps managers to im-
prove corporate decision making and accountability by including both leading
and lagging measures of performance [63].
2.5.3 Problem Formulation
A performance measurement system is a tool for implementing strategic plan-
ning and achieving continuous improvement at all levels of an organization: the
balanced scorecard is an integral part of business planning and strategy.
The state of practice related to transportation performance measurements is
developing rapidly in the European Community and all over the world. There
is an abundance of material on the subject that describes the theory, offers
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recommendations for performance measurement programs, and documents ex-
periences of agencies building and implementing their own programs. Interest
is growing in enhancing management processes by including performance mea-
surements as a core component.
When developing performance measurement programs, the literature empha-
sizes that outcome measures should be included, where these relate the activities
an agency undertakes to its strategic goals. Data constraints must be considered
and performance measurements should be implemented only when it is feasible
to collect the data necessary to generate them.
The number of measures included should also be limited to those that are
really important to an agency. This will simplify data collection and reporting
and increase the likelihood the measures will be understood by the public sector,
the private operator and the users.
In road authorities around the world, common performance measurements
include:
• system condition and preservation
• safety
• accessibility and
• traffic conditions-mobility.
In many cases a user satisfaction index is reported which may be estimated
from customer surveys. Protection of environment and sustainability are also
cited as an important goal for most transportation agencies, public or private,
around the world, and there is a common desire to be able to measure perfor-
mance in this regard. A balanced scorecard identifies performance improvement
opportunities/targets and highlights the need for business redesign or enterprise
processes. Now, we will begin to develop the application of the balanced score-
card approach to a company from the motorway sector. In order to do this,
the first step of our framework is to propose our vision in Figure 2.4 for S.p.A.
Autovie Venete (AV): Corporate Social Responsibility is a way of doing business
which goes beyond mere financial results.
In the North-East of Italy, Autovie Venete was established in 1928 in Trieste
to design and build the highway from Trieste to Fiume (Rjeka -HR) and in 1965
it started the design and realization of the Trieste-Udine-Venezia Motorway, in
operation since 1966. Now, the concessionaire manages about 200 Kilometers of
motorways near the border with Slovenia and Austria [A4 (Venice-Triest), A23
(Triest-Udin), A28 (Portogruaro-Pordenone-Conegliano)].
Due to the changes in the countries near Italy (Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary,
etc.), since the middle of 90’s the traffic has increased with an unusual trend
and the motorway, designed and realized for a different level of service, has
become less comfortable and safer for users. The concessionaire has planned
to invest a large amount of money in the network upgrade in the near future
from two to three lanes in the stretch from Venice to Villesse. The construction
phases will predictably induce the risk of traffic congestion: then the realization
of Intelligent Highways and Intelligent Transport Systems become necessary to
support the management in making decisions on traffic control, especially during
emergencies and unusual conditions.
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According to Vogelsang [232], AV has to state its own commitment to sus-
tainable development through environmental protection, social responsibility
and economic progress.
Consequently, AV should define a strategy to achieve these goals and to cre-
ate a future that engages stakeholders, leverages core competencies and creates
superior shareholder and societal value [140]. Finally, AV must develop value-
Vision
Mission
Business Planning and Strategy
Goals and 
Objectives
Balanced
Scorecard
Corporate Measurement
and 
Reporting System
Figure 2.4: Adapted from ”The Strategy-Focused Organization”, Kaplan and
Norton, HBS Press, 2001
based codes and Corporate Social Responsibility strategies and link them to its
own mission, vision and values.
2.5.4 Solution approach
The mission of AV is to provide, ensuring safety and mobility, a primary
service which is by nature deeply connected to its impact on society and the
environment in which it operates. These factors will put the issues of social
and environmental responsibility at the top of Group companies’ agendas, which
combine public service provision with the goals of creating value and meeting
all stakeholders’ requirements [174]. Moreover, the quality of the company’s
strategy and management and its performance in dealing with opportunities
and risks deriving from economic, environmental and social developments can
be quantified and used to identify and select leading companies for investment
purposes [34]. Consequently, in AV Corporate Sustainability must be an in-
vestable concept and its performance shall be crucial in driving interest and
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investments in sustainability to the mutual benefit of investors [149].
Then, the Concessionaire needs to begin to invest in improving behavior
models according to commitments derived from signing up to the United Nations
Global Compact projects, which aim to promote corporate social responsibility
with the ultimate goal of building a more sustainable and non-discriminatory
global economy [124]. The new mission shall be to meet the infrastructure
needs for the mobility of people, goods, materials and information: it is nec-
essary to work vigorously to integrate different historic businesses into a new
corporate culture including the Strategic Plan for Corporate Social Responsi-
bility. According to Marrewijk [164], this plan in particular must contemplate:
• minimizing environmental impact;
• guaranteeing transparency with the investment community;
• ensuring the motivation of human resources (H.R.);
• ensuring the involvement of H.R. in the continuous improvement of the
Company;
• maintaining a close relationship with customers;
• guaranteeing customer satisfaction.
There is an opportunity for a new approach named ”Sustainable Value Added
- Measuring Corporate Contributions to Sustainability beyond Eco-Efficiency”
[93]. With it, it is possible to measure corporate contributions to sustainability
called Sustainable Value Added. Value is created whenever benefits exceed
costs.
Current approaches to measure corporate sustainable performance take into
account external costs caused by environmental and social damage or focus
on the ratio between value creation and resource consumption. Environmental
goals are drivers for long-term growth in profitability as they reduce releases
to the environment and rate of waste generation, and improve energy efficiency
per unit of production [162].
The concept of strong sustainability requires that each form of capital is
kept constant. As Sustainable Value Added is inspired by strong sustainability,
it measures whether a company creates extra value while ensuring that every
environmental and social impact is in total constant.
Therefore, it takes into account corporate eco- and social efficiency as well as
the absolute level of environmental and social resource consumption (eco- and
social effectiveness). As a result, Sustainable Value Added considers simultane-
ously economic, environmental and social aspects.
The overall result can be expressed in any of the three dimensions of sustain-
ability. But a Sustainable Organization of this kind is also in reality a Learning
Organization [196], as described in the following model in Figure 2.5. In addi-
tion, we propose that AV has to integrate Sustainability into the Core Elements
of Business just using a balanced scorecard. Leading indicators are generally
thought of as input or process indicators that link more closely to operations,
while lagging indicators relate more to outcomes achieved through the manage-
ment of leading indicators. However, leading and lagging indicators should be
thought of as a continuum, or as a part of a complex flow of causes and effects.
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Figure 2.5: Model for Sustainable Organization
For example, a facility’s toxic emissions are a lagging measure of process ef-
ficiency, and also a leading indicator of environmental costs. Employee turnover
is a lagging measure of employee benefit expenditures, but a leading measure of
recruitment and training costs.
To more effectively determine performance measures, managers must under-
stand the causal links between actions that create organizational capabilities
and the impact of those actions on operational performance, customer value,
sustainability performance, and financial performance. The four perspectives
of the balanced scorecard connect, through chains of cause and effect, learning
and growth actions impact, internal business process outcomes, internal business
process actions impact, and both customer and financial outcomes.
According to Epstein [73], developing social and environmental balanced
scorecard measures helps environmental health and safety (EH&S) managers
identify the key performance factors that link their department work to the
company’s strategic objectives and leading companies recognize the critical im-
portance of systematically and pro actively managing corporate, social and en-
vironmental impacts.
There is no rule for the right number of measures to include in a balanced
scorecard, although including too many of them tends to distract from the
pursuit of pursuing a focused strategy. Generally, a complete balanced scorecard
contains three to six measures in each perspective. A rich set of potential
measures reflects the complexity of business today.
The measurement mix should be a combination of leading/lagging, finan-
cial/no financial, external/internal, strategic/tactical, process/product, peo-
ple/technology, and input/output measures. Measures chosen for the scorecard
should be:
• quantifiable, in either absolute or percentage terms;
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• complete;
• controllable.
“Complete” in the sense that the measure sums up in one number the contribu-
tion of all elements of performance that matter; for example, profitability is a
summary measure of revenue generation and cost control. “Controllable” in the
sense that employees in the organization can actually influence improvement in
the measured factor.
Finally, for the motorway concessionaire we propose the following Aim and
Objectives and the customized balanced scorecard in Table 2.2 and 2.3.
Aims: Safe Motorways, Reliable Journeys, Informed Travellers, putting cus-
tomers first, working together in dynamic teams and partnerships, encourag-
ing learning, innovation and flexibility, delivering effective services that provide
value for money, building trust by acting with honesty and fairness.
Objectives: to deliver a high quality service to all customers by improving
road safety, making journeys more reliable through better network management
and information, respecting the environment, to ensure more effective delivery
through better working relationships, to implement best practice and innovative
solutions to improve service now and in the future, to be an efficient firm with
effective business processes and resource management systems.
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Table 2.2: Balanced Scorecard proposed for a motorway concessionaire
Financial and Customer perspectives
( in italic the motorway specific factors)
FINANCIAL CUSTOMER
Environmental Social Environmental Social
• environmental saved
• fines/penalties
• EH&S cost (% of
sales)
• % proactive vs. re-
active expenditure
• increase in relative
% of proactive ex-
penditures
• % environmental costs
direct -traced
• capital investments
• energy costs
• disposal costs
• recycling revenues
• revenues from ”green”
products
• operating expendi-
tures
• education in cost of
debit
• cost avoidance from en-
vironmental actions
• reduce costs in terms
of life and money of
the consequences of ac-
cidents
• philanthropic con-
tributed
• workers compensa-
tion costs
• employee lawsuits
• employee benefits
• legal actions/costs
• training budgets
• reduction in hiring
costs
• revenue from
socially positioned
products
• increased sales from
improved reputation
• reduce costs in terms of
life of the consequences
of accidents
• cause-related
marketing
• green products
• product safety
• % recalls
• customer returns
• unfavourable press
coverage
• % products re-
claimed after
use
• % stakeholder com-
munications
• product life
• functional product eco-
efficiency
• customer perceptions
• % of cause-related
events supported
(cancer, Aids)
• community support
(parks, safety,
recreation, etc.)
• % community meet-
ings
• customer satisfaction
• social report
requests
• % product recalls
• customer group de-
mographics
• understand more in
depth the needs of the
users
• respond to the needs
with adequate services
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Table 2.3: Balanced Scorecard proposed for a motorway concessionaire
Internal and Learning perspectives
(in italic the motorway specific factors)
INTERNAL BUSINESS PROCESSES LEARNING and GROWTH
Environmental Social Environmental Social
• % LCAs performed
• % material recycled
• % waste to landfill
• % certified suppliers
• % accidents spills
• % audits /year
• % truck miles
• % office supplies re-
cycled
• internal audit scores
• energy consumption
• % facilities certified
• % of product reman-
ufactured
• packaging volume
• non product output
• % supplier audits /
year
• fresh water consump-
tion
• greenhouse gas emis-
sions
• air emissions
• water emissions
• vehicle fuel use
• habitat changes due to
operations
• % employee accidents
• % lost workdays
• % days work stop-
pages
• hours overtime work
• average work week
hours
• warranty claims
• minority business
purchases
• % plant tours / vis-
itors
• % non-employee acci-
dents
• certifications
• % suppliers certified
• % supplier viola-
tions
• environmental quality
of facilities
• observance of interna-
tional labour standards
• % safety improvements
projects
• % solutions to avoid
crashes and accident
• % solutions for a better
and safer mobility
• % of employees
trained
• training programs /
hours
• reputations per sur-
veys
• inclusion in ”green”
funds
• employee com-
plaints
• community
complaints
• shareholder
complaints
• unfavourable press
coverage
• violations reported
by employees
• % of employees with
incentives linked to
environmental goals
• % of functions with
environmental respon-
sibilities
• Management attention
to environmental issues
• % of employees us-
ing car pools
• workforce diversity
(age, gender, race)
• management diver-
sity
• % internal promo-
tions
• employee volunteer
hours
• average length of
employment
• % involuntary dis-
charges
• employee education
• % family leave days
• employee benefits
• salary gaps between
genders / races
• employee satisfac-
tion
• ”quality of life”
programs
• % of employees own-
ing company stock
• % applicants / job
openings
• employees with dis-
abilities
• employee grievances
• workforce equity
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2.5.5 Quality factors of the Italian Motorway System
In subsection 2.4.5 we presented that the tariffs of the Italian Concession mo-
torway system are governed by the so called price-cap principle. In practice,
until 2006 the system was based on the following formula:
∆T ≤ ∆P −X + β ·∆Q (2.7)
where:
∆T is the weighted average change;
∆P is the planned rate of inflation;
X is the expected productivity rate;
β∆Q is the element of the tariff change
that depends on the quality of the service;
β is a positive or null coefficient and
∆Q is the percentage change of the quality indicator Q.
In January 2007 the Italian Government adopted a change by introducing a new
tariff formula defined as follows:
∆T = ∆P −X +K (+Y ) (2.8)
where:
∆T is the annual percentage change of the tariff;
∆P is the planned rate of inflation;
X and K are two new parameters that take into account the return on
invested capital as well as operating and infrastructure
building costs vis--vis investments;
Y is is a quality factor.
It must be underlined that this change may be traced to the scope of a wider
change of the entire regulatory framework governing the concession contracts
that has been unilaterally changed by the Italian government. This change
entails unsustainable costs for Concessionaires and this, in turn, has lead to a
claim against the Italian State and a regulatory uncertainty which currently
affects the entire Italian toll motorway system.
2.5.6 Re-modulation of the tariff adjustment formula
Among the proposals submitted submit by Italian concessionaires to the Min-
istry for Infrastructure and Transport and A.N.A.S. (the granting body of Italian
tolled motorways) there is as an alternative to the legislative intervention which
is today being disputed. This alternative could be a re-modulation of the tariff
system aimed at correcting certain quality parameters as well as the introduc-
tion of a specific penalty system, both useful to optimise the infrastructure’s
operation. According to [202], the proposal provided for:
• the introduction of a new quality parameter It relating to the efficiency
of toll stations through the introduction of a new addend β1∆Q1;
32
• the setting up of a penalty system related to minimum technical standards
and relative procedures required to guarantee an adequate degree of mo-
torway efficiency. The penalty system, which would be external to the
tariff formula, is structured in such a way as to enable amounts collected
from penalties/tickets to lead to reduced annual tariff increases.
In this way tariffs would be adjusted according to the following formulas:
∆T ≤ ∆P −X + β ·∆Q+ β1∆Q1 (2.9)
or, after the new formula introduced in 2007, and assuming the existing β ·∆Q,
∆T ≤ ∆P −X +K + β ·∆Q+ β1 ·∆Q1 (2.10)
and
∆Teff = ∆T −∆T ∗ (2.11)
where ∆T is the tariff increase to be adopted in the year in the absence of
a penalty system. The actual tariff increase ∆Teff to be imposed on users,
under the new penalty system, is given by deducting the tariff decrease due to
penalties ∆T ∗ from ∆T .
Both the tariff re-modulation as well as the introduction of the penalty sys-
tem are aimed at directly tying the work of the motorway operator to observance
of defined quality standards as described by the new quality factors.
In practice a virtuous mechanism is triggered, where the operator’s aim
of generating a profit coincides with the user’s right to always have the best
quality of infrastructure available: in fact, the operator’s greatest tariff returns
are directly related to effective observance of quality standards and efficiency.
2.5.7 Service quality
What we are proposing is the introduction of a quality indicator capable of
measuring the smoothness/fluidity of toll collection operations at toll stations.
We consider the greatest amount of time that is lost by users occurs at toll
gates that do not have a telematic toll payment system (i.e, Telepass). Overall
increased efficiency at toll stations may be achieved by reducing user build-up at
non-Telepass gates in favour of Telepass gates. This is a form of tool-collection
that has much higher service performance levels - approx. 1,600 transits/h on
the one hand and increasing the hours of operation of non-Telepass gates on the
other hand.
2.5.8 The Q1 quality indicator and the β1 coefficient
The index Q1 is proposed as a measurement of the smoothness of toll station
operations. It is calculated on the basis of aggregated data such as:
• annual exit transits from toll stations belonging to the network operated
under concession broken down by type of payment;
• the number and type of exit lanes;
• the number of hours of operation of non-Telepass dedicated exit lanes,
excluding night time (22.00-6.00), for the 12 months being examined (from
July to June of the following year).
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Through an understanding of this data, a historical series of dedicated non-
Telepass exit lanes (i.e. manual lanes manned by a toll collector) may be as-
sembled in an aggregate form for each concessionaire. In order to determine
the smoothness/fluidity index of toll stations Q1 we first calculate the aver-
age hourly flow per non-Telepass lane according to the relationship between
the total number of annual transactions with non-Telepass dedicated payment
(TAnoTLP ) and the cumulative number of annual hours of operation of the
non-Telepass dedicated payment lanes (OOOnoTLP ):
Is = FMOnoTLP =
TAnoTLP
OOPnoTLP
(2.12)
We then define the maximum hourly capacity of non Telepass dedicated payment
lanes CMOnoTLP :
CMOnoTLP = 350transits/h (2.13)
We then calculate the index of smoothness/fluidity of toll stations Q1 through
the following equation:
Q1 = 100 ·
(
1− FMOnoTLP
CMOnoTLP
)
(2.14)
The value of the proposed β1 coefficient is calculated on the basis of the value
Q1 as described below:
Figure 2.6: Model for determining coefficient β1
• the first element, ∆T ∗1 , is related to the penalties that are imposed once
non-respect of a predefined standard has been notified and not been recti-
fied, as well as any blocks related to adverse weather ( for example snow);
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• the second element, ∆T ∗2 , is related to the number of signals of non-respect
of predefined standards that are observed per motorway stretch at the end
of each year by each individual concessionaire company.
In order to determine the annual change ∆Q1 the following equation has been
proposed:
∆Q1 =
Qi − Q¯i−1
Q¯i−1
(2.15)
where Q¯i−1 is the average of the Q1 quality indicators over the last three years.
In the absence of the necessary historical series and in order to immediately
start an experimental application of the formula, data from the year that has
just ended shall be compared with that of the previous year during the initial
transitional phase; this shall be done until the aforesaid three year historical
series is built.
2.5.9 A penalty system and the Annual Monitoring Pro-
gramme
2.5.9.1 A penalty system
The proposal entails the introduction of a penalty system, connected to cer-
tain technical standards of reference that are useful to optimise the motorway’s
degree of efficiency. This penalty system is separate from the tariff formula,
and may be able to transform amounts that are collected for penalties into a
non-increase of tariffs. In this way, the penalty system attached to the tariff
increases would turn amounts that are collected from penalties directly into a
benefit for motorway users, without passing through the Grantor.
The total amount of penalties is transformed into a tariff rate ∆T ∗ on the
basis of vehicles ∗ tolledkm during the same period. This rate is deducted
from the tariff adjustment ∆T so as to obtain the actual increase ∆Teff to be
imposed on users during the year of reference:
∆Teff = ∆T −∆T ∗ (2.16)
The tariff reduction ∆T ∗ only holds for the reference year and is not added to
that of the following years. Accordingly, once the year that is subject to the
reduction has ended, the tariff that is applied shall no longer take into account
the reduction that was made, and therefore the tariff change to be applied shall
be calculated against the full tariff ∆T (without the reduction) matured during
the previous year.
The penalty system requires an initial three year test period in order to assess
the actual consequences of its adoption. In this regard, in order to guarantee
consistency with the financial planning of concessionaire companies, a maximum
cap to the tariff reduction is set at ∆T ∗max and equal to 0.5% of the unitary tariff
for the first three years of application of this penalty system. Effective with the
third year of adoption, the results of the test period shall be assessed. If the
average penalties imposed shall have exceeded eighty percent of the plafond
(average penalty in the three years > 0.4% of the tariff) this plafond shall be
increased to 0.8%.
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The value of the tariff decrease ∆T ∗ is calculated as the sum of two elements:
The value of the proposed β1 coefficient is calculated on the basis of the value
Q1 as described below:
• the first element, ∆T ∗1 , is related to the penalties that are imposed once
non-respect of a predefined standard has been notified and not been recti-
fied, as well as any blocks related to adverse weather ( for example snow);
• the second element, ∆T ∗2 , is related to the number of signals of non-respect
of predefined standards that are observed per motorway stretch at the end
of each year by each individual concessionaire company.
We therefore have:
∆T ∗ = ∆T ∗1 + ∆T
∗
2 ≤ ∆T ∗max (2.17)
2.5.9.2 The Annual Monitoring Programme
Controls relating to respect/alignment with reference standards must be carried
out according to procedures described in a Annual Monitoring Programme. This
Programme must be prepared by the Grantor in agreement with concessionaire
companies and shall concern motorway stretches not affected by works. All
notices shall be sent to the concessionaire company which shall be invited to take
part in the assessment. The Annual Monitoring Programme shall be updated
on an annual basis and shall include:
1. a list of those elements that are subject to the assessment, with an explicit
definition of:
• the field/scope of application;
• the parameters to be measured;
• the standard of reference (benchmark);
2. an indication of the motorway’s network breakdown into stretches for each
concessionaire company. Each stretch shall have to be no longer than 80
km. Every notice of non-alignment shall need to refer to a specific stretch
of the motorway network;
3. an indication of the Grantor’s staff that is authorised to carry out the
checks as well as an indication of the Concessionaire company’s staff au-
thorised to take part in the checks;
4. the number of planned annual checks shall be the same for each conces-
sionaire company. The minimum number of annual checks is set at 4
checks/year. The Grantor shall have the right to increase the number of
checks. In consideration of the possible widening of the motorway network,
checks may be carried out over a number of days.
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2.6 Balanced Scorecard, Deming Cycle and Cus-
tomer Satisfaction
One key goal of all businesses is to achieve a continuous and high level of cus-
tomer satisfaction in the delivery of services and/or products. Such satisfaction
is believed to be the basis of long term profitability and business growth.
In the sphere of motorway-based system services, customer satisfaction is
dependent on how system development projects evolve to build operational
product systems and services that satisfy the perceived and actual customer
need and associated system and service requirements. Ultimately, successful
customer satisfaction depends upon the depth of “through-life” understanding
about the business needs and associated user requirements for a future system,
and the ability to communicate those requirements to the system developer. In
addition, customer satisfaction and confidence depends upon the level of system
assurance offered throughout the system development lifecycle. Requirements
problems without understanding inevitably lead to poor customer-supplier re-
lationships, unnecessary re-works, and overruns in cost and/or time so that the
excellent construction of a motorway (or any other relevant project) is not suffi-
cient on its own for achieving a successful operation and the public recognition.
The provision of high level services is a necessity and these services are capable
of highlighting the advantages of the project and justifying the benefits arising
from the payment of toll by the users.
As a consequence, Customer Satisfaction is the “key” factor for the success
operation of a modern tollway and the management of a motorway must develop
a complete methodology for achieving continuous improvement of the services
provided to the users.
Customer satisfaction is dependent upon many factors that are associated
with the business need, the development project and resultant system product
quality. Ultimately the customer is looking for added value to benefit the busi-
ness operations within a defined time frame but at an affordable price; hence
the customer priority is for an overall successful business.
The system supplier perspective is to deliver a system within the agreed cost
plans to satisfy the customer requirements, thus contributing to the supplier’s
profit and reputation; hence the supplier’s priority is for a successful project.
These different perspectives are typically controlled through inflexible and for-
mal contract management arrangements in the pursuit of a successful project
for both customer and supplier.
The cornerstone of such “success” involves an appropriately rigorous and
long-term approach to “quality” by customers and suppliers. A Model of Cus-
tomer Satisfaction and its Components is presented in Figure 2.7. To develop
a new methodology we can start from the cycle of W. Edwards Deming which
proposed that business processes should be analyzed and measured to identify
sources of variations that cause products to deviate from customer requirements.
He also recommended that business processes be placed in a continuous feed-
back loop so that managers can identify and change the parts of the process that
need improvements. The diagrams in the Figure 2.8 illustrates this continuous
process, commonly known as the PDCA cycle for Plan, Do, Check, Act and the
Continuous Learning Spiral.
PLAN : design or revise business process components to improve results.
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Figure 2.7: Model of Customer Satisfaction and its Components
DO : implement the plan and measure its performance.
CHECK: assess the measurements and report the results to decision mak-
ers.
ACT : decide on changes needed to improve the process.
Deming’s focus was on industrial production processes, and the level of improve-
ments he sought were on the level of production. In the modern post-industrial
company, these kinds of improvements are still needed but the real performance
drivers often occur on the level of business strategy. Strategic deployment is an-
other process, but it has relatively longer-term variations because large compa-
nies cannot change as rapidly as small business units. Still, strategic initiatives
can and should be placed in a feedback loop, complete with measurements and
planning linked in a PDCA cycle.
According to [171], the new methodology that we want to develop can be
called “Continuous Learning Spiral” and it must be supported by both a bal-
anced scorecard and a range of advanced and complete adjusted tools to the
characteristics of the project. These tools are instruments for analysing data
and market research, but also evaluation models of the economic impacts by the
provision of new or existing services to the users of the motorways.
The main stages of this methodology could be:
1 - the recognition of the motorways users, their main trip charac-
teristics and their socio-economic needs;
2 - the planning of new services covering the fundamental users
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Figure 2.8: Graphical representation of the Deming Cycle and Continuous
Learning Spiral
needs or adjusting the existing services according to the newly
developed conditions;
3 - the provision and the support of these services to be known to
the users and their recognition by the users and
4 - the evaluation of the perceived benefit of these services by the
users.
As it is outlined in the caption of Figure 2.8, the procedure is continuous and
this is the main element of the success of this approach. The stages are known
internationally, but it may be the first time that they have been used in com-
bination and completed for the planning and the evaluation of the provided
services by a modern sustainable motorway [110]. In the following paragraphs,
a short description of the main principles for each stage and all the supporting
tolls are presented.
In the following subsection we present an analysis of the stages of the method-
ology.
2.6.1 Know your Customers and Learn from them
The aim of this task is to record and subsequently to analyse the main demo-
graphic and socio-economic characteristics, which are dominant at a specific
time period and influence directly the trip generation of the potential motorway
Tollway users. The continuous recording and analysis of the trips generated
in a motorway can lead to the definition of the special characteristics of these
trips and allows the creation of a user group with similar needs and behaviours.
Various different categories can be used today by a motorway management com-
bined with in depth analysis of the user needs for each category, contributing
significantly to the development of adjusted services for achieving the satisfac-
tion of these needs and ensuring the substantial acceptance by the users. The
main supporting tools of this procedure are Road Side and Telephone Surveys,
which have as targets the following:
• to define Users Profile and Users Groups;
• to know the Trip Purpose and Frequency of Use;
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1. Know  your Customers
& Learn from them
Define their needs
2. Design/Adjust 
Products & Services
3. Launch and Support 
Products & Services
4. Evaluate 
Products & Services 
Figure 2.9: Graphical representation of the approach
• to know the Common routes and Value of Time;
• to identify the Professional and Income Status;
• to obtain User’s Feedback for the Tollway;
• to measure the Level of Understanding for Products and Services.
Equally significant is the recording and analysis of the requests and suggestions
made by the motorway’s users, who point out possible small defaults of the pro-
vided services, significant improvements, and proposals for new useful services.
For this reason, the company must develop a consistent and automated manage-
ment system for user comments and complaints which constitutes a significant
source of information for planning the new services.
2.6.2 Design/Adjust products and Services
For any new service planned or for any existing service modified it is crucial to
examine its influence on the existing services and on the overall performance of
the company. For this reason, high attention must be to the analytical recording
of attributes of these services, and to the recognition of the relationships and
interfaces (direct and indirect) of each of these characteristics with other services
provided by the motorway or to the overall performance of the company. In
this perspective several different scenarios of implementation are developed.
These scenarios, with the support of complete models, are examined in terms of
feasibility and effectiveness. In this manner, identifying the real consequences
of each change or new service is possible and the justification of the decision
pursued by the company is also available.
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2.6.3 Launch and Support Products and Services
The success of a new service or the adjustment of an existing service mainly
depends on the manner in which it is provided to the users of the motorway. It
also depends on the efficiency of the support provided to each stage of provision
of this service.
It can be mentioned that the successful operation of a new subscription
scheme substantially depends on the completeness and the level of the informa-
tion given to the users of the motorway regardless of whether they are already
subscribers or not. This information is developed with data that arises from
the analysis of the trips characteristics (stage 1 of the methodology) and it is
focused on groups of users who are potential users of the specific subscription
scheme.
Hence, the informative documents for this subscription scheme are distributed
on determinate days and hours and from specific toll plazas which are used by
those users. Specific research and measures are carried out during each cam-
paign and afterwards of its completeness in order to evaluate its effectiveness.
These measures provide significant remarks. These remarks are used for both
the adjustment of the current campaigns and the planning of new ones.
Except for the subscription schemes, the subject of the campaigns must be
all services provided by the motorway as well as issues directly or indirectly
connected to its operation such as: Traffic Safety, Beautification, Signage and
Guidance along the motorway, Tunnel Operation, etc. The support provided to
the users that intend to use a new service contributes to the success of the new
service.
An essential function is provided by Customer Support Centers and an excel-
lent organized Call Center, which pays special attention to providing complete
support to the users for each service provided to them. In this case the users’ re-
quests for support are recorded thanks to CRM software and they are regularly
analyzed to indicate useful remarks for the future campaigns of the company.
2.6.4 Evaluate Product and Services
It is necessary to implement a complete evaluation of each service or product
that is provided to the users of motorway. The results of this evaluation are
compared with the expected results provided from models that were being used
in stage 3 of the present methodology. The data necessary for this evaluation
are collected and evaluated. This is a substantial monthly task that is carried
out by the company and its external partners. A company using new techniques
such as “data mining” and integrated systems “reporting” can carry out several
processing such as:
• the evaluation of the operation of each provided service in comparison
with the observed use from the users;
• the recording and the evaluation of the effects of each service on the total
company’s revenues and on the traffic volumes along the motorway to
know the Trip Purpose and Frequency of Use;
• the determination of the interaction among the provided services;
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• the definition of parts of the provided services that need to be improved
to identify the Professional and Income Status;
Except from the evaluation of the data provided by the operation of the motor-
way, a substantial information reference for the acceptance and the perceived
use of the services by the users are the Road Side Surveys and the regular tele-
phone surveys to users. These surveys record the users’ level of satisfaction,
their perceived benefit from each provided service and essential proposals for
improvement of these services is recorded.
2.7 Conclusions
This part of the thesis describes the problem and proposes a solution to perform
the objective of a Sustainable Value Added in a Strategic Plan for Corporate
Social Responsibility in the sector of Build-Operate-Transfer, road operators
and motorway concessionaires in particular.
The European Union objective of reducing by half injuries and casualties on
the Trans-European road network (TERN) is a real challenge for the different
member states and road operators.
The continuous increase of traffic urges the development of systems that
improve road safety and network fluidity and optimize the use of infrastruc-
tures in time and space. In that context, ICT for Cooperative Systems promise
to substantially increase road quality, safety and efficiency, and to reduce the
environmental impact of road transport.
Ethics are not a substitute for a fundamentally sound business strategy,
and so it is important to provide value-added tools for companies to help them
manage all aspects of sustainable and socially responsible business practices as
in the road and motorway sector.
In order to perform the objective of a Sustainable Value Added in a Strate-
gic Plan for Corporate Social Responsibility, it is very important to define the
roles of technological progress, resource substitution, alternate capital valua-
tion, better provision and pricing mechanisms of public goods in enhancing the
productivity of existing assets.
It is also essential to discover the key features and principles of sustainable
development by examining emerging needs, available capitals, and productivity
capacities of each environment.
Business has a responsibility, beyond its basic responsibility to its sharehold-
ers, to a broader constituency that includes its key stakeholders: customers,
employees, government and the people of the communities in which it operates.
Organizational ethics, values and Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives
are becoming increasingly important value drivers in corporations and have
implications right across the organization in area such as transportation.
The state of practice related to transportation performance measurements is
developing rapidly in the European Community and all over the world. There
is an abundance of material on the subject that describes the theory, offers
recommendations for performance measurement programs, and documents ex-
periences of agencies building and implementing their own programs. Interest
is growing in enhancing management processes by including performance mea-
surements as a core component.
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When developing performance measurement programs, the literature empha-
sizes that outcome measures should be included, where these relate the activities
an agency undertakes to its strategic goals.
Data constraints must be considered and performance measurements should
be implemented only when it is feasible to collect the data necessary to generate
them.
The number of measures included should also be limited to those that are
really important to an agency.
This will simplify data collection and reporting and increase the likelihood
the measures will be understood by the public sector, the private operator and
the users.
In road authorities around the world, common performance measurements
include:
• system condition and preservation;
• safety;
• accessibility and
• traffic conditions-mobility.
In many cases a user satisfaction index is reported which may be estimated from
customer surveys. Protection of environment and sustainability are also cited
as an important goal for most transportation agencies, public or private, around
the world, and there is a common desire to be able to measure performance in
this regard.
The Balanced Scorecard model can really to be useful to estimate corporate
efficiency and to evaluate environmental and social performance in a motorway
company.
It is so possible to improve Financial Benefits, to reduce Operating Costs,
to enhance Brand Image & Reputation, increased Sales & Customer Loyalty, to
increase Ability to Attract and Retain Employees, to reduce Regulatory Super-
vision.
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Chapter 3
Hazardous Material
The scope and format of this chapter cover the following aspects:
• hazard identification;
• risk evaluation (i.e. evaluation of the acceptability of the risk) and risk
reduction;
• quantified risk assessment (QRA);
• risk management (concerning the measures in place to eliminate, prevent,
detect, control and mitigate major fire and explosion hazards, and their
associated performance standards); and
• emergency arrangements.
In order to the scope, we introduce some important concepts about Hazardous
Materials: in section 3.1 the definition and the classification of HAZMAT are
given. Section 3.2 presents product, process, risk perception concepts. In section
3.3 we present hazard, risk, safety and accepted risk concepts. Section 3.4
describes the steps of risk analysis in detail.
3.1 HAZMAT Classification
HAZMAT category consists of dangerous goods and hazardous substances. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows this composition.
HAZMAT are divided into classes on the basis of the specific chemical character-
istics producing the risk. According to the US Department of Transportation,
a hazardous material is any substance or material capable of causing harm to
people, property, and the environment [192].
There are nine major hazardous material classes:
Class 1 - Explosives (dynamite, caps)
2 - Gases (propane, anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, oxygen)
3 - Flammable Liquids (gasoline, oil, tars, diesel, kerosene)
4 - Flammable Solids (plastics, asphalt shingles)
5 - Oxidizing Substances (peroxides)
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Figure 3.1: HAZMAT composition
6 - Poisonous and infectious substances (herbicides, pesticide)
7 - Radioactive materials
8 - Corrosives (acids)
9 - Miscellaneous (PCB’s, dangerous wastes)
As described above dangerous goods may be radioactive, flammable, explosive,
toxic, corrosive, biohazardous, an oxidizer, an asphyxiant, a pathogen, an al-
lergen, or may have other characteristics that render it hazardous in specific
circumstances.
Most countries regulate hazardous materials by law, and they are subject to
several international treaties as well. Persons who handle dangerous goods will
often wear protective equipment, and metropolitan fire departments often have
a response team specifically trained to deal with accidents and spills. These
teams train with different organizations at a variety of specialized locations.
In Italy, the “Nuclei NBCR (Nucleare, Batteriologico, Chimico e Radioat-
tivo)” of “Corpo Nazionale dei Vigili del Fuoco” has a specialized Training
Institute oriented to deal with accidents and spills. the “Nuclei NBCR” has
the most important emergency site in Mestre (Venice), near the A4 motorway
(Trieste-Venezia).
Persons who handle or potentially come into contact with dangerous goods
as part of their work are also often subject to monitoring or health surveillance
to ensure that their exposure does not exceed occupational exposure limits.
Laws and regulations on the use and handling of hazardous materials may
differ depending on the activity and status of the material. For example one
set of requirements may apply to their use in the workplace while a different
requirements may apply to spill response, sale for consumer use, or transporta-
tion.
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3.1.1 HAZMAT Placard
As hazardous materials can come in various forms, ranging from radioactive
to explosive, it is important to be aware of what you are transporting when
operating a courier service or heavy good vehicle.
Title 49 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR) also
known as the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Regulations (FMCSR) [90] requires
the use hazardous materials placards when shipping hazardous materials cargo
and dangerous goods in the United States.
EU, Canada, Mexico and many other countries have similar regulations that
also require the use of these placards that bear a UN/NA number on railway
cars, trucks, shipping containers etc.
Mitigating the risks associated with hazardous materials may require the ap-
plication of safety precautions during their transport, use, storage and disposal.
HAZMAT placards are essential when works involving hazardous materi-
als are taking place. Equally, HAZMAT placards are vital when transporting
hazardous materials.
If you do not make it directly apparent that you are working with, or are
transporting, hazardous materials, you may not only be liable to personal lit-
igation, but you may also be found criminally negligent and face a stretch in
jail.
Each country has its own particular legislation and standards for HAZMAT
placards, and so it is important to be aware of those which affect you when
dealing with hazardous materials.
3.2 Product and Process
Human existence involves exposure to many hazards. Natural disasters such
as floods and earthquakes cost thousands of lives every year all over the world.
Since the industrial revolution also technical hazards, such as airplane crashes,
train derailments, tunnel fires and industrial accidents disrupt society on a reg-
ular basis.
Long ago people tried to guard themselves from natural hazards with rela-
tively simple methods, for example by building their houses on high grounds to
protect them against floods.
As society changed protection systems were built, such as dams and dikes.
Later new technological inventions, for instance nuclear power plants and avia-
tion, and their accompanying hazards were introduced.
Other developments such as population growth and growing levels of pro-
duction, consumption and transportation have lead to an increase of hazards
and the consequences of the accidents.
Nowadays large amounts of money are spent to protect society against these
disasters. However, in decision- and policymaking these expenditures on safety
have to compete with other public interests, for instance public health and the
development of new infrastructure.
Between its discovery and its elimination, every product passes through
many different steps throughout its history: conception, design, feasibility stud-
ies, market studies, manufacturing, distribution, use, and elimination, the ulti-
mate step, where from functional product, it becomes a waste product.
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Figure 3.2: Class 1 Explosives
Figure 3.3: Class 2 Compressed Gasses
Figure 3.4: Class 3 Flammable Liquids
Figure 3.5: Class 4 Flammable Solids and Class 5 Oxidizers
Figure 3.6: Class Class 6 Poisons and Class 7 Radioactive Materials
Figure 3.7: Class 8 Corrosive Liquids and Class 9 Miscellaneous
For example, the chemical industry uses numerous and often complex equip-
ment and processes. Moreover, in the fine chemical industries (including phar-
maceuticals), the plants often have a multi-purpose character, that is, a given
plant may be used for different products [68].
3.2.1 Product Safety
Risks exist linked to handling or using a product during the steps of conception,
design, feasibility studies, market studies, manufacturing, distribution, use, and
elimination [112].
This enters the negative side of the balance between benefits and adverse
effects of the product and, consequently, its sustainability. Even if the public is
essentially concerned with the product risks during its use, risks are also present
during other stages, that is, manufacture, transportation, and storage.
For pharmaceutical products, the major concerns are secondary effects. For
other products, adverse effects are toxicity for people and/or for the environ-
ment, as well as fire and explosion. Whatever its form, once a product is no
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longer functional, it becomes a waste product and thus represents a potential
source of harm.
Therefore, in order to guarantee sustainability, important decision have to be
made during product design in order to maximize the benefits that are expected
from the product and to minimize the negative effects that it may induce. These
decisions are crucial and often taken after a systematic evaluation of the risks.
Commercialization is strictly regulated by law and each new product must
be registered with the appropriate authorities. The aim of the registration is to
ensure that the manufacturer knows of any properties of its product that may
endanger people or the environment and is familiar with the conditions allowing
its safe handling and use, and finally safe disposal at the end of the product’s
life.
Thus products are accompanied by a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)
that summarizes the essential safety information as product identity, properties
(toxicity, eco-toxicity, physical chemical properties), information concerning its
life cycle (use, technology, exposure), specific risks, protection measures, classi-
fication (handling, storage, transportation), and labeling [141].
3.2.2 Process Safety
If, for example, we consider a chemical process, we must do it in an extensive
way, including not only the production itself but also storage and transportation.
This includes not only the product, but also the raw material.
Risks linked with chemical processes are diverse: product risks include tox-
icity, flammability, explosion, corrosion, etc. but also include additional risks
due to chemical reactivity. A process often uses conditions (temperature, pres-
sure) that by themselves may present a risk and may lead to deviations that
can generate critical effects [195].
The plant equipment, including its control equipment, may also fail. Finally,
since fine chemical processes are work-intensive, they may be subject to human
error. All of these elements, that is, chemistry, energy, equipment, and operators
and their interactions, constitute what we call process safety.
3.2.3 Risk Perception
According to European Statistics on Accidents at Work (ESAW) 2001 [83],
about 4.8 million accidents at work resulted in more than 3 days as average of
absence from work in the 15 Member States of the EU at that time .
Every year, about 5500 people are killed in the workplace across the Euro-
pean Union, with another 4.5 million accidents resulting in more than 3 days
absence from work (amounting to around 146 million working days lost). These
accidents are estimated to cost the EU about 20 billion.
The problem affects all sectors of the economy and is particularly acute in
enterprises with less than 50 workers, that is another sustainability problem
[108]. Due to accidents at work, around 5% of people were forced to change
their job or place of work or reduce their working hours. 0.2% stopped working
permanently. Between 1998 and 1999, it is estimated that work-related accidents
cost the EU 150 million working days per year.
A further 350 million days were lost through work-related health problems.
Together, the total bill was 500 million days per year. Accidents and occupa-
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tional diseases can give rise to heavy costs to the company. For small companies
particularly, occupational accidents can have a major financial impact.
Prevention of accidents has more benefits than just reducing damages. Pre-
venting work accidents, occupational injuries and diseases not only reduces the
costs, but also contributes to improving company performance.
Despite some incidents, the chemical industry presents good accident statis-
tics. A statistical survey of work accidents shows that chemistry is positioned
close to the end of the list, classified by order of decreasing lost work days.
For example, we can take into consideration in Figure 3.8 the accidents
at work in different industries in Switzerland, from the statistics of the Swiss
National Accident Insurance (2005). Further, these accidents only constitute a
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ties, industrial activities are perceived as presenting higher risks. This may essen-
tially be due to the risk perception. The difference in perception is that for traveling 
or sporting activities, the person has the choice as to whether to be exposed or not, 
whereas for industrial activities exposure to risk may be imposed. Industrial risks 
may also impinge on people who are not directly concerned with the activity. 
Moreover, the lack of information on these risks biases the perception  [5] . 
 1.2.2 
 Responsibility 
 In industrial countries, employers are responsible for the safety of their employ-
ees. On the other hand, legal texts often force the employees to apply the safety 
rules prepared by employers. In this sense, the responsibility is shared. Environ-
ment protection is also regulated by law. Authorities publish threshold limits for 
Table 1.1  ccidents at work in different industries in Switz rland, 
from the statistics of the Swiss National Accident Insurance (2005). 
 Activity  Work accidents for 1000 insured 
 Construction  185 
 Wood  183 
 Mining  160 
 Metallurgy  147 
 Cement, glass, ceramics  130 
 Food  113 
 Rubber, plastics  95 
 Machinery  72 
 Transport  66 
 Energy  59 
 Textile, clothes  50 
 Ofﬁ ces, administration  46 
 Paper, graphics  45 
 Chemistry  37 
 Electricity, ﬁ ne mechanics  33 
Table 1.2  Some values of the  FAR index for different activities. 
 Industrial activities  FAR  Non industrial activities  FAR 
 Coal mining  7.3  Alpinism  4000 
 Construction  5  Canoe  1000 
 Agriculture  3.7  Motor bike  660 
 Chemistry  1.2  Travel by air  240 
 Vehicle manufacturing  0.6  Travel by car  57 
 Clothing manufacturing  0.05  Travel by railway  5 
Figure 3.8: Accidents at work in different industries in Switzerland, from the
statistics of the Swiss National Accident Insurance (2005).
minor part due to chemical accidents, the greatest part consisting of common
accidents such as falls, cuts, and so on that can happen in any other activity.
Another instructive comparison can be made by comparing fatalities in different
activities.
Here we use the Fatal Accident Rate index (FAR) that gives the number of
fatalities for 108 hours of exposure to the hazard. Some activities are compared
in Figure 3.9. This shows that even with better statistics in terms of fatalities,
industrial activities are perceived as presenting higher risks.
This may essentially be due to the risk perception [218]. The difference in
perception is th t for traveling or sporting activities, the person has the choice
as to wheth r to be ex os d or not, whereas for industrial ac ivities exposure
to i k may be imposed [151]. Industrial risks may also impinge on p ople who
are not directly concerned with the activity. Moreov r, the lack of information
on these risks bias s the perc ption. Under European Union directives, employ-
ers have responsibilities for the safety and health of their workers. Directive
89/391 provides the general framework for health and safety management, risk
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 Clothing manufacturing  0.05  Travel by railway  5 
Figure 3.9: Some values of the FAR index for different activities.
identification and prevention. T e Directive has been implem nted in national
legislation that may include additi nal require ents.
Empl yers are required to assess risks an take practical measures to protect
the safety and health of their workers, k ep accident records, provide information
and training, consult employees and co-operate and co-ordinate measures with
contractors. A hierarchy of prevention is set including:
• Avoid risks;
• Comb t risks at source;
• Adapt work to the worker;
• Replace the d nge ous with the non-dangerous; and,
• Give collective measures priority over individual measures.
Companies should ensure the safety and health of workers in every aspect related
to their work. Therefore, employers should take the necessary measures for the
safety and health protection of workers, including the prevention of occupational
risks and the provision of information and training, and provide the necessary
organization and means.
The Dangerous Goods Safety Management (DGSM) legislation (especially
Part 3 of the Regulation 2001) [214], identifies specific risk control issues as-
sociated with the storage and handling of dangerous goods and combustible
liquids that occupiers must address. If you are the occupier of a premises where
HAZMAT or combustible liquids are present, you must identify the hazards
from those materials and assess the resultant risks to people, property or the
environment. The risk assessment must take into account the likelihood and
magnitude of such injury or damage. Hazard identification and risk assessment
can be simple and straightforward or highly complex.
For example, the storage of only one or two classes of dangerous goods at
retail outlets where handling is limited to placing the goods on shelving for dis-
play is a relatively simple case and the hazard identification and risk assessment
for the activity should be simple. By contrast, a major warehouse or chemical
manufacturing plant handling a large range of HAZMAT and combustible liq-
uids is likely to require detailed investigations of hazards and risks, involving
people who have specialist knowledge of:
• the dangerous goods and combustible liquids;
51
• the processing of those materials; and
• the work practices employed in connection with those materials.
3.3 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Process
According to the European Federation of Chemical Engineering ( EFCE ) [96],
in this section we summarize the definitions of hazard, risk and safety. As the
risk assessment forms the basis for implementing control measures to achieve
an acceptable level of risk, in this section we also provide a step-by-step process
to guide the person or persons carrying out a hazard identification and risk
assessment for HAZMAT. It can be used at any premises where HAZMAT are
stored or handled. The flow diagram in Figure 3.10 provides a helpful summary
of the process.
3.3.1 Hazard
Hazard is a situation that has the potential to cause harm to human, environ-
ment and property. Thus, hazard is the antonym of safety. As an example, for
the chemical industry, the hazard results from the simultaneous presence of the
three following elements.
• A threat stemming from the properties of processed substances, chemical
reactions, uncontrolled energy release, or from equipment.
• A failure that may be of technical origin or stem from human error, either
during the operation or during process design. External events, such as
weather conditions or natural catastrophe may also be at the origin of a
failure.
• An undetected failure in a system as non - identified hazards during risk
analysis, or if insufficient measures are taken, or if an initially well - de-
signed process gradually deviates from its design due to changes or lack
of maintenance.
A hazard identification technique appropriate to the complexity of the installa-
tion, the stage of the installation in its lifecycle and the scale and nature of the
hazards on the installation should be employed, for example [222]:
• Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) [139];
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [23];
• Safety reviews [44];
• Industry standard or bespoke checklists [127];
• Job safety analysis [84]; and
• Human error identification methods [138].
The hazard identification should be based on suitable reference information, for
example:
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Figure 3.10: Hazard identification and risk assessment process
• Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) [6];
• Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) [50];
• Layout plans [122];
• Equipment lists [51];
• Process data sheets [66]; and
• Operating and maintenance philosophy [54].
The hazard identification methods presented above are all based on strongly
systematic procedures [222] used by a risk analysis team. Obviously, the com-
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position of the risk analysis team is of primary importance for the quality of the
work.
Here the professional experience of the participants plays a key role, since
the objective of the analysis is to identify events that have not yet occurred.
The work of the team must be traceable, even by persons who did not
participate to the analysis. Thus, it is necessary to also document the hazards
that were not considered as critical.
In the check list method, the systematic is provided by the check list itself.
With the FMEA, the systematic is provided by the division of the system into
elements and the failure modes considered.
In the HAZOP study, the systematic stems from the division of the plant
into nodes and lines, then the systematic application of the keywords. With the
decision table method, the systematic is inherent to the table. For the FTA and
ETA, the systematic is given by the tree and the logical ports.
Another important method is based on the Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix
that provides a systematic method for assigning a hazard level to a failure event
based on the severity and frequency of the event [59]. An example of this matrix
is presented in Figure 3.11. The hazard level consists of one number and one
Figure 3.11: The Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix
letter. The number represents the severity of the event. The numbers represent:
1 - Death, system loss, or irreversible environmental damage;
2 - Severe injury, occupational illness, major system damage, or
reversible severe environmental damage;
3 - Injury requiring medical attention, illness, system damage, or
mitigatible environmental damage;
4 - Possible minor injury, minor system damage, or minimal envi-
ronmental damage.
The letter of the hazard level represents the Frequency of Occurence. The letters
represent:
A - Expected to occur frequently;
B - Will occur several times in the life of an item;
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C - Likely to occur sometime in the life of an item;
D - Unlikely, but possible to occur in the life of an item;
E - So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experi-
enced.
As can be seen from the Figure 3.11, each hazard level is associated with a risk
category. Risk categories assist risk-management team members in differenti-
ating credible high-hazard threats that may result in loss of life and property
from less probable risks, therefore aiding management in risk vs. cost decisions.
3.3.1.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
In order to illustrate a hazard identification technique, we can take the example
of the FMEA, or Failure Modes and Effects Analysis [23]. FMEA is a system-
atic approach to identify failure modes that could either directly result in, or
contribute significantly to, the identified accident scenario by a multi-discipline
team familiar with the process.
The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is based on the systematic
analysis of failure modes for each element of a system, by defining the failure
mode and the consequences of this failure on the integrity of that system.
It was first used in the 1960s in the field of aeronautics for the analysis of
the safety of aircraft. It is required by regulations in the USA and France for
aircraft safety. It allows assessing the effects of each failure mode of a system s
components and identifying the failure modes that may have a critical impact
on the operability safety and maintenance of the system.
It proceeds in four steps:
• the system is to be defined with the function of each of its components;
• the failure modes of the components and their causes are established;
• the effects of the failure are studied, and
• conclusions and recommendations are derived.
The failure modes and failure causes are identified initially and are used as
the starting point for the FMEA. Each cause is evaluated for adequate design
safety and potential effect on the system. A qualitative ranking is determined
by considering both the severity and frequency of occurrence.
Critical areas of the process are identified and studied to determine the
possibility of a major incident. Management can then use this information to
control the potential risk, and avoid the accident scenario.
A block flow diagram of the FMEA process is given in Figure 3.12.
The following terms are used in the FMEA process:
• Line No. - consists of an ”Operation/Item” number and a single letter
identifying the ”Failure Cause” (e.g., 1A, 1B, 2A...).
• Operation/Item - the operation or item of concern in the scenario.
• Failure Mode - the potential problem.
• Failure Cause - events that cause the failure mode.
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Figure 3.12: The FMEA process
• Potential Effects - potential effects of the problem in the system or sub-
system. The potential Effects column lists the consequences of the Failure
Mode.
• Design Safety - those features of a system that will prevent the Failure
Mode from occurring. Any deficiencies in Design Safety will be reflected
in the Recommendation column.
• Hazard Category - an assessment of the hazard risk of the operation. In
this analysis, we have used the MIL-STD-882B, ”Hazard Risk Assessment
Matrix.”
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• Recommendations - recommended corrective actions. Deficiencies in the
Design Safety are corrected by implementing the recommendations in the
Recommendation column.
One important point in this type of analysis is to define clearly the different
states of the working system, to ensure that it is in normal operation, in a
waiting state, in emergency operation, in testing, in maintenance, and so on.
The depth of decomposition of the system into its components is crucial for the
efficiency of the analysis.
3.3.1.2 The HAZard and OPerability analysis
In order to illustrate another hazard identification technique, we can take the
example of the HAZOP, or HAZard and OPerability analysis [166]. This is a
structured technique in which a multi-discipline team performs a systematic
study of a process using guide words to discover how deviations from the design
intent can occur in equipment, actions, or materials, and whether the conse-
quences of these deviations can result in a hazard.
The Hazard and Operability Study ( HAZOP ) was developed in the early
1970s by Imperial Chemical Indsturies (ICI) [139], after the Flixborough in-
cident [211]. It is derived from the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, but
specially adapted for the process industry in general, and in the chemical in-
dustry in particular. It is essentially oriented towards the identification of risks
stemming from the process equipment. It is particularly well suited for the
analysis of continuous processes in the steady state, but can also be used for
batch processes.
The first steps of the risk analysis, of scope definition, data collection, safe
conditions definition, are the same as for other methods. Using the process and
instruments design (PID) and the Process Flow Diagram (PFD) as basic docu-
ments, the plant is divided into itnodes and lines. For each of these divisions, a
design intention is written that precisely summarizes its function.
For example, a feed line could be defined as: the line A129 is designed to
feed 100 kg hour−1 of product A from Tank B101 to reactor R205. Then in
a kind of guided brainstorming approach, using predefined guidewords applied
to different parameters of the design intention, the process is systematically
analyzed.
These guidewords are listed below:
• Design Intent - the way a process is intended to function.
• Deviation - a departure from the design intent discovered by systematically
applying guide words to process parameters.
• Guide Word - simple words such as ”high” pressure, ”high” temperature,
”leak” etc. that are used to modify the design intent and to guide and
stimulate the brainstorming process for identifying process hazards.
• Cause - the reason why a deviation might occur.
• Consequence - the results of a deviation.
• Safeguard - engineered systems or administrative controls that prevent the
causes or mitigate the consequences of deviations.
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• Hazard Category - an assessment of the hazard risk of the operation.
• Recommendations - recommendations for design changes, procedural changes,
or for further study.
Guide words for flow in a chemical process include High Flow, No/Low Flow,
Reverse Flow, Misdirected Flow, High Pressure, Low Pressure, High Tempera-
ture, Low Temperature, High Contaminants, Leak and Rupture. For processes
utilizing explosives, the guide words include electrical initiation, ESD spark, Im-
pact shock, Friction, Impingement, Incompatibilities, Explosive shock, Thermal
ignition, Propagation, Personnel Injury, Environmental contamination, Equip-
ment damage and Product damage.
There is some redundancy in the guidewords, for example, a temperature
may be too high due to over - heating. This, again, is intentional and allows
ensuring a comprehensive analysis. In cases where batch processes are to be
analyzed by the HAZOP technique, additional guidewords concerning time and
sequencing, for example, too early, too late, too often, too few, too long, or too
short may also be added. It is then verified that the deviation generated by
applying the guideword to a parameter is meaningful.
For example, reverse flow may be meaningful, but it would hardly be
the case for reverse temperature. If the generated deviation has no sense, it is
skipped and the next deviation is generated with the next guideword. For trace-
ability of the thoroughness of the analysis, it may be marked as not applicable,
n.a. For the meaningful deviations identified by the procedure described above,
the possible causes for triggering the deviation are systematically searched.
As an example, possible causes for no flow may be an empty feed tank, a
closed valve, an inadvertently open valve to another direction, a pump failure,
a leak, and so on. In this context, it may be useful to indicate the logical
relationship between the causes, such as where simultaneous failure of several
elements is required in order to trigger the deviation. This is of great help for
the assessment of the probability of occurrence.
The effects are searched in order to allow the assessment of the severity.
These results are documented together with the risk evaluation and, where
required, with risk - reducing measures in a hazard catalog, as presented in figure
3.13. The analysis is performed on the totality of the nodes and lines defined
by the division of the plant. This allows checking the comprehensiveness of the
analysis. The HAZOP technique, as its name indicates, is not only devoted
to identification of hazards, but also to the identification of operability issues.
In this frame, the hazard catalog also provides a list of possible symptoms for
the early identification of abnormal situations and remedy. Then it becomes an
efficient tool for process design, especially for the design of automation systems
and interlocks.
The results of the HAZOP analysis are the team’s recommendations, which
include identification of hazards and the recommendations for changes in design,
procedures, etc. to improve the safety of the system. Deviations during normal,
startup, shutdown, and maintenance operations are discussed by the team and
are included in the HAZOP. A block flow diagram of the HAZOP process is
given in Figure 3.14 and a more detailed schema in Figure 3.15.
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 With continuous processes, different stages must be considered: steady state, 
start up and shut down, emergency stops, and so on. 
 The methods for search of hazards can be classiﬁ ed into three categories: 
 1.  Intuitive methods, such as brainstorming. 
 2.  Inductive methods, such as check lists,  Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
( FMEA ), event trees, decision tables,  Analysis of Potential Problems ( APP ). 
These methods proceed from an initial cause of the deviation and construct a 
scenario ending with the ﬁ nal event. They are based on questions of the type: 
 “ What if? ” 
 3.  Deductive methods, such as the  Fault Tree Analysis ( FTA ) that proceeds by 
starting from the top event and looking for failures that may cause it to happen. 
These methods are based on questions of the type:  “ How can it happen? ” 
 Some examples of those methods, commonly used for hazard search in chemi-
cal processes, are presented in Section  1.5 . 
 The triggering mechanism to make a real threat out of a potential threat is called 
the cause. Each potential threat can have several potential causes, which should 
be listed. The possible consequences of a triggered event are referred to as the 
effects. This description of hazard causes and effects build an event scenario. The 
listing of the hazards in a table with an identiﬁ er, a short description a list of pos-
sible causes and the consequences, makes up the hazard catalog. The table may 
also contain risk assessment, a description of risk - reducing measures, assessment 
of residual risk, and who is responsible for the action decided on. This is of great 
help for the follow - up of the project. An example of such a hazard catalog is pre-
sented in Figure  1.1 . 
Figure 1.1  Example of Hazards Catalogue with deviation causes 
effects and actions decided by the team as well as their status. 
1.3 Risk Analysis  11
Figure 3.13: Example of Hazards Catalogue with deviation causes effects and
actions decided by the team as well as their status.
3.3.2 Risk
Risk is a concept that denotes the precise probability of specific eventualities.
Technically, the notion of risk is independent from the notion of value and, as
such, eventualities may have both beneficial and adverse consequences.
However, in general usage the convention is to focus only on potential nega-
tive impact to some characteristic of value that may arise from a future event.
There are many definitions of risk that vary by specific application and situa-
tional context. One is that risk is an issue, which can be avoided or mitigated
(wherein an issue is a potential problem that has to be fixed now.) Risk is
described both qualitatively and quantitatively. In some texts risk is described
as a situation which would lead to negative consequences.
Qualitatively, risk is proportional to both the expected losses which may
be caused by an event and to the probability of this event. Greater loss and
greater event likelihood result in a greater overall risk. Frequently in the subject
matter literature, risk is defined in pseudo-formal forms where the components
of the definition are vague and ill-defined, for example, risk is considered as an
indicator of threat, or depends on threats, vulnerability, impact and uncertainty.
It is possible to identify three main categories of risk.
• Specific Risk: very frequent or continuous events, with small damages.
• Conventional Risk: quite frequent events, with damages of medium inten-
sity against one or more people (mostly injuries).
• Potential Risk - relevant accident: caused by rare events with very large
consequences and high damages.
In engineering, the definition of risk often simply is:
Risk = (probability of an accident)× (losses per accident)
or in more general terms:
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THE HAZOP PROCESS
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Figure 3.14: A block flow diagram of the HAZOP process
Risk = (probability of event occurring)× (impact of event occurring)
According to Stoessel [222], risk is defined as a measure of loss potential, and
damage to the environment or persons in terms of probability and severity. An
often-used definition is shown in (3.1) that risk is the product of severity time
probability:
Risk = Severity × Probability (3.1)
In fact, considering risk as a product is somewhat restrictive: it is more general
to consider it as a combination of the terms, severity and probability, that
characterize the effects, that is, consequences and impact of a potential accident
and its probability of occurrence.
This also means that the risk is linked to a defined incident scenario. In other
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Figure 3.15: An example of a detailed model of analysis
words, the risk analysis will be based on scenarios that must first be identified
and described with the required accuracy, in order to be evaluated in terms of
severity and probability of occurrence.
In statistics, risk is often mapped to the probability of some event which is
seen as undesirable. Usually, the probability of that event and some assessment
of its expected harm must be combined into a believable scenario (an outcome),
which combines the set of risk, regret and reward probabilities into an expected
value for that outcome.
Thus, in statistical decision theory, the risk function of an estimator δ(x)
for a parameter θ, calculated from some observables x, is shown in (3.2) and
defined as the expectation value of the loss function L,
R (θ, δ(x)) =
∫
L (θ, δ(x)) f (x|θ) dx (3.2)
3.3.3 Safety
Safety is a quiet situation resulting from the real absence of any hazard. Abso-
lute safety (or zero risk) does not exist for several reasons: first, it is possible
that several protection measures or safety elements can fail simultaneously; sec-
ond, the human factor is a source of error and a person can misjudge a situation
or have a wrong perception of indices, or may even make an error due to a
moment’s inattention.
3.3.4 Security
In common language, security is a synonym of safety. In the context of this
thesis, security is devoted to the field of property protection against theft or
incursion.
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3.3.5 Accepted Risk
The accepted risk is a risk inferior to a level defined in advance either by law,
technical, economical, or ethical considerations. The risk analysis, as it will be
described in the following sections, has essentially a technical orientation.
The minimal requirement is that the process fulfills requirements by the
local laws and that the risk analysis is carried out by an experienced team using
recognized methods and risk-reducing measures that conform to the state of the
art. It is obvious that non-technical aspects may also be involved in the risk
acceptation criteria. These aspects should also cover societal aspects, that is, a
risk benefit analysis should be performed.
3.4 Risk Analysis
A risk analysis is not an objective by itself, but is one of the elements of the
design of a technically and economically efficient process. In fact, risk analysis
reveals the process inherent weaknesses and provides means to correct them.
Thus, risk analysis should not be considered as a police action, in the sense
that, at the last minute, one wants to ensure that the process will work as
intended.
Risk analysis rather plays an important role during process design. There-
fore, it is a key element in process development, especially in the definition of
process control strategies to be implemented.
A well-driven risk analysis not only leads to a safe process, but also to an
economic process, since the process will be more reliable and give rise to less
productivity loss.That is risk analysis is very important for the sustainability.
3.4.1 Steps of Risk Analysis
There are many risk analysis methods, but all have three steps in common:
1 - search for hazards,
2 - risk assessment, and
3 - definition of risk-reducing measures.
If these three steps are at the heart of the risk analysis, it is also true that
performing these steps requires preliminary work and other steps that should
not be bypassed. By systematically in the sector studying past incidents, sev-
eral causes can be identified. Thus, the risk analysis must be well prepared,
meaning that the scope of the analysis must be clearly defined; data must be
available and evaluated, to define the safe process conditions and the critical
limits. Then, and only then, the systematic search for process deviations from
the safe conditions can be started. The identified deviations lead to the defi-
nition of scenarios, which can be assessed in terms of severity and probability
of occurrence. This work can advantageously be summarized in a risk profile,
enhancing the major risks that are beyond the accepted limits. For these risks,
reduction measures can then be defined. The residual risk, that is, the risk
remaining after implementation of the measures, can be assessed as before and
documented in a residual risk profile showing the progress of the analysis and
the risk improvement. These steps are reviewed in the next subsections.
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3.4.2 Scope of Analysis
The scope of the analysis aims to identify the process under consideration, in
which plant it will take place, and with which chemicals it will be performed.
The chemical reactions and unit operations must be clearly characterized. In
this step, it is also important to check for interface problems with other plant
units. As an example, when considering raw material delivery, it can be assumed
that the correct raw material of the intended quantity and quality is delivered
from a tank farm. Thus, it can be referred to the tank farm risk analysis, or
the tank farm is to be included in the scope of the analysis. Similar consider-
ations can be made for energy supply, to ensure that the appropriate energy
is delivered. Nevertheless, loss of energy must be considered in the analysis,
but it will be assumed that if nitrogen is required, nitrogen will be delivered.
This allows checking for non-analyzed items in a whole plant, completing the
analysis. Appropriate consideration should be given to the various hazardous
inventories on an installation, for example for fire and explosion events:
• process oil/gas/condensate;
• process additives (e.g. methanol);
• fuels (e.g. diesel, aviation fuel) and lubricants;
• bottled gas;
• explosives and detonators;
• chemicals; and
• ordinary combustibles.
Appropriate consideration should be given to the potential for release of the
down hole annulus gas inventory for gas-lifted wells. The various potential
causes or initiating events should be identified. For example, in spite of external
as helicopter crash, ship collision and extreme weather, causes in the fire and
explosion events can have as internal causes:
• incorrect equipment or material specification;
• defective material or equipment;
• pressure outside design limits;
• temperature outside design limits;
• vibration;
• corrosion;
• erosion;
• human error;
• external loading; and
• impact.
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3.4.3 Key Factors for a Successful Risk Analysis
The risk analysis represents an important part of the process know how. It may
be useful to describe the risk - reducing measures together with the status, such
as new, accepted, rejected, implemented, and so on. In order to a successful risk
analysis the quality of a risk analysis is very important; it depends essentially
on three factors:
• the systematic and comprehensive hazard identification;
• the experience of the risk analysis team members;
• the quality and comprehensiveness of the data used during the analysis.
As a consequence the hazards catalog cannot be a static document, but a part
of the process documentation at the same level as the operating mode and
mass balances. The hazard catalog then becomes a management tool and a
living document, which must regularly be updated and accompany the process
throughout its life.
3.4.4 Safety Data Collection
The required data must be collected prior to the risk analysis. This can be done
gradually during process development as the knowledge on the process increases.
The data can be summarized on data sheets devoted to different aspects of the
process. They typically should encompass the following:
• involved chemical compounds,
• chemical reactions,
• technical equipment,
• utilities,
• operators.
In order to be economic and efficient, the data collection is accompanied by their
interpretation in terms of risks. This allows adapting the amount and accuracy
of the data to the risk. There are many different sources for safety data, such
as Material Safety Data Sheet ( MSDS ), databases, company databases, and
reports. Great care is required, when using MSDS, since experience has shown
that they are not always reliable.
The safety data used in risk analysis can be grouped into different categories,
described in the following subsections. The data should be provided for raw
material, intermediates, and products, as well as for reaction mixtures or wastes
as they are to be handled in the process. Missing data, important in risk
analysis, may be marked with a letter I, to indicate that this information is
missing or as a default by a letter C, if its value is unknown but judged to be
critical.
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3.4.4.1 Physical Properties
Physical properties such as melting point, boiling point, and vapor pressure,
as well as densities and solubility in water, are especially important in case of
a release, but also give important restrictions to the process conditions. For
instance, the melting point may indicate that the contents of a stirred vessel
solidify below this temperature.
This gives a lower limit to the heating or cooling system temperature, which
would forbid using an emergency cooling system. In a similar way, the vapor
pressure may define an upper temperature limit if a certain pressure level is not
to be surpassed. Densities may also indicate what the upper and lower phase
in a mixture is. Solubility in water is important in case of spillage.
3.4.4.2 Chemical Properties
The chemical properties allow summarizing observations or experiences made
during process development or previous production campaigns. The following
characteristic chemical properties should be identified during the risk analysis:
acidity, auto-ignition temperature, pyrophoric properties, reaction with water,
light sensitivity, air sensitivity, and storage stability. Further, impurities in the
product may affect the toxic and ecotoxic properties of substances or mixtures.
3.4.4.3 Toxicity
The odor limit compared to other limits may indicate an early warning of a
leak. The maximum allowed work place concentration (MAC), is the maximum
allowed average concentration expressed in mgm−3 of a gas, vapor, or dust in
air in a workplace, which has no adverse effects on health for an exposure of 8
hours per day or 42 hours per week for the majority of a population.
Since it is an average, maintaining the concentration below this value
does not guarantee no effects, since the sensitivity may differ within a
population. On the other hand, a short-term exposure to a concentration above
MAC does not imply consequences on health.
A distinction is made between acute toxicity and chronic toxicity. For acute
toxicity, the following indicators may be used.
• Lethal dose LD50 : gives the concentration that caused 50% of fatalities
within 5 days in an animal population exposed once to the concentration.
It may be an oral or dermal exposure and is expressed in mgkg−1 of
organism with a specification of the test animal used.
• Lethal concentration LC50 : is the concentration in air that caused 50%
of fatalities within 5 days in a test in an animal population exposed to
this concentration. It is through inhalation and is expressed in mgkg−1
of organism with a specification of the test animal used.
The LD50 and LC50 for humans would be more directly applicable but, for
obvious reasons, only very sparse data are available:
• The toxic dose lowest (TDLo oral) is the lowest dose that induced diseases
in humans by oral absorption.
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• The toxic concentration lowest (TLCo oral) is the lowest concentration in
the air that induced diseases in humans by inhalation.
More qualitative indicators are also useful: absorption through healthy skin,
irritation to skin, eyes, and respiratory system, together with sensitization with
the following indicators: carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, reprotoxic, and
so on. These properties can be summarized by indication of a toxicity class.
To judge the effect of short-term exposure, such as during a spillage, the
short-term exposure limit (e.g. IDLH), must be known. The different levels
given by the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines ( EPRG ), issued by
the authorities as for example the American Department of Energy and the
Department of Transport, may also be used in this frame.
The use of carcinogenic material should be avoided as far as possible, by
replacement with non-toxic or at least less toxic substances. If their use cannot
be avoided, appropriate technical and medicinal measures should be applied
in order to protect the workers from their effects. Among such measures, the
reduction of the exposure in terms of concentration and duration as well as a
medical follow-up may be required. The exposure can be limited by using closed
systems, avoiding any direct contact with the substance, or personal protection
equipment. Moreover, the number of exposed operators should be limited.
3.4.4.4 Ecotoxicity
In instances of spillage or release, not only humans may be concerned, but the
damage may also affect the environment. The following data are required:
• biological degradability, bacteria toxicity (IC50),
• algae toxicity (EC50),
• daphnia toxicity (EC50),
• fish toxicity (LC50),
The Po/w, that is, the distribution coefficient between octanol and water, in-
dicates a possible accumulation in fat. Malodorous or odor intense compounds
should also be indicated. The symbol (LC50 means lethal concentration for 50%
of a test population. The symbol (EC50 means efficiency concentration for mo-
bility suppression of 50% a test population. The symbol IC50 means inhibition
concentration for 50% of a population in a test for respiratory suppression.
3.4.4.5 Fire and Explosion Data
The most common property in the assessment of fire hazards is the flashpoint
that is applicable to liquids or melts, and is the lowest temperature at which the
vapor above the substance may be ignited and continue to burn. The reference
pressure for the flashpoint is 1013 mbar.
The combustion index is applicable to solids and gives a qualitative indica-
tion about combustibility, ranging from one to six. Index1 corresponds to no
combustion and Index6 to a violent combustion with fast propagation. From
Index4, the combustion propagates through to the solid.
The self-sustaining decomposition is a phenomenon whereby the decompo-
sition is initiated by a hot spot, and then propagates through to the solid with
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a velocity of some millimeters to centimeters per second. The decomposition
does not require oxygen, so it cannot be avoided by using an inert atmosphere.
Electrostatic charges may provide an ignition source for the explosion of a gas,
vapor, or dust cloud. Electrostatic charges can accumulate only if a separation
process is involved.
Since this is an often - occurring phenomenon as soon as a product is in mo-
tion, separation processes are common in chemical processes, during pumping,
agitation, pneumatic transport, and so on. Charge accumulation occurs when
the conductivity is too low to allow charge relaxation.
This may lead to an electrostatic discharge that may ignite an explosion
if present at the same time as explosive atmosphere. For this to occur the
concentration of combustible must be in a given range and oxygen must be
present. In order to assess such situations, the explosion characteristics are
required.
Explosion limits indicate in which concentration range a mixture of com-
bustible substance can be ignited. There are two limits, the lower explosion
limit(LEL), below which the concentration is too low to produce an explosion
and the upper explosion limit (UEL), above which the oxygen is in default and
no explosion occurs. Further, the explosion is characterized by the maximum
explosion pressure and its violence by the maximum pressure increase rate.
In order to decide if an explosion can be ignited, the minimum ignition
energy (MIE) is required. The shock and friction sensitivity of a solid is also an
important parameter, especially when it is to be submitted to mechanical stress
during processing.
3.4.4.6 Interactions
The reactivity of chemicals used in a process must be assessed, since these
chemicals may become in contact in a desired way or accidentally during the
process. These interactions are usually analyzed in a triangular matrix where
the desired and undesired reactions are marked at the intersection of each row
and column.
Beside chemicals or mixtures, the different fluids (i.e. heat carrier), waste
streams, and construction materials must also be considered. An example of
such a matrix, summarizing the safety data and the interactions, is represented
in figure 3.16. Once the safety data have been collected and documented, they
must be evaluated with regard to the process conditions in terms of their signif-
icance for process safety. With the interpretation of the safety data, the process
conditions that provide safe operation and the limits that should not be sur-
passed become clear. This defines the critical limits of the process, which are at
the root of the search for deviations in the next step of the risk analysis. This
task should be performed by professionals having the required skills. Practice
has shown that it is advantageous to perform, or at least to review, the inter-
pretation with the risk analysis team. This ensures that the whole team has the
same degree of knowledge and understanding of the process features.
3.4.5 Search for Deviations
During this step, the process is considered in its future technological environ-
ment, that is, the plant equipment, the control systems including the operators,
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Figure 3.16: Interaction matrix, also called hazard matrix, summarizing the
safety data of chemicals involved in a process.
and the delivery of raw material. The utilities are included in the critical ex-
amination of deviations from normal operating conditions. Here the following
fields may be distinguished:
• deviations from operating mode, which are a central part in batch pro-
cesses;
• technical failures of equipment, such as valves, pumps, control elements,and
so on, which represent the central part of the equipment-oriented risk anal-
ysis;
• deviations due to external causes, such as climatic impacts (frost, flooding,
storms);
• failure of utilities, especially electrical power or cooling water.
With continuous processes, different stages must be considered: steady state,
start up and shut down, emergency stops, and so on.
The methods for search of hazards can be classified into the following three
categories.
1 - Intuitive methods, such as brainstorming,
2 - Inductive methods, such as check lists, Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA), event trees, decision tables, Analysis of Po-
tential Problems (APP). These methods proceed from an initial
cause of the deviation and construct a scenario ending with the
final event. They are based on questions of the type: “What
if ?”
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3 - Deductive methods, such as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) that
proceeds by starting from the top event and looking for failures
that may cause it to happen. These methods are based on
questions of the type: “How can it happen?”
The triggering mechanism to make a real threat out of a potential threat is
called the cause. Each potential threat can have several potential causes, which
should be listed. The possible consequences of a triggered event are referred
to as the effects. This description of hazard causes and effects build an event
scenario.
The listing of the hazards in a table with an identifier, a short description a
list of possible causes and the consequences, makes up the hazard catalog. An
example of such a hazard catalog was presented in figure 3.13.
The table may also contain risk assessment, a description of risk-reducing
measures, assessment of residual risk, and who is responsible for the action
decided on. This is of great help for the follow-up of the project.
3.4.6 Risk Assessment
Risk assessment connotes a systematic approach to organizing and analyzing
scientific knowledge and information for potentially hazardous activities or for
substances that might pose risks under specified circumstances [71].
Risk assessment can be qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative risk assess-
ment regards the identification of possible accident scenarios and attempts to
estimate the undesirable consequences [106].
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) tries to assess the risk in terms of
the value of some indicators to be used to actively manage risk, to identify
and prioritize technology needs and decision making and, finally, to evaluate
regulatory alternatives [29, 133].
The deviation scenarios found in the previous step of the risk analysis must
be assessed in terms of risk, which consists of assigning a level of severity and
probability of occurrence to each scenario. This assessment is qualitative or
semi-quantitative, but rarely quantitative, since a quantitative assessment re-
quires a statistical database on failure frequency, which is difficult to obtain for
the fine chemicals industry with such a huge diversity of processes.
The severity is clearly linked to the consequences of the scenario or to the
extent of possible damage. It may be assessed using different points of view, such
as the impact on humans, the environment, property, the business continuity,
or the company’s reputation.
In order to allow for a correct assessment, it is essential to describe the sce-
narios with all their consequences. This is often a demanding task for the team,
which must interpret the available data in order to work out the consequences
of a scenario, together with its chain of events.
The probability of occurrence (P) is linked to the causes of the deviations. It
is often expressed as frequency (f), referring to an observation period (T) often
of one year:
P = f × T ⇒ f = P
T
(3.3)
A probability of 0.01 is equivalent to an occurrence of 1 incident in 100 years.
There are two approaches for the assessment of probability:
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• the qualitative approach, based on experience and using analogies to sim-
ilar situations;
• the quantitative approach, based on statistical data obtained from equip-
ment failure databases [151].
These data were mainly gathered from the petrochemicals industry and bulk
chemical industry, working essentially with dedicated plant units.
For the fine chemicals and pharmaceutical industries, where the processes
are carried out in multi-purpose plants, this approach is more difficult to use.
This is because the equipment may work under very different conditions from
process to process, which obviously has an impact on its reliability.
The quantitative analysis must be based on a method, to allow identification
of the interaction between different failures.
To get a better idea of the probability, a semi-quantitative approach consists
of listing the logical relationships between the different causes. This allows
identifying if the simultaneous failure of several elements is required to obtain
the deviation and gives access to a semi-quantitative assessment. Severity and
probability of occurrence of an event form the two coordinates of the risk profile.
The fault tree analysis is an example of a method on which is based the
quantitative analysis. The fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive method,
whereby the top event is given and the analysis focuses on the search of the
causes that may trigger it. The principle is to start from the top event and
identify the immediate causes or failures. Then each of these failures is again
considered as an event and is analyzed to identify the next generation of causes
or failures. In this way, a hierarchy of the causes is built up, where each cause
stems from parent causes as in a generation tree. Such a tree may be developed
to infinity; nevertheless, the depth of the analysis can easily be adjusted to
function as the objectives of the analysis. In most cases, the depth of the analysis
is adjusted to allow the design of risk - reducing measures. For example, in the
analysis of a chemical process, when a pump failure is found, it is not useful
to find out what caused the pump failure. For the process safety, it may be
more appropriate to provide a back - up pump or to increase the maintenance
frequency of the pump. Thus, in general the analysis is stopped at the failure
of elementary devices as valves, pumps, control instruments, and so on.
A special feature of the FTA is that different events are linked by logical
relationships as in figure 3.17. One possibility is the logical “AND” , meaning
that two parent events must be realized simultaneously in order to generate
the child event. The other possibility is the logical “OR” meaning, whereby
only the realization of one parent event is sufficient to generate the child event.
It becomes clear that the realization of an event behind an “AND” gate is less
likely to occur than events behind an “OR” gate. This allows for a quantification
of the fault tree. The probability of occurrence of an event C depending on the
simultaneous realization of two events A and B, that is, behind a logical gate
“AND”, is the conditional probability of A AND B:
PC = PA · PB (3.4)
Since probabilities are comprised between zero and one and should be low fig-
ures, the conditional probability usually becomes extremely small.
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 Figure 1.8  Example fault tree analysis for the collision of a car with a deer. 
 P P PC A B= ⋅   (1.3) 
 Since probabilities are comprised between zero and one and should be low 
ﬁ gures, the conditional probability usually becomes extremely small. In other 
terms, an  “ AND ” gate strongly reduces the probability of the occurrence of an 
event and it is advisable to design a safety system in order to provide such  “ AND ” 
relationships before the top event. 
 The probability of occurrence of an event C, where only the realization of one 
parent event from A or B is required (behind an  “ OR ” gate), the probability is the 
sum of probabilities of all parent events:
 P P P P PC A B A B= + − ⋅    (1.4) 
 In this expression, the subtraction of the product of probabilities takes into 
account the fact that the simultaneous realization of both events is still taken into 
account in the realization of individual events. This correction is usually very 
small, since individual probabilities are small. 
 In this way, the fault tree can be quantiﬁ ed, which makes this technique very 
powerful for the reliability analysis of protection systems. The prerequisite is the 
availability of statistical reliability data of the different devices and instruments 
that is often difﬁ cult to obtain for multi - purpose plants, where devices can be 
exposed to very different conditions when changing from one process to another. 
Nevertheless, if the objective is to compare different designs, semi - quantitative 
data are sufﬁ cient. 
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Figure 3.17: Example fault tree analysis for the collision of a car with a deer.
In other terms, an “AND” gate strongly reduces the probability of the oc-
currence of an event and it is advisable to design a safety system in order to
provide such “AND” relationships before the top event.
The probability of occurrence of an event C, where only the realization of
one parent event from A or B is required (behind an “OR” gate), the probability
is the sum of probabilities of all parent events:
PC = PA + PB − PA · PB (3.5)
In this expression, the subtraction of the product of probabilities takes into
account the fact that the simultaneous realization of both events is still taken
into account n the realization of individual event . This correction is usually
very small, since individual probabilities are small.
In this way, the fault tree can be quantified, which makes this technique very
powerful for the reliability analysis of protection systems. The prerequisite is the
availability of s atistical reliabil ty data of the different devices and instrum nts
that is often difficult to obtain for multi-purpose plants, where devices can be
exposed to very different conditions when changing from one process to another.
Nevertheless, if the objective is to compare different designs, semi-quantitative
data are sufficient.
In spite of the deductive method fault tree analysis (FTA), there is the
event tree analysis (ETA) that is an inductive method. It starts from an initial
event and searches for the different possible effects and it is especially useful for
studying the scenario of what may happen after the initial event when developing
emergency plans.
Starting from the initial event, one searches for consecutive events, until the
system reaches a final state. These different generations of events are represented
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 1.5.6 
 Fault Tree Analysis 
 The  fault tree analysis ( FTA ) is a deductive method, whereby the top event is given 
and the analysis focuses on the search of the causes that may trigger it. The prin-
ciple is to start from the top event and identify the immediate causes or failures. 
Then each of these failures is again considered as an event and is analysed to 
identify the next generation of causes or failures. In this way, a hierarchy of the 
causes is built up, where each cause stems from parent causes as in a generation 
tree (Figure  1.8 ). Such a tree may be developed to inﬁ nity; nevertheless, the depth 
of the analysis can easily be adjusted to function as the objectives of the analysis. 
In most cases, the depth of the analysis is adjusted to allow the design of risk -
 reducing measures. For example, in the analysis of a chemical process, when a 
pump failure is found, it is not useful to ﬁ nd out what caused the pump failure. 
For the process safety, it may be more appropriate to provide a back - up pump or 
to increase the maintenance frequency of the pump. Thus, in general the analysis 
is stopped at the failure of elementary devices as valves, pumps, control instru-
ments, and so on. 
 A special feature of the FTA is that different events are linked by logical relation-
ships. One possibility is the logical  “ AND ” , meaning that two parent events must 
be realized simultaneously in order to generate the child event. The other possibil-
ity is the logical  “ OR ” meaning, whereby only the realization of one parent event 
is sufﬁ cient to generate the child event. It becomes clear that the realization of an 
event behind an  “ AND ” gate is less likely to occur than events behind an  “ OR ” 
gate. This allows for a quantiﬁ cation of the fault tree. 
 The probability of occurrence of an event C depending on the simultaneous 
realization of two events A and B, that is, behind a logical gate  “ AND ” , is the con-
ditional probability of A AND B:
Figure 1.7  Event tree for the collision of a car with a deer. Figure 3.18: Event tre for the collision of a car with a deer.
as a tree. An example, again based on the collision of a car with a deer, is
represented in figure 3.18. The vertical lines leading from one event to the next
are related in a logical “AND” relationship and the corresponding probabilities
must be multiplied. Horizontal lines indicate a logical “OR” relationship and the
corresponding probabilities must be added. Thus, the tree can be quantified for
the probability of entering one or the other branch after an event is known. Thus,
it allows assessing quantitatively the effects of different possible chains of events
and focuses the measures on the avoidance of the most critical chains. Often,
it is useful start the analysis using the decision table method. It consists of
logically combining all possible states of each element of a system and outlining
the consequences on the entire system and it can be applied to a part of a system
or to an operating mode. The combinations are analyzed by Boole’s algebra that
gives the analysis a strong logical backbone. A part of such a decision table is
shown in figure 3.19, an other time by the example of the collis on of a car with
a deer. It is the most powerful method for analysing combinations of failures,
exhaustive in this r spect. Neverthel ss, the combinations rapidly become so
numerous that it is difficult to retain an overview of the system by this method.
Thus, it ha a more academic character.
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identiﬁ cation of hazards, but also to the identiﬁ cation of operability issues. In this 
frame, the hazard catalog also provides a list of possible symptoms for the early 
identiﬁ cation of abnormal situations and remediation. Then it becomes an efﬁ -
cient tool for process design, especially for the design of automation systems and 
interlocks. 
 1.5.4 
 Decision Table 
 The decision table method consists of logically combining all possible states of 
each element of a system and outlining the consequences on the entire system. It 
can be applied to a part of a system or to an operating mode. The combinations 
are analysed by Boole ’ s algebra that gives the analysis a strong logical backbone. 
A part of such a decision table is shown by the example of the collision of a car 
with a deer (Figure  1.6 ). It is the most powerful method for analysing combina-
tions of failures, exhaustive in this respect. Nevertheless, the combinations rapidly 
become so numerous that it is difﬁ cult to retain an overview of the system by this 
method. Thus, it has a more academic character. 
Figure 1.6  Decision table for the collision of a car with a deer  [8] .
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 1.5.5 
 Event Tree Analysis 
 The  event tree analysis ( ETA ) is an inductive method that starts from an initial 
event and searches for the different possible effects. It is especially useful for 
studying the scenario of what may happen after the initial event when developing 
emergency plans. Starting from the initial event, one searches for consecutive 
events, until the system reaches a ﬁ nal state. These different generations of events 
are represented as a tree. An example, again based on the collision of a car with 
a deer, is represented in Figure  1.7 . The vertical lines leading from one event to 
the next are related in a logical  “ AND ” relationship and the corresponding proba-
bilities must be multiplied. Horizontal lines indicate a logical  “ OR ” relationship 
and the corresponding probabilities must be added. Thus, the tree can be quanti-
ﬁ ed for the probability of entering one or the other branch after an event is known. 
Thus, it allows assessing quantitatively the effects of different possible chains of 
events and focuses the measures on the avoidance of the most critical chains. 
Figure 3.19: Decision table for the collision of a car with a deer.14  1 Introduction to Risk Analysis of Fine Chemical Processes
 1.3.1.6  Risk Proﬁ les 
 Risk assessment is not an objective by itself, but represents the required step for 
the risk evaluation. This is the step whereby it is decided if a risk is acceptable, or 
if it should be reduced by appropriate measures. This is usually done by comparing 
the risk to acceptance criteria deﬁ ned in advance. This can be done graphically by 
using a risk diagram or risk matrix, as the example presented in Figure  1.2 . The 
numbers characterizing the different scenarios can be placed into the matrix, thus 
allowing a visual risk evaluation. Such a risk diagram must comprise two zones 
corresponding to the clearly accepted (white in Figure  1.2 ) and clearly rejected 
risks (dark gray in Figure  1.2 ). Often a third zone (light grey in Figure  1.2 ) is also 
used. This third zone corresponds to risks that should be reduced, as far as reason-
ably applicable measures can be deﬁ ned, the decision being based on technical 
and economical considerations. This practice corresponds to the  As Low As Rea-
sonably Practicable ( ALARP ) principle  [9] . The borderline separating the white 
zone from the others is called the protection level: this is the limit of accepted 
risks and represents an important decision for the risk policy of a company. 
 The risk matrix presented in Figure  1.2 is based on Tables  1.4 and  1.5 and 
deﬁ nes a 4  ×  6 matrix. Experience has shown that choosing too narrow a matrix, 
for example, a 3  ×  3 matrix, with the levels Low, Medium, and High, has the 
drawback of being too rough. It is unable to show the improvement of a risk situ-
ation especially with high severities, since such a situation often remains with high 
severity and low probability, even if additional measures are deﬁ ned. On the other 
hand, too precise a matrix is not useful for risk evaluation and may lead to tedious 
discussions during its assessment. 
1.3.1.7  Risk Reducing Measures 
 If the risk linked to a scenario falls into the non - acceptable zone, it must be 
reduced by appropriate risk - reducing measures. These are usually classiﬁ ed fol-
lowing two viewpoints, the action level and the action mode. The action level can 
Figure 1.2  Example risk diagram with the accepted risk in 
white, non - accepted risk in dark gray, and conditionally 
accepted risks in light gray. 
Figure 3.20: Example risk diagram with th ac epted r sk in white,
non-accepted risk in dark gray, and co ditionally accepted risks in light gray.
3.4.7 Risk Profiles
Risk asse sment is ot an objective y itself, ut represents th required tep fo
the risk evaluation. This is the step whereby it is decided if a risk is acceptable,
or if it should be reduced by appropriate measures. This is usually done by
comparing the risk to acceptance criteria defined in advance. This can be done
graphically by using a risk diagram or risk matrix, as the xample presente i
figure 3.201.2. The numbers characterizing the different scenarios can be placed
into the matrix, thus allowing a visual risk evaluation. Such a risk diagram
must comprise two zones corresponding to the clearly accepted (white in figure
3.20 and cle rly rejected risks (d rk gray in figure 3.20. Often a third zone
(light grey in Figure 3.20 is also used. This third zone corresponds to risks that
should be reduced, as far as reasonably applicable measures can be defined, the
decision being based on technical and economical considerations. This practice
corresponds to the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) [169]. The
borderline separating the white zone from the others is called the protection
level: this is the limit of accepted risks and represents an important decision for
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Figure 3.21: ALARP Carrot Diagram.
the risk policy of a company.
The term ALARP arises from UK legislation, particularly the Health and
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which requires “Provision and maintenance of
plant and systems of work that are, so far as is reasonably practicable, safe
and without risks to health”. The phrase So Far As is Reasonably Practicable
(SFARP) in this and similar clauses is interpreted as leading to a requirement
that risks must be reduced to a level that is As Low As is Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP).
The key question in determining whether a risk is ALARP is the definition of
reasonably practicable. This term has been enshrined in a UK case law in 1949
(the case of Edwards v. National Coal Board). The ruling was that the risk must
be insignificant in relation to the sacrifice (in terms of money, time or trouble)
required to avert it: risks must be averted unless there is a gross disproportion
between the costs and benefits of doing so. Including gross disproportion means
that an ALARP judgment in the UK is not a simple cost benefit analysis, but
is weighted to favour carrying out the safety improvement. However, there is
no broad consensus on the precise factor that would be appropriate.
Outside the UK the ALARP principle is often not used; instead standards
and ’good engineering practice’ are adhered to, and legislation tends to require
absolute levels of safety.
Where the ALARP principle is used, it may not have the same implications
as in the UK, as “reasonably practicable” may be interpreted according to the
local culture, without introducing the concept of gross disproportionality. So
called carrot diagrams are often used to display risks. They are called carrot
diagrams, because they have an elongated triangle in the centre, which looks
74
 12  1 Introduction to Risk Analysis of Fine Chemical Processes
 1.3.1.5  Risk Assessment 
 The deviation scenarios found in the previous step of the risk analysis must be 
assessed in terms of risk, which consists of assigning a level of severity and prob-
ability of occurrence to each scenario. This assessment is qualitative or semi - 
quantitative, but rarely quantitative, since a quantitative assessment requires a 
statistical database on failure frequency, which is difﬁ cult to obtain for the ﬁ ne 
chemicals industry with such a huge diversity of processes. The severity is clearly 
linked to the consequences of the scenario or to the extent of possible damage. It 
may be assessed using different points of view, such as the impact on humans, the 
environment, property, the business continuity, or the company ’ s reputation. Table 
 1.4 gives an example of such a set of criteria. In order to allow for a correct assess-
ment, it is essential to describe the scenarios with all their consequences. This is 
often a demanding task for the team, which must interpret the available data in order 
to work out the consequences of a scenario, together with its chain of events. 
 The probability of occurrence ( P ) is linked to the causes of the deviations. It is 
often expressed as frequency (  f  ), referring to an observation period ( T  ) often of 
one year:
 
P f T f
P
T
= ⋅ ⇒ =
  
(1.2)
 
 Table 1.4  Example assessment criteria for the severity. 
 Category  1. Negligible  2. Marginal  3. Critical  4. Catastrophic 
 Life/health 
in company 
 Injury, ambulant 
treatment 
 Injury requiring 
hospitalization 
 Injury with long -
 term disability 
 Fatality 
 Life/health 
outside 
company 
 No effect  No effect  First aid cases  Severe injury 
 Environment  No effect  Only on - site 
effects, effect 
on water 
treatment 
plant 
 Pollution outside 
site, recovery 
within 
1 month 
 Long - term 
pollution of 
water, soil 
 Property  Not signiﬁ cant  Production line 
to be repaired 
 Loss of 
production 
line 
 Loss of plant 
 Business 
continuity 
 Not affected  Production 
stopped over 
1 week 
 Delivery to 
customers 
must be 
interrupted 
several weeks 
 Business 
interruption 
more than 
1 month 
 Image  No report outside 
company 
 Report in local 
media 
 Report in 
national media 
 Report in 
international 
media 
Figure 3.22: Example assessment criteria for the severity.
like a carrot, and indicates the high (reducible) risks at the top and the low
(insignificant) risks at the bottom.
The region in between is sometimes called the ALARP region; however this
is misleading because the ALARP principle applies to all regions. A better
name is the “Tolerable Region”, because risks in this region can sometimes
be tolerated, if they cannot practically be reduced, in return for the benefits
provided by the system or installation that causes the risks. It is unable to
show the improvement of a risk situation especially with high severities, since
such a situation often remains with high severity and low probability, even if
additional measures are defined. On the other hand, too precise a matrix is
not useful for risk evaluation and may lead to tedious discussions during its
assessment.
The criteria mentioned in figure 3.22 and in figure 3.23 are given as an
example of a possible practice, but as a part of the company’s risk policy, they
must be defined for each company with respect to its actual situation.
3.4.8 Quantified Risk Assessment
It is important to realize that decision making about risks is very complex and
that not only technical aspects but also political, psychological and societal
processes all play an important role.
In this complex decision making process a clear identification of the risks
and the effects of risk reducing measures is very useful. From a technical point
of view the extent of the risks and the effects of risk reducing measures can be
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 A probability of 0.01 is equivalent to an occurrence of 1 incident in 100 years. 
An example of evaluation criteria for the probability is given in Table  1.5 . There 
are two approaches for the assessment of probability: one is the qualitative 
approach, based on experience and using analogies to similar situations. The other 
is the quantitative approach, based on statistical data obtained from equipment 
failure databases  [4] . These data were mainly gathered from the petrochemicals 
industry and bulk chemical industry, working essentially with dedicated plant 
units. For the ﬁ ne chemicals and pharmaceutical industries, where the processes 
are carried out in multi - purpose plants, this approach is more difﬁ cult to use. This 
is because the equipment may work under very different conditions from process 
to process, which obviously has an impact on its reliability. The quantitative analy-
sis must be based on a method, to allow identiﬁ cation of the interaction between 
different failures. Such a method, such as the fault tree analysis, is presented in 
Section  1.5.4 . To get a better idea of the probability, a semi - quantitative approach 
consists of listing the logical relationships between the different causes. This 
allows identifying if the simultaneous failure of several elements is required to 
obtain the deviation and gives access to a semi - quantitative assessment. 
 The criteria mentioned in Tables  1.4 and  1.5 are given as an example of a pos-
sible practice, but as a part of the company ’ s risk policy, they must be deﬁ ned for 
each company with respect to its actual situation. Severity and probability of occur-
rence of an event form the two coordinates of the risk proﬁ le. 
Table 1.5  Example assessment criteria for the probability. 
 Category  Frequency  Deﬁ nition/Examples 
 Frequent  Several times 
in a week 
 Hazards occurring at each batch if no measures are taken, 
e.g. charging powders in ﬂ ammable solvent, exposure 
during handling of liquid or solid chemicals, ignition 
effective electrostatic discharge (if nothing is done 
against charging) 
 Moderate  Once or twice 
a month 
 Pump failure, failure of data acquisition, weighing error, 
wrong set point setting 
 Occasional  Several times 
a year 
 Imprecise communication between production, e.g. tank 
farm, failure of utilities, failure of a motor, explosive 
mixture after a failure 
 Remote  Once a year  Wrong piping connection after repair, mix - up of 
chemicals, programming error of control system, 
leakage at reactor or tank jacket, total power failure in 
the site 
 Unlikely  Once in 
10 years 
 Simultaneous failure of redundant level control, e.g. LAH 
and LAHH, leak at ﬂ ange 
 Almost 
impossible 
 Once in 
100 years 
or more 
 Undiscovered failure of self controlling data acquisition, 
simultaneous failure of multiple technical safety 
measures, heavy earthquake, aircraft impact 
1.3 Risk Analysis  13
Figure 3.23: Example assessment criteria for the probability.
quantified in a quantitative risk assessment (QRA).
Typically, QRA presents Risk Results in terms of
• Individual risk (fatalities);
• Individual risk (Health and Injuries);
• Societal Risk (group Risk);
• Environmental risk:
• Economic risk (not necessarily a regulatory issue).
It is therefore that th QRA can provide a basis for the rational d cision
making ab ut risks. In literature on quantitativ risk assessment generally
four phases are distinguished.
1. Qualitative analysis: in this step the system and the scope are de-
fined, and the hazards and failure modes and scenarios are identified
and described.
2. Quantitative analysis: the probabilities and consequences of the de-
fined events are determined. The risk is quantified in a risk number
or graph as a function of probabilities and consequences.
3. Risk evaluation: with the results of the former analysis the risk is
evaluated. In this phase the decision is made whether the risk is
tolerable or not.
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4. Risk control and risk reduction measures: dependent on the outcome
of the risk evaluation measures should be taken to reduce the risk.
It should also be determined how the risks can be controlled (for
example by inspection, maintenance or warning systems).
Risk measures play an important role in communicating the whole risk
assessment process. A risk measure is defined as a mathematical function
of the probability of an event and the consequences of that event. This
risk measure forms the basis for evaluation of risks by the decision-makers.
With limits or standards an acceptable risk level is set. Finally the risk
measure can be used as an instrument to show the effect of risk reducing
actions.
The risk measures are categorized in sections based on the consequences they
consider:
• Individual risk
• Societal risk
3.4.8.1 Individual Risk and Individual Risk Measures
The first measure is the individual risk (IR). For example IR is used by the Dutch
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM). It is defined
as the probability that an average unprotected person permanently present at
that point location, would get killed due to an accident at the hazardous activity
[29].
IR = Pf · Pd|f (3.6)
where:
Pf is the probability of failure;
Pd|f is the probability of dying of the individual in the case of failure,
assuming the permanent unprotected presence of the individual.
The IR is thus a property of the place and as such useful in spatial planning.
A slightly different definition, in which the actual presence of the individual is
considered, is used by Dutch Technical Advisory Committee on Water Defences
(TAW) and by Bohenblust [27] to describe the actual personal risk.
An overview of measurements to express the individual risk is given by Bed-
ford and Cooke [21]. Apart from the individual risk as mentioned above four
other expressions are described. The loss of life expectancy shows the decrease
of life expectancy due to various causes. The delta yearly probability of death
computes the intensity at which a given activity is performed (at suitable units)
in order to increase the yearly probability of death by 10−6. The activity spe-
cific hourly mortality rate reflects the probability per time unit of dying while
engaged in a specified activity. An example is the Fatal Accident Failure Rate
(FAFR) which gives the number of fatalities per 1000 hours of exposure to a
certain risk. A variant is the death per unit activity, which replaces the time
unit by a unit measuring the amount of activity. The risks of travel by car,
train or aeroplane are often expressed in the form of the number of deaths per
kilometer traveled.
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The assessment of risks is the essential first step in the effective management of
such risks throughout the life-cycle of an installation. It informs the selection
of risk reduction measures and the establishment of appropriate performance
standards for those measures. The assessment is an on-going process to ensure
that, as changes to an installation occur, for example fire and explosion risks
are maintained ALARP. The events selected should be a representative and suf-
ficient set for the purposes of risk assessment. The basis for selection of the
representative set of events should be explained. This should include consider-
ation of such factors as:
Table 3.1: Factors for selection of the representative set of events for the
purposes of risk assessment
Initial release Event outcome
leak size ignition characteristics
(timing/location)
leak duration
wind direction and speed
composition of hydrocarbon ventilation conditions
phase (gas/liquid/two-phase)
protective systems (eg deluge)
operate or fail
leak location and leak orientation
personnel distribution
cause of release
process conditions
ESD/blowdown operates or fails
installation operating regime
The selection of the representative set of events should have regard to the na-
ture of releases which have occurred and the basis for selection of representative
hole sizes or release rates should be explained and should be appropriate to the
characteristics of the installation.
3.4.9 Risk Reducing Measures
If the risk linked to a scenario falls into the non-acceptable zone, it must be
reduced by appropriate risk-reducing measures. These are usually classified
following two viewpoints:
• the action level;
• the action mode.
The action level can be elimination of the hazard, risk prevention, or mitigation
of the consequences. For the action mode, different means can be used: tech-
nical measures that do not require any human intervention, or organizational
measures that require human intervention and are accompanied by procedural
measures defining the operating mode of the measure. Eliminating measures are
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the most powerful since they avoid the risk, meaning that the incident can sim-
ply not occur or at least they strongly reduce the severity of the consequences of
an eventual incident. For a chemical process, eliminating the risks can mean that
the synthesis route must be changed avoiding instable intermediates, strongly
exothermal reactions, or highly toxic material. The choice of the solvent may
also be important in this frame, the objective being to avoid flammable, toxic,
or environmentally critical solvents. Concerning runaway risks, an eliminating
measure aims to reduce the energy in such a way that no runaway can take
place.
Preventive measures provide conditions where the incident is unlikely to
happen, but its occurrence cannot be totally avoided. In this category, we find
measures such as inventory reduction for critical substances, the choice of a
continuous rather than a batch process leading to smaller reactor volumes, and
a semi-batch rather than a full batch process providing additional means of
reaction control. Process automation, safety maintenance plans, etc. are also
preventative measures. The aim of these measures is to avoid triggering the
incident and thus reducing its consequences. In the frame of runaway risks, a
runaway remains theoretically possible, but due to process control, its severity
is limited and the probability of occurrence reduced, such that it can be con-
trolled before it leads to a critical situation. Mitigation measures have no effect
on triggering the incident, but avoid it leading to severe consequences. Exam-
ples of such measures are emergency plans, organization of emergency response,
and explosion suppression. In the frame of runaway risks, such a risk may be
triggered but its impact is limited, for example, by a blow down system that
avoids toxic or flammable material escaping to the environment.
Technical measures are designed in such a way that they require no interven-
tion, nor need to be triggered or executed. They are designed to avoid human
error (in their action, but not in their design). Technical measures are often
built as automated control systems, such as interlocks or safety trips. In certain
instances, they must be able to work under any circumstances, even in the case
of utility failure. Therefore, great care is required in their design, which should
be simple and robust. Here the simplification principle of inherent safety, the
KISS principle (Keep It Simple and Stupid), should be followed. Depending on
the risk level, they must also present a certified high degree of reliability. This is
described in the international standard IEC 61511 (International Electrotechni-
cal Commission) that advises on the different Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) with
the required reliability as a function of the risk.
Organizational measures are based on human action for their performance.
In the fine chemicals and pharmaceutical industries, reactor-charging operations
are often manual operations and the product identification relies on the opera-
tor. In this context, quality systems act as support to safety, since they require
a high degree of traceability and reliability. Examples of such measures are
labeling, double visual checks, response to acoustic or optical alarms, in process
control, and so on. The efficiency of theses measures is entirely based on the
discipline and instruction of the operators. Therefore, they must be accompa-
nied by programs of instructions, where the adequate procedures are learned in
training. During the risk analysis, the measures must be accurately described
to establish terms of reference, but no detailed engineering must be done during
the analysis. It is also advisable to define a responsible person for the design
and establishment of these measures.
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risk measures Risk measures play an important role in communicating the
whole risk assessment process. A risk measure is defined as a mathematical
function of the probability of an event and the consequences of that event. This
risk measure forms the basis for evaluation of risks by the decision-makers. With
limits or standards an acceptable risk level is set. Finally the risk measure can
be used as an instrument to show the effect of risk reducing actions.
The risk measures are categorized in sections based on the consequences they
consider:
• Individual risk
• Societal risk
3.4.10 Residual Risk
This is the last step of risk analysis. After having completed the risk analysis
and defined the measures to reduce risks, a further risk assessment must be
carried out to ensure risks are reduced to an accepted level. The risks cannot
be completely eliminated: risk zero does not exist, thus a residual risk remains.
This is also because only identified risks were reduced by the planned measures.
Thus, the residual risk has three components:
• the consciously accepted risk;
• the identified, but misjudged risk, and
• the unidentified risk.
Thus, a rigorous and consciously performed risk analysis should reduce both of
the last components. This is the responsibility of the risk analysis team. Hence,
it becomes obvious that risk analysis is a creative task that must anticipate
events, which may occur in the future and has the objective of defining means
for their avoidance. This may also be seen in opposition to laws that react
on events from the past. Therefore, it is a demanding task oriented to the
future, which requires excellent engineering skills. At this stage, a second risk
profile can be constructed, in a similar way to that shown in subsection 3.4.7.
This allows the identification of the risks that are now strongly reduced and
thus the measures, which require special care in their design, should perhaps be
submitted to a reliability analysis.
It is a creative task to identify the hazards, but also to define risk - reducing
measures. Thus, different professions must be represented in the team, including
chemists, chemical engineers, engineers, automation engineers, and operators.
When a new process is to be analysed, the experience gained during process
development should be available to the team, hence members of the process
development team must be represented in the risk analysis. The plant manager,
who is the risk owner, takes a determining part in the analysis. The team
leader or moderator is responsible for the quality of the analysis; caring for
its thoroughness, for discipline in the team, and for the time management. In
the choice of risk - reducing measures, the moderator drives the group toward
efficient solutions. More generally, the group dynamics is important, so the
participants should also be creative and open - minded. The moderator ensures
that all opinions can be expressed, leading the team toward consensual solutions.
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It is advantageous that the moderator has a sound industrial experience and, if
possible, some experience in dealing with risks or in incident analysis.
3.4.11 Risk Management
Risk management is activity directed toward the assessing, mitigating (to an
acceptable level) and monitoring of risks. In some cases the acceptable risk may
be near zero. Risks can come from accidents, natural causes and disasters as
well as deliberate attacks from an adversary. In businesses, risk management
entails organized activity to manage uncertainty and threats and involves people
following procedures and using tools in order to ensure conformance with risk-
management policies.
The possibility of accidents requires the development of integrated safety
management systems to implement mitigation activities, which seek the reduc-
tion of the vulnerability, and prevention activities, which try to reduce the
hazard [147].
Theoretically, risk management activities can be oriented to deal with spe-
cific and defined risk and manage it optimally. Unfortunately, reality is far too
complex and resources far too scarce to deal with each risk event individually,
as often one hazardous event is linked or related to one or more other hazardous
events. Some events triggered others.
As an example Pons et al., 2007 [197], urban degradation caused, e.g., by
unplanned urban growth, bad construction practices, or immigration of people
from the rural areas, tends to disturb the balance in the urban system, influences
the interaction process between different hazards and vulnerabilities increasing
vulnerability levels, and then creates new hazards factors.
The strategies include transferring the risk to another party, avoiding the
risk, reducing the negative effect of the risk, and accepting some or all of the
consequences of a particular risk.
In spite of these strategies the traditional risk management programs (e.g.,
health risk assessment) are focused on risks stemming from physical or legal
causes (e.g. natural disasters or fires, accidents, ergonomics, death and law-
suits).
An advanced approach to risk management must to emphasize:
• Minimizing personnel exposure
• Minimizing quantities of hazardous materials
• ”Safety by Design”
• Accurate procedures and standards
• Rigorous personnel training.
Proper risk management, as given in Figure 3.24 focuses on not only normal op-
erations/conditions but also abnormal operations/conditions, equipment design,
human factors, standard operating and contingency procedures, maintenance
operations, and facility design and siting.
A possible approach to risk management focuses resources on addressing critical
credible failure scenarios. This is accomplished by prioritizing operations/equipment
based on perceived risk and material type and quantity, identifying and ranking
81
Figure 3.24: An example of proper risk management
potential hazards using qualitative methodologies, and then using quantitative
methodologies to evaluate the critical scenarios. This type of review is known
to industry as risk assessment or Process Hazards Analysis (PHA). These PHA
services may be used independently or in conjunction with our explosive char-
acterization, incident investigation, facility siting, and other analysis services.
Process Hazards Analysis and Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Assessment
techniques can be applied to processes to minimize potential hazards. In order
to this scope, the Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix presented in Figure 3.11 can
be very useful because it provides a systematic method for assigning a hazard
level to a failure event based on the severity and frequency of the event.
Finally, in Figure 3.25 there is a procedural schema that step-by-step arrives to
emergency arrangements starting from hazard identification trough Quantified
risk assessment, Risk evaluation and reduction and Risk management.
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 2-4
Figure 2.2  Scope of Topic Guidance for Fire, Explosion and Risk Assessment 
 
Interface with other topic 
specialist teams (Appendix A) 
Aspects covered: APOSC Ref 
(Para No.s) 
SCR Ref 
     
 
 
 
Hazard identification · use of a systematic process for hazard identification 
· application of appropriate hazard identification methods 
· identification of combinations or sequences of events leading to a major accident 
· consideration of the various existing (and potential future) activities on an installation as 
potential initiators of a major accident 
38-48 Reg 8(1)(c) 
     
 
 
Quantified risk assessment · approach to application of QRA 
· suitability and sufficiency of QRA 
- selection of representative set of events 
- event frequency estimation 
- hazard assessment 
- consequence assessment 
- escalation analysis 
- risk assessment  
75-77 Sch 1 – 3 
     
 Risk evaluation and 
reduction 
· approach to risk evaluation 
· criteria for elimination of less significant risks 
· consideration of reasonable practicability 
· consideration of relevant good practice and application of sound engineering judgement 
· consideration of people exposed to exceptional risks 
· consideration of uncertainty 
· identification and implementation of risk reduction measures 
49-68 
78-89 
Reg 8(1)(d) 
     
 Risk management · description of measures to manage major accident hazards 
· application of principles of inherent safety 
· strategy for prevention of major accident hazards 
· provision of appropriate detection measures 
· provision of appropriate control and mitigation measures 
· PFEER summary 
90-105 
117-119 
Sch 1 – 3 
Reg 8(1A) 
     
 Emergency arrangements  · consideration of anticipated conditions during an emergency 
· sufficiency of protection of TR 
· demonstration that frequency of TR impairment is below 10-3 per year and ALARP  
· performance standards and endurance times for access to TR 
106-112 
122-129 
135-137 
Sch 1 – 3 
Control systems 
Human factors 
Mechanical integrity 
Pipelines 
Process integrity 
Structural integrity 
Well operations 
Human factors 
Mechanical integrity 
Pipelines 
Process integrity 
Well operations 
 
Mechanical integrity 
Process integrity 
Structural integrity 
 
EER 
 
Figure 3.25: The problem of HAZMAT step-by-step
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Chapter 4
Hazardous Materials
Transportation
In this chapter, some important concepts are introduced about Hazardous Ma-
terials Transportation: Section 4.1 gives background informations.
Section 4.2 presents hazard and risk concepts in HAZMAT transportation
and the main factor that differentiate HAZMAT logistic problems from other
logistic problems. We also review different models of risk assessment.
Section 4.3 offers a high-level view of HAZMAT logistics literature. It de-
scribes how the transportation of HAZMATs can be classified according to the
mode of transport, namely: road, rail, water, air, and pipeline. We propose
a classification scheme that take into account the framework and the method
of the former article by Erkut, Tjandra and Verter edit in 2007, completes it
with the most recent literature. In Section 4.4 we cluster and discuss the papers
available in the literature according to the proposed scheme.
4.1 Background Informations
In the last few years, logistics has become a strategic factor for development and
competition. In fact, Research and Development activities have traditionally
faced the management of Supply Chain and International Transport focusing
on two main aspects: speed and efficiency.
However, several vulnerabilities have recently been highlighted under a safety
and security viewpoint. The weakness of the logistic chains has become more
evident with the beginning of the new millennium. Terrorist attacks, such as
11/09 in the USA have caused the introduction of new rules and procedures,
which affect the overall logistics showing the vulnerability of the global economy.
As a consequence, nowadays, it is necessary to carry out an exhaustive re-
search activity on the various typologies of risk, which may affect the supply
chain. HAZMAT transport probably represents by definition the most vulner-
able aspect in global logistics and transportation activities.
In Chapter 3 HAZMATs were defined and referred to any material whose
transportation has the potential to cause harm to people, property or the en-
vironment. This category includes flammable liquids or gases, chemicals, toxic,
explosives, radioactive, corrosive and nuclear materials.
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Most of the 1.5 billion tons of HAZMAT transferred annually in the USA are
flammable liquids. HAZMAT transportation is an important economic activity
in industrialized countries due to the need to move a large number of HAZMAT
shipments from production to consumption sites. With globalisation, these
distances tend to increase as production sites are shift to countries with more
favorable labour conditions.
As hazardous materials traffic originates and terminates at numerous loca-
tions throughout shipment network in the world, the HAZMAT transportation
poses risks to life, health, property, and the environment due to the possibility
of an unintentional release. While moving HAZMAT is necessary, authorities
are increasingly concerned about the risks associated with these movements and
the catastrophic consequences of possible accidents.
More than 300 million HAZMAT shipments are transported annually in the
USA, and it is estimated that HAZMAT transportation accounts for 5% to 15%
of the total number of shipments carried.
Although the possibility of an accident is relatively low (10−8 ÷ 10−6 per
vehicle-mile traveled) the catastrophic outcomes together with the large number
of shipments and the longer distances they travel cause great concern to the
authorities [4].
HAZMAT catastrophes occur primarily through either involvement of the
transportation vehicle in an accident or leakage and activation of the HAZMAT
carried. The combination of these two incidents of course, could have even more
catastrophic consequences. The events above could result in human injuries and
fatalities, environmental pollution and large economic costs.
As most hazardous materials are not used at their point of production and
they are transported over considerable distances, HAZMAT transportation can
be also classified according to the mode of transport, namely: road, rail, water,
air, and pipeline, although some shipments are intermodal. Most countries
regulate some aspect of hazardous materials.
The most widely applied regulatory scheme is that for the transportation
of dangerous goods. The Committee of Experts on the Transport of Danger-
ous Goods of the United Nations Economic and Social Council issues Model
Regulations on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods.
Most regional and national regulatory schemes for hazardous materials are
harmonized to a greater or lesser degree with the UN Model Regulation.
As it was seen in Section 3.1.1, HAZMAT placards are essential when works
involving hazardous materials are taking place. Furthermore, in the event of
an accident, it is important for first responders to know the nature of the haz-
ardous materials involved. Hence, vehicles transporting hazardous materials
must display unified placards describing the class and the nature of the cargo.
On the other hand, making HAZMAT vehicles easy to identify through placards
exposes them to another kind of risk: sabotage or misuse as weapons of mass
destruction or of convenience.
UN/NA numbers are required for the shipment of hazardous materials and
some Hazard Identification Numbers have special meanings and indicate a par-
ticular hazard or combination of hazards. United Nations (UN) Numbers are
four-digit numbers used world-wide in international commerce and transporta-
tion to identify hazardous chemicals or classes of hazardous materials. These
numbers generally range between 0000 and 3500 and are ideally preceded by the
letters “UN” (for example, “UN1005”) to avoid confusion with other number
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Figure 4.1: Example of The ADR Hazard Identification Number
codes.
UN numbers are assigned by a committee of the United Nations, the Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Committee of Experts (COE) on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods which issues “Recommendations on the Trans-
port of Dangerous Goods” (also called “the Orange Book” [227]).
UN Recommendations are not regulations, but are recommendations ad-
dressing the international transport of dangerous goods by sea, air, road, rail
and inland waterways. These recommendations are reviewed, amended and up-
dated biennially (every second year) by the UN COE and are distributed to
nations throughout the world.
These recommendations serve as the basis for national, regional, and in-
ternational transport regulations such as those prepared by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO). The UN Recommendations are also used as a basis for the de-
velopment of regional (e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and European Road and Rail regulations) and national transport regulations,
including the U.S. Hazardous Materials Regulations.
Each country has its own particular legislation and standards for HAZMAT
placards, and so it is important to be aware of those which affect you when
dealing with hazardous materials.
For instance, in the U.S., hazardous materials carried in bulk are required to
be marked before shipment by road, rail, or air. The authority that regulates this
marking is the Department of Transportation, or DOT. The rules for placarding
are contained in CFR (The Code of Federal Regulations) Title 49, sections 171
and 172 [49]. North American (NA) Numbers are identical to UN numbers. If
a material does not have a UN number, it may be assigned an NA number;
these are usually 4-digit numbers starting with 8 or 9 such as 9037 (or ideally,
NA9037), the NA number for hexachloroethane.
Vehicles running under International ADR regulations will carry a three-
digit Code, referred to as the Kemler Code (see Figure 4.1). This code will give
the Fire and Rescue Service further information about the hazards involved in
dealing with the material. The first figure of the Kemler Code indicates the
primary hazard and the second and third figure generally indicate secondary
hazards as indicated in Figure 4.2. Doubling of a figure indicates an intensifica-
tion of that particular hazard. Where the hazard associated with a substance
can be adequately indicated by a single figure, this is followed by a zero. An
orange blank placard without any numbers indicates vehicle carrying dangerous
load (drums, packages, etc.) or multi-load tanker.
If a hazard identification number is prefixed by letter ’X’, this indicates that
the substance will react dangerously with water. The international carriage
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reacts dangerously with waterX
risk of spontaneous, violent reaction9miscellaneous/environmental
hazard
9
corrosive risk8corrosive substance8
radioactive substance7
toxic risk6toxic substance6
oxidizing risk5oxidizing substance or organic
peroxide
5
fire risk4flammable solid4
fire risk3flammable liquid3
(flammable) gas may be given off2gas2
the hazard is adequately described
by the first figure
0
The second and third figure
generally indicate
secondary hazards:
The first figure of the Kemler Code
indicates the primary hazard:
Figure 4.2: The Kemler Code
of HAZMAT has long been governed by established international agreements
known, in the case of land transport, by the abbreviations ADR, RID or ADNR.
These rules were drawn up by international organizations which have a wealth
of experience and knowledge in the field. They are updated at intervals to keep
pace with technical progress and improve safety.
The European Union’s approach is to transpose these rules via specific di-
rectives which are then applicable to national transport too, not just transport
between Member States. Currently, the European Union has legislation for the
transport of dangerous goods by road and by rail.
In Europe, the first directive adopted by the Council (in 1989) covered only
very specific aspects such as the training of drivers.
The Maastricht Treaty explicitly established the competence of the Euro-
pean Community to deal with transport safety. Subsequently, the Commission
suggested general legislation concerning the transport of dangerous goods in
various modes, such as road or rail transport.
In order to avoid duplicating with the work carried out by international
organizations, the Commission considered that Community legislation should
be established on the basis of the following principles:
• uniform application of international agreements at EU and Member States
level;
• elimination of obstacles to exchanges created by non-harmonized interna-
tional standards;
• adoption of measures at Community level, to supplement those contained
in the international agreements;
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• coherence of Community legislation in this field with other EU policies.
The first Directive was the 94/55/EC from 21 November 1994 on the approxima-
tion of the laws of the Member States with regard to the transport of dangerous
goods by road, usually called the A´DR Framework Directive´. This directive is
intended to apply the requirements of the technical annexes to the ADR agree-
ment uniformly to national road transport and to transport between Member
States.
A second Directive is very similar to the ADR Framework Directive but
applies to transport by rail: the Council Directive 96/49/EC of 23 July 1996 on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States with regard to the transport
of dangerous goods by rail (’RID Framework Directive’).
As far as ’Class 2 gases’ are concerned, the annexes to both these directives
contain common requirements on the design of containers, the materials to be
used depending on the type of the product to be transported, the maximum
level to which containers should be filled and periodical examination.
As certain requirements of the ADR and the RID, concerning containers for
category 2 Gases are less detailed than the requirements of national legislation,
article 6.4 of each of these Framework Directives allow the Member States to
retain their national requirements on the subject until such time as the reference
to the European Standards for the construction and use are added to the annexes
of the two directives.
An abstract of the Standardization Programme of CEN and the section of
RID/ADR where the standards will be referred to is available.
The collection of legal instruments organizing the safe transport of dangerous
goods is quite complex. Further information on EU legislation can be found on
the Commission’s Europa website.
The European Commission has initiated a proposal in order to regroup the
Road and Rail Frameworks Directives under a single framework Directive deal-
ing with Road, Rail and Inland Navigation transport of dangerous goods.
In the context of its global goal of improving safety in transport, the Euro-
pean Union has issued in 1999 the Directive 1999/36/EC to enhance safety with
regard to transportable pressure equipment approved for the inland transport
of dangerous goods by road and by rail. The Directive aims simultaneously to
ensure the free movement of such equipment within the Community, including
the placing on the market and repeated putting into service and repeated use
aspects.
Directive 1999/36/EC is commonly referred to as TPED (Transportable
Pressure Equipment Directive). In order to facilitate the use of the Directive,
the Commission together with Member States’ experts has elaborated TPED
Guidelines, which may be found here. These will be completed as new Guide-
lines are adopted.
The European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Danger-
ous Goods by Road, commonly known as ADR (from the french abbreviation
Accord europen relatif au transport international des marchandises dangereuses
par route), governs transnational transport of hazardous materials. Launched in
Geneva on 30 September 1957 under the aegis of the United Nations’ Economic
Commission for Europe, it first took effect on 29 January 1968. The agreement
was modified (article 14, paragraph 3) in New York on 21 August 1975, though
these changes only took effect on 19 April 1985. A set of new Amendments
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entered into force on 1 January 2007, and consequently, a fourth consolidated
restructured version was published as document ECE/TRANS/175, Vol.I and
II (ADR 2007).
The agreement itself is brief and simple, and its most important article is
article 2. This article states that with the exception of certain exceptionally
dangerous materials, hazardous materials may in general be transported inter-
nationally in wheeled vehicles, provided that two sets of conditions be met:
• Annex A regulates the merchandise involved, notably their packaging and
labels.
• Annex B regulates the construction, equipment and use of vehicles for the
transport of hazardous materials.
The Regulations covering the transport of dangerous goods are very different
from those covering Supply. There are also separate arrangements for each of
the four modes: Road, Rail, Air and Sea. These pages explore each of these in
turn, looking at the situation in the UK and International transport.
4.2 Risk analysis of HAZMAT transportation
In Chapter 3, hazard and risk concepts were defined and it was seen that risk
estimates are often used to evaluate the safety of an industrial plant, in order
to find which additional safety measures can reduce the risk, or to support
public authorities new plant siting in establishing new plant siting or emergency
planning.
In this section, a survey of the mathematical models used to calculate the
individual and societal risk in HAZMAT transportation is given.
4.2.1 Risk assessment of HAZMAT transportation
Risk assessments are an essential part of the process of integrating natural dis-
aster programs with overall development objectives. These assessments identify
sources of risk, vulnerable groups, and potential interventions.
Risk assessment allows policymakers to specifically define the objectives of
the risk management programs and to establish vulnerability reduction targets.
Risk is characterized by two aspects: occurrence probability of an event and
consequences of an occurring event. In the context of HAZMAT transportation,
the undesired events are the accidents that could lead to a release of a HAZMAT.
According to Alp [10], “risk is a measure of the probability and severity
of harm to an exposed receptor due to potential undesired events involving a
HAZMAT whereas the exposed receptor can be a person, the environment, or
properties in the vicinity”.
Harwood et al. (1989) [114] define risk on the basis of historical data, that
is, as:
Risk =
Events
Exposure
(4.1)
where: The strength of indicators as (4.1) is that they represent an integrated
comprehensive measure of both frequency and severity of the past undesired
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Exposure is an exposure measure, such as truck miles, and
Events is the weighted number of releases or vehicular accidents.
Here, the weight associated to an event expresses
the level of its severity.
events, and for this reason they are frequently used in literature to assess the
risk.
On the other hand, the subjectivity, in defining the value of the weights
that account for the severity of the events, is an unavoidable weakness of these
indicators.
In addition, such indicators may be not suitable to assess the risk of potential
future occurrences, in presence, e.g., of technological advances. Different studies
tries to overcome this latter limitation (see, e.g., [18, 20, 26]).
As these studies are usually focused on releases that occur on the road or, in
a lesser extent, along railways, they assesses the risk by taking into consideration
different factors such as population density, facility type, material to be shipped
and exposure.
The challenge is to convert these factors into quantitative values that allow
to express the probability of a hazardous materials accident and a measure
of the associated consequences (e.g. expected population exposure) to apply
to the links of the road (rail) network so that the best (safest) routes can be
determined.
QRA involves the following key steps:
1. hazard and exposed receptor identification;
2. frequency analysis; and
3. consequence modeling.
In addition, examination of risks on different types of exposed receptor is es-
sential to cover different response characteristics in the risk assessment. Also,
given the fact that public opposition is a function of perceived risks, perhaps
more attention should be paid to quantifying and modeling of perceived risks.
Each step of QRA presents some difficulties. For example, the consequence
modeling step requires as inputs the territorial distribution of the population
exposed to the consequences of an accident. Differently, many past studies
roughly assumed uniform population density along transport links.
4.2.2 Frequency analysis of HAZMAT transportation
According to [12], the frequency analysis involves:
1 - determining the probability of an undesirable event;
2 - determining the level of potential receptor exposure, given the nature of
the event;
3 - estimating the degree of severity, given the level of exposure.
Each stage of this assessment requires the calculation of a probability distribu-
tion, with stage (1) and (2) involving conditional distributions.
91
As an example, [80], for each unit road segment, determine the joint proba-
bility of type of accident, release, incident, and consequence as follows.
Let it be:
A the accident event that involves an HAZMAT carrier,
M the release event,
I the incident event,
D the event of an injury to an individual.
Suppose that the consequence of the HAZMAT release is expressed in terms of
the number of injuries. Then, using Bayes’ theorem, we obtain the probability
of an injury resulting from an accident related to the HAZMAT as:
p (A,M, I,D) = p (D|A,M, I) p (I|A,M) p (M |A) p (A) (4.2)
where: Despite its simplicity, the above model already contains many of the
p(E) denotes the probability of the event E, and
p(E|F ) denotes the associated conditional probability.
necessary elements for HAZMAT risk assessment. For example, Chow et al.
(1990) [53] used a Bayesian model that includes multiple levels of event severity
to predict severe nuclear accidents and to estimate the associate risks. Glickman
(1991) [101] used a Bayesian model in the assessment of the risks of highway
transportation of flammable liquid chemicals in bulk.
Furthermore, if Slm denotes the number of shipments of HAZMAT of type
m on the road segment l per year, then the product Slm · pl(A,Mm, I,D) cor-
responds to the frequency of the occurrence of the hazardous release event with
consequence D for a person in the neighborhood of road segment l.
In assessing the risk, the literature makes a distinction individual and societal
risks. Such a distinction is justified as, if few people are present around the
hazardous activity, the societal risk may be close to zero, whereas the individual
risk may be quite high.
4.2.3 Individual Risk Assessment
Individual Risk [177] defines the individual risk as the yearly death frequency for
an average individual at a certain distance from the impact area. The analytical
expression for individual risk are often mathematically complex and their value
can only determined numerically.
As an example [153, 155] propose a model that requires the following high
level variables to assess the individual risk:
• frequency of release,
• probability of final outcome given a release,
• wind probability,
• vulnerability.
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We must take into consideration that a pipeline accident can take place
everywhere along the pipeline route.a road tanker release can occur in any point
along the road on which the tanker is traveling.
We should consider also a road tanker release can occur in any point along the
road on which the tanker is traveling. As a consequence, a tanker or a pipeline
conveying HAZMAT can be considered as a linear risk source equivalent to a
great number of point-risk sources.
First, the point-risk source must be characterized by defining the release
cases, i.e. by assigning:
• a hole size;
• a physical state of the outcome;
• a release rate;
• a release duration.
In addition, it is necessary to know:
• a likelihood of occurrence to the possible accidents which may occur during
the transport;
• which have been chosen to classify all possible releases;
• the suitable meteorological conditions have to be chosen, given by the
pairs “atmospheric turbulence class wind speed”.
Then, consequence models are used to calculate the spatial distribution of the
physical effects of each pair “release case meteorological condition”, i.e.:
• concentrations if the hazardous chemical is a toxic one;
• thermal radiation and the overpressure of the blast if it is flammable.
The physical effects are then combined with proper exposure times to obtain
the received doses which are converted in vulnerabilities, i.e. death probabilities
of an average individual, through “probit” equations [234]. In this way, the
vulnerability distribution around the risk point is assigned to each pair “release
case-meteorological condition”: it is named vulnerability map.
Probability Estimates (probits) are just used to calculate the percentage
of an exposed population that will suffer a certain type of consequence from
a given magnitude of an adverse effect. They can be used to estimate the
consequences of toxic exposures, thermal radiation from fires and overpressure
from explosions. In mathematical terms “probit” is a straight line probability
relationship developed to measure, for example, killing a certain proportion of
the population, expressed as a standard deviation and related to a mean of 5.
It has the advantage of being easily used without deep understanding of the
underlying theory, provided suitable data is available.
Probit equations have the form:
Y = k1 + k2 lnV (4.3)
Where Y is the probit, which is related to the percentage of the population
suffering the set consequence. k1 and k1 are constants which are determined
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from historical data and V is the magnitude of the effect, for example the
overpressure or thermal dose [151].
According to Bonvicini et al. (1998) [28], at a test area point (i.e. a point
corresponding to a real location of a geographical site), the individual risk is
given by the sum of the risks created at that point by all arcs of the linear risk
source of the road).
In order to calculate the individual risk at point P due to an accident at point
Q(t), the vulnerability maps are combined with the probability of occurrence of
different seasonal situations, weather conditions and wind directions to obtain
the unit risk maps, whereas t is a curvilinear route abscissa.
Let Q(t) the point risk source; then, at a generic point O of the unit risk
map for the ith release case, the unit risk RQ(t)→O is a parameter given by:
R¯Q(t)→O (i) =
Nseas∑
j=1
x (j)
Nmet∑
k=1
∫ 2pi
0
Pwind (j, k, ϑ) υQ(t)→O (i, k, ϑ) dϑ (4.4)
where:
Nseas is the number of different seasonal situations;
Nmet is the number of different meteorological situations;
Pwind is the probability density function of a given wind ϑ for
a specified meteorological condition k and a seasonal situation j;
υQ(t)→O is the vulnerability that a release i at Q(t) creates at O when the
is meteorological condition is k and the wind direction is ϑ;
x(j) is the fraction of the year that tankers travel on the road in a given
season (the symbol xV (j) is used in this case);
is the fraction of the season during which the pipeline is active
(the symbol xp(j) is used in this case).
Then, the unit risk maps are combined with proper frequency factors and trans-
lated along the route to describe the changes in the position where an accident
can occur, i.e. the contributions of all point risk sources Q(t) to the risk at P .
Finally, they are summed for all release cases to obtain the global individual
risk at P , IRP :
IRP =
Nrel∑
i=1
[∫
L
frel(i, t)R¯Q(t)→P (i)dt
]
(4.5)
where:
L is the road route;
Nrel is the number of release cases;
frel is the frequency of the ith release case.
Of course, the frequency frel of the ith release case has different expressions for
the road in spite of other modal transports as, for example, the pipeline.
The release case frequency for the pipeline is calculated as
frel(i, t) = λp(t)pΦ(i)pI (4.6)
where λp is the average release frequency (release year−1km−1).
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The release case frequency for the road is given by
frel(i, t) = λR(t)prelpΦ(i)pIpV (4.7)
where:
λR is the average incident rate (vehicle−1km−1);
prel is the probability to have a release once an incident has occurred;
pΦ(i) is the probability of the release of a particular size;
pI is the ignition probability (for flammable substances only);
nV is the number of yearly traveling tankers.
The release case frequency for the pipeline is calculated as
frel(i, t) = λp(t)pΦ(i)pI (4.8)
where λp is the average release frequency (release year−1km−1).
In order to perform the line integral of 4.5, it is necessary to represent the route
as a polygonal curve of Nseg straight segments, each characterized by constant
release frequency values.
With this hypothesis, 4.5 becomes
IRP =
Nrel∑
i=1
Nseg∑
l=1
frel(i, l)
[∫
Li
R¯Q(t)→P (i)dt
]
(4.9)
4.2.4 Societal Risk Assessment
Societal risk can be represented by means of F (N) curves, where F is the is the
frequency of all accidents capable of causing the death of N or more persons.
Apart from the vulnerability maps defined for each release casemeteorological
condition, it is necessary to identify on a population map:
• the zones of rectangular shape, where people may be considered uniformly
distributed with a density depending on the area being an urban, a sub-
urban or a rural one;
• the roads, where people are linearly distributed;
• the aggregation centres, e.g., schools, hospitals, and commercial sites,
where people can be considered as clustered. Furthermore, the proba-
bilities of each category of people being indoor have to be assigned.
At the point risk source Q(t), a scenario is given by the combination release
case i-seasonal situation j-meteorological condition k-wind direction ϑ.
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When an accident occurs at Q(t), the number of fatalities NscenQ(t) (i, j, ϑ) due
to each scenario is evaluated according to the following equation.
NscenQ(t) (i, j, ϑ) =
nL∑
m=1
ρLm (j)
∫
Lm
νQ(t) (i, k, ϑ) [xLm (j) + (1− xLm (j))αP,Lm ] dLm+
nA∑
n=1
ρAn (j)
∫
An
νQ(t) (i, k, ϑ) [xAn (j) + (1− xAn (j))αP,An ] dAn+
nC∑
o=1
vQ(t)(i, k, ϑ) [xCo(j) + (1− xCo(j))αP,Co ]NCo(j) (4.10)
where:
nL is the number of lines on the population map;
nA is the number of rectangles on the population map;
nC is the number of points on the population map;
ρLm is the people densities corresponding to the mth line;
ρAn is the people densities corresponding to the nth rectangle;
NCo is the number of persons in the aggregation centre o;
xLm is the fraction of people staying indoors on the generic line;
xAn is the fraction of people staying indoors on the generic rectangle;
xCo is the fraction of people staying indoors on the aggregation centre o;
αP−Lm is the the mitigation factor deriving from
being indoors on the generic line;
αP−An is the the mitigation factor deriving from
being indoors on the generic rectangle;
αP−Co is the the mitigation factor deriving from
being indoors on the aggregation centre;
vQ(t) is the vulnerability due to a release in the
point risk source Q(t) stored in vulnerability maps.
To perform the integration steps of 4.10, each vulnerability matrix is linearly
interpolated obtaining a continuous function.
An efficient numerical algorithm based on the “circuitation theorem” accel-
erates the surface integration that constitutes the slowest step of the procedure.
Each scenario of the point risk source has to be characterized by a number of
fatalities NscenQ(t) (i, j, ϑ) and a frequency per unit length and unit angle, defined
as
fscenQ(t) (i, j, ϑ) = frel(i, t)x(j)Pwind(i, j, ϑ) (4.11)
In order to evaluate NscenQ(t) (i, j, ϑ) for a given scenario at a point risk source Q(t),
the population map is overlaid with the vulnerability maps, which are rotated
to describe the changes in the wind direction.
Once NscenQ(t) (i, j, ϑ) and f
scen
Q(t) (i, j, ϑ) at point Q(t) are known for each sce-
nario, FQ(t)(N(i, j, k)), i.e. the cumulative frequency function Q(t) per unit
length at point Q(t) can be evaluated by taking into account all wind direc-
tions.
To simulate the change in the position where accidents can occur, the vul-
nerability maps are translated along the route, and for each route point Q(t),
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the evaluation of FQ(t)(N(i, j, k)), along the route obtaining F(N(i,j,k)), and,
for fixed values of N, and, for fixed values of N, to sum the integrated values
for all combinations of release casemeteorological conditionseasonal situation,
in order to obtain the final F (N) curve.
As in the individual risk model, the route is represented by a polygonal curve
of Nseg straight segments, each characterized by constant release case frequency
values.
For each segment l, the outlined calculus is performed, and eventually, the
F (N)l curves are summed for constant N values to obtain the F (N) curve for
the whole route. An alternative way to describe the societal risk is the use of the
so-called FN -curves [126], where F is the cumulative frequency of an accident
with N or more either fatalities or evacuated people. Such FN -curve are drawn
by computing, the probability that a group of more than N persons would be
impacted due to an HAZAMAT accident, for each (reasonable) value of N .
Expressions from (4.5) to (4.10) allow to assess the risk in the assumption
that just one type of accident may happen. However, more than one type of
accident, release, incident, and consequence can occur during the HAZMAT
transport activity. For example, a release of flammable liquid can lead to a
variety of incidents such as a spill, a fire, or an explosion. To accommodate
this, Erkut et al.(2005) [80] suggest to assess the risk as follows.
Let A, M , I, and C denote respectively the set of possible accidents, releases,
incidents, and consequences that may occur on road segment l. Suppose that
all consequences (injuries and fatalities, property damage, and environmental
damage) can be expressed in monetary terms. Then, the hazardous materials
transport risk associated with road segment l can be expressed as:
Rl = slm
∑
a∈A
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈l
∑
c∈C
pi(Aa,Mm, Ii, Cc) · CONSc (4.12)
where CONSc is the possible c-type consequence.
In practice, researchers frequently neglect conditional probabilities and simplify
the analysis by considering the expected loss (or the worst-case loss) as the
measure of risk. The expected value is calculated as the product of the proba-
bility of a release accident and the consequence of the incident [161]. Hence the
HAZMAT risk associated with a road segment l is expressed as
Rl =
∑
m∈M
slm p(Mm) · clm (4.13)
where clm is the undesirable consequence due to the release of HAZMAT m on
road segment l. This risk model is sometimes referred [82] to as the technical
risk.
4.2.4.1 Security of HAZMAT transportation
The risk assessment methodologies introduced in the previous section may need
reviewing in the next future due to the new concern for security in HAZMAT
transportation.
The terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 have focused attention on what
other targets terrorists may choose. It was quickly recognized that HAZMAT
vehicles could be desirable targets for terrorists, and certain HAZMAT vehicles
were designated as weapons of mass destruction, see [2, 225].
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Such concerns changed the way the HAZMAT industry operates. For exam-
ple, the US Federal Government now requires HAZMAT truckers to submit to
fingerprinting and criminal background checks [97].
The security issue, however, has not yet received much attention from the
operations research (OR) literature. However, there is potential for OR studies,
for examples:
• Rerouting around major cities - The risk of terrorist attacks made it very
undesirable to route HAZMAT vehicles (particularly trains) through ma-
jor population centres. In particular, [76] show that significant risk reduc-
tions are possible through rerouting, and [78] develop new methodology
for routing with a catastrophe-avoidance objective.
• Changes in the modeling of incidence risks - The traditional risk assess-
ment for HAZMAT assumes incidents are caused by traffic accidents or
human error. We now know that there is a nonzero probability of a ter-
rorist attack or a hijack. This fact increases the incident probabilities and
requires a new way of modeling consequences since the impact may no
longer be limited to the planned route. Furthermore, attack probabilities
are unlikely to be uniform. For example, a tunnel, a bridge, or a trophy
building are likely to have a higher attack probabilities than a remote and
unpopulated area. In contrast, sparsely populated areas may be associ-
ated with a higher hijack probability. A hijacked vehicle’s future route is
unpredictable and special precautions may have to be taken to prevent it
from having an incident in a densly populated area. As a result, tradi-
tional risk assessment-based route planning is no longer adequate. There
are few papers on these subjects, but see [188] for probabilistic modeling
of terrorist threats, and [118, 120] for incorporation of security concerns
in route planning.
• Changes in route planning methodology - Past HAZMAT routing litera-
ture focuses on finding a minimum risk route. Unfortunately, the use of
quantitative measures and selecting routes accordingly make the routes
predictable by terrorists. To minimize the probability of a successful ter-
rorist attack or hijacking, shippers should use alternative routes. A game
theory approach can be applied determine the best way of either alter-
nating the routes or switching from one to other ones en-route time to
minimize predictability. In this context, video surveillance, global posi-
tioning systems and communication equipment installed on all HAZMAT
vehicles allow the precise tracking of vehicles, but also allow the imple-
mentation of such real-time decision making (see, e.g., [97, 237]).
4.2.5 Risk management of HAZMAT transportation
The possibility of accidents requires a risk management process that involves set
of crucial logistic decisions referring to, as an example, the organization of the
emergency response operations. In fact, the logistical decisions on the routing
of HAZMAT vehicles and the emergency response must be integrated [240].
HAZMAT routing constitutes a critical decision in mitigating the associated
transportation risk. Rerouting of this traffic, especially toxic inhalation hazard
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materials, away from populated areas has received considerable attention in
recent years as a means of reducing risk.
However, rerouting on a route-specific basis is neither simple nor necessarily
effective at reducing risk because of physical constraints in the configuration of
the network and the possible need to increase the miles traveled by hazardous
materials so as to avoid populated areas.
Well-defined HAZMAT response policies, procedures and risk management
can allow to accurately identify the hazardous material, direct further response
and minimize risks.
As a consequence, it is very important to define models to assess the risks
relative to the transport of HAZMAT in a quantitative way. The models must
evaluate simultaneously the consequences and the frequencies of occurrence of
possible scenarios. This makes it possible to assess quantitatively the societal
risk (if the distribution of the people liable to be exposed is at hand) and the
individual risk.
It is also necessary the development of integrated safety management systems
to implement mitigation activities, which seek the reduction of the vulnerability,
and prevention activities, which try to reduce the hazard [148].
However, as the consequences of an accident involving hazardous materials
can be enormous, researchers are whetted to model the risk associated with
this shipment to propose various methods to design suitable routes that present
interesting trade-offs between transportation costs and accident risks.
In addition to these concerns, recently the possibility of a HAZMAT inci-
dent deliberately caused by terrorists is raising even greater concern. While
government agencies have attempted to address the problem with a number of
measures and laws that differ from state to state, researchers focus on setting
the necessary framework that aims at two complementary goals:
• to model risk parameters and develop methods for quantifying transporta-
tion risk and
• to efficiently formulate and solve the problem of routing HAZMAT, so that
the risk is minimized without unreasonably increasing transportation cost.
This area of research has recently attracted more interest because of the devel-
opment of advanced transport systems for sensing and communicating vehicle
locations. These technologies provide the ability for real-time decision making
in complicated networks. Further, the world-wide concern caused by terrorist
activities highlights the need for safer living conditions in every aspect of hu-
man activity. Minimizing HAZMAT transportation risk serves this goal. The-
oretically, risk management activities can be oriented to deal with specific and
defined risk and manage it optimally. Unfortunately, reality is far too complex
and resources far too scarce to deal with each risk event individually, as often
one hazardous event is linked or related to one or more other hazardous events.
Some events triggered others. As an example, urban degradation caused,
e.g., by unplanned urban growth, bad construction practices, or immigration of
people from the rural areas, tends to disturb the balance in the urban system,
influences the interaction process between different hazards and vulnerabilities
increasing vulnerability levels, and then creates new hazards factors [56].
The hazardous materials risk management process involves a set of crucial
logistical decisions referring to:
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• the planning of the hazardous materials transportation;
• the organization of the emergency response operations.
The inherent interrelationships between the emerging hazardous materials logis-
tical problems imply the integration of routing and emergency response logistical
decisions in order to improve the effectiveness of the hazardous materials emer-
gency response process. Public agencies have addressed the problem with series
of regulations and safety measures; hazardous materials transported via:
• Rail (RID regulation applies);
• Road (ADR regulation applies);
• Sea (IMDG regulation applies);
• Air, in some cases (ICAO).
Researchers have striven to model the risk associated with shipment of haz-
ardous materials to propose various methods to design suitable routes that
present interesting trade offs between transportation costs and accident risks.
The key elements of risk management are divided into two phases: the pre-
disaster phase and the post-disaster phase. The pre-disaster phase includes risk
identification, risk mitigation, risk transfer, and preparedness; the post-disaster
phase is devoted to emergency response and rehabilitation and reconstruction.
In Figure 4.3 the key components of disaster risk management are divided into
actions required in the pre-disaster phase and actions needed in the post-disaster
period [157].
A comprehensive risk management program addresses all these components:
they are an integrated, cross-sector network of institutions addressing all the
above phases of risk reduction and disaster recovery. Activities that need sup-
port are policy and planning, reform of legal and regulatory frameworks, coordi-
nation mechanisms, strengthening of participating institutions, national action
plans for mitigation policies, and institutional development.
Figure 4.3: Phases of risk reduction and disaster recovery
In ideal risk management, a prioritization process is followed whereby the risks
with the greatest loss and the greatest probability of occurring are handled
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first, and risks with lower probability of occurrence and lower loss are handled
in descending order.
In practice the process can be very difficult, and balancing between risks
with a high probability of occurrence but lower loss versus a risk with high loss
but lower probability of occurrence can often be mishandled.
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4.3 HAZMAT logistics literature review
The attention to HAZMAT research dates back 1980’s, mainly due to growing
safety concerns in developed countries (see, e.g., [22, 55, 99, 103, 128, 136, 137,
144, 190, 191, 194, 206, 213, 215, 217, 219, 228, 235]).
After a slight slow-down mainly caused by the difficulty of gathering accurate
and relevant data, it has recently gained emphasis again (see, e.g., [9, 11, 25,
33, 39, 40, 61, 69, 74, 75, 77, 79, 118, 118, 134, 238]).
This renewed interest is also owed to two factors that have acquired more and
more importance in the recent years: sustainability and equity. Sustainability
is the long-term compatibility between the economic and the environmental and
the social dimensions of development [15].
According to Keeney [136], Equity regards the public sensitivity to HAZMAT
as the beneficiaries from these shipments are usually those who live near produc-
tion facilities or the delivery points, yet also the populations living along HAZ-
MAT routes are also exposed to transportation risks (see, e.g., [57, 137, 165]).
This lack of burden-benefit concordance is typical source of public opposition
to hazardous material shipments. The shipment of spent nuclear fuel offers a
good example of equity-based public opposition ((see, e.g., [52, 53, 87, 102,
172, 175, 179, 212, 215, 231]).
4.3.1 Special issues of journals
The following journal have had special issues either devoted or strictly related
to HAZMAT transportation.
• Management Science published a special issue on Risk Analysis in 1984
(Vol. 30, No. 4) where five papers dealt with HAZMATs and hazardous
facilities. This issue was followed by a number of special issues of refer-
eed academic journals that focus on HAZMAT transportation or location
problems [31, 98, 144, 219].
• Transportation Research Record published two special issues on HAZMAT
transportation in 1988 (No. 1193) that included four papers [100, 116,
125, 204] and 1989 (No. 1245) that included six papers [3, 52, 114, 208,
210, 239].
• Transportation Science devoted an issue to HAZMAT logistics in 1991
(Vol. 25, No. 2) that contained six papers [101, 158, 160, 161, 200, 233].
• Journal of Transportation Engineering published a special section on HAZ-
MAT transportation in the March/April 1993 issue that included four
papers [115, 117, 146, 203].
• INFOR published a special double-issue on hazardous materials logistics
in 1995 (Vol. 33, No. 1 and 2) with nine papers.
• Location Science published four papers included in a special issue dealing
with HAZMATs in 1995 (Vol. 3, No. 3) [32, 57, 168, 173].
• Transportation Science produced a second special issue with seven papers
on HAZMAT logistics in 1997 (Vol. 31, No. 3).
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• Studies in Locational Analysis published a special issue on undesirable
facility location in April 1999 (Vol. 12) that contained seven papers.
• Computers & Operations Research have published a HAZMAT logistics
special issue in 2007 which contains results of the most recent research in
the area in 13 papers.
4.3.2 Books
The following books are a good starting point for those who wish to familiarize
with the terminology and the problem context.
1. Transportation of Hazardous Materials (1993) [176] - This book, edited
by L. N. Moses and D. Lindstrom, Kluwer Academic Publishers, issues
in Law, Social Science, and Engineering. It contains 18 articles presented
at HAZMAT Transport ’91, a national conference held at Northwestern
University on all aspects of HAZMAT transport. While only a few of the
articles use OR models and techniques, the book offers a multi-dimensional
treatment of the subject and it is good reading for new researchers in the
area.
2. Institute for Risk Research (IRR), University of Waterloo, Toronto, On-
tario, Canada (1992) - Three books were produced by this Institute as
a result of the First International Consensus Conference on the Risks of
Transporting hazardous materials, held in Toronto, Canada in April, 1992.
Transportation of hazardous materials: Assessing the Risks [205] - This
book, edited by F.F. Saccomanno and K. Cassidy, contains 30 ar-
ticles which are organized into five main chapters: Application of
QRA models to the transport of hazardous materials; Analysis of
hazardous materials Accident and Releases; Application of Simple
Risk Assessment Methodology; Uncertainty in Risk Estimation; Risk
Tolerance, Communication and Policy Implications.
Comparative Assessment of Risk Model Estimates for the Transport of
hazardous materials by Road and Rail [207] - This book, edited by
F.F. Saccomanno, D. Leming, and A. Stewart, documents the as-
sessment of a corridor exercise involving the application of several
risk models to a common transport problem involving the bulk ship-
ment of chlorine, LPG and gasoline by road and rail along predefined
routes. The purpose of the corridor exercise was to provide a well
defined transportation problem for analysis in order to examine the
sources of variability in the risk estimates. Seven agencies in six
countries participated in this exercise.
Risk and Responsibility [152] - This book, edit by W. Leiss,and C. Choci-
olko, documents the controversies over how to manage health and
environmental risks.
3. Hazardous materials transportation risk analysis (1994) [201] - This book,
edited by Rhyne WR, Van Norstrand Reinhold, developes a quantitative
approaches for truck and train and it explains the QRA methodologies and
their application to HAZMAT transportation. It also provides an extended
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example of a QRA for bulk transport of chlorine by truck and train. This
detailed example explores every step of the QRA from preliminary hazards
analysis to risk reduction alternatives. This book is a valuable reference
for HAZMAT transportation risks, and it is intended for practitioners. It
is not an OR book, but it provides useful information for OR research in
HAZMAT transportation modeling and analysis.
4. Guidelines for chemical transportation risk analysis (1995) [43] - This
book, edited by American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) New York, completes two other books
in the series of process safety guidelines books produced by CCPS: Guide-
lines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (CPQRA, 1989) and
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (HEP, 2nd edition, 1992).
It is intended to be used as a companion volume to the CPQRA and HEP
Guidelines when dealing with a quantitative transportation risk analysis
(TRA) methodology. This book offers a basic approach to TRA for differ-
ent transport modes (pipelines, rail, road, barge, water, and intermodal
containers). It can be useful to an engineer or manager in identifying cost
effective ways to manage and reduce the risk of a HAZMAT transportation
operation.
5. Quantitative Risk Assessment of Hazardous Materials Transport Systems
(1996) [181] - This book, edited by M. Nicolet-Monnier and A.V. Gheorge,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, contains a comprehensive treatment of the
analysis and assessment of transport risks due to HAZMAT transport on
roads, rail, by ship, and pipeline. It contains European case studies as well
as a discussion of computer-based decision support system for HAZMAT
transport problems. It is a useful reference book in the area.
4.3.3 Classification
The rest of this section deals mainly with the academic literature consisting
of refereed journal articles. The number of papers published between 1982 and
2007s in this area of research has peaked in mid 1990s and has declined somewhat
since 2004. In 2007 there is again a grow-up of the importance of the matter
and of the number of articles. Given the large number of papers in these last
twenty years, the articles deal with different aspects of the problem and can be
classified as summarized in Tab. 4.1.
Table 4.1: Main subjects in HAZMAT transportations literature
1. Risk assessment 3. Combined facility location and routing
2. Routing 4. Network design
Most hazardous materials are not used at their point of production and they
are transported over considerable distances. From this perspective HAZMAT
transportation can be also classified according to the mode of transport, namely:
road, rail, water, air, and pipeline, although some shipments are intermodal.
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Risk assessment
Road
Jonkman et al. (2003), Nardini et al. (2003),
Martinez-Alegria et al. (2003)G, Rosmuller and
Van Gelder (2003), Abkowitz (2002)C , Fabi-
ano et al. (2002), Gheorghe (2002), Kimberly
and Killmer (2002), Saccomanno and Haastrup
(2002)tunnels, Hollister (2002), Hwang et al.
(2001), Abkowitz et al. (2001), Verter and Kara
(2001)G, Efroymson and Murphy (2000), ICF
Consulting (2000), Leonelli et al. (1999), Zhang
et al. (2000)G, Pet-Armacost et al. (1999),
Cassini (1998), Mills and Neuhauser (1998), Cut-
ter and Ji (1997), Groothuis and Miller (1997),
Lovett et al. (1997)G, Pine and Marx (1997),
Alp and Zelensky (1996), Ertugrul (1995), Sis-
sell (1995), Chakraborty and Armstrong (1995),
Erkut and Verter (1995a)U , Erkut and Verter
(1995b), Moore et al. (1995)G, Spadoni et al.
(1995), Verter and Erkut (1995)U , Gregory and
Lichtenstein (1994), Macgregor et al. (1994),
Hobeika and Kim (1993), Sandquist et al. (1993),
Harwood et al. (1993), Abkowitz et al. (1992),
Glickman (1991), Grenney et al. (1990)DSS ,
Kunreuther and Easterling (1990), Chow et al.
(1990), Abkowitz and Cheng (1989), Ang et al.
(1989), Harwood et al. (1989), Abkowitz and
Cheng (1988), Hillsman (1988), Horman (1987),
Keeney and Winkler (1985), Scanlon and Can-
tilli (1985), Pijawka et al. (1985), Kunreuther et
al. (1984), Philipson, et al. (1983), Wilmot et al.
(1983), Keeney (1980), Shappert et al. (1973)
Rail
Anderson and Barkan (2004), Barkan et al.
(2007), Barkan et al. (2003), Fronczak (2001),
Orr et al. (2001), Dennis (1996), Larson (1996),
Glickman and Golding (1991), McNeil and Oh
(1991), Saccomanno and El-Hage (1991), Glick-
man and Rosenfield (1984), Glickman (1983),
Saccomanno and El-Hage (1989)
Marine
Douligeris et al. (1997), Roeleven et al. (1995),
Romer et al. (1995)
Air LaFrance-Linden et al. (2001)
Road + Rail
Brown and Dunn (2007), Milazzo et al. (2002),
Bubbico et al. (2000), Neill and Neill (2000),
Deng et al. (1996), Leeming and Saccomanno
(1994), Purdy (1993), Saccomanno and Short-
reed (1993), Saccomanno et al. (1989), Vanaerde
et al. (1989), Glickman (1988), Swoveland (1987)
Road + Rail +
Marine
Andersson (1994)
Road + Rail +
Marine + Air
Kloeber et al. (1979)
Routing Local Routing Road
Akgu¨n et al. (2007), Boul-
makoul (2006), Duque et
al. (2005), Erkut and In-
golfsson (2005), Huang and
Cheu (2004)C,G, Huang et
al. (2003)C,U , Kara et
al.(2003),
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Table 4.2
Routing Local Routing Road
Luedtke and White
(2002)C,U , Marianov et
al. (2002), Frank et al.
(2000), Erkut and In-
golfsson (2000), Leonelli
et.al. (2000), Zografos et
al. (2000)DSS , Erkut and
Verter (1998), Tayi et al.
(1999)M , Bonvicini et al.
(1998), Marianov and ReV-
elle (1998)M , Verter and
Erkut (1997), Sherali et al.
(1997)M , Nembhard and
White (1997)M , Erkut and
Glickman (1997), Jin and
Batta (1997), Verter and
Erkut (1997), Erkut (1996),
Jin et al. (1996), Ashtakala
and Eno (1996)S , Beroggi
and Wallace (1995),Bof-
fey and Karkazis (1995),
Erkut (1995), Moore et
al. (1995)G, Karkazis and
Boffey (1995), Glickman
and Sontag (1995)M , Mc-
Cord and Leu (1995)M ,
Sivakumar et al. (1995),
Beroggi (1994), Beroggi and
Wallace (1994), Ferrada
and
Routing Local Routing Road
Michel-haugh (1994), Patel
and Horowitz (1994)G,
Lassarre et al. (1993)G,
Sivakumar et al. (1993),
Turnquist (1993)M,S , Wi-
jeratne et al. (1993)M ,
Lepofsky et al. (1993)G,
Beroggi and Wallace
(1991), Miaou and Chin
(1991), Gopalan et al.
(1990a), Chin and Cheng
(1989)M , Zografos and
Davis (1989)M , Abkowitz
and Cheng (1988)M , Batta
and Chiu (1988), Vansteen
(1987), Cox and Turnquist
(1986), Belardo et al.
(1985), Saccomanno and
Chan (1985), Urbanek and
Barber (1980), Kalelkar and
Brinks (1978)M
Rail
Verma and Verter (2005),
McClure et al. (1988),
Coleman (1984), Glickman
(1983)
Marine
Iakovou (2001), Li et al.
(1996), Haas and Kichner
(1987)
Road + Rail Glickman (1988)
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Table 4.2
Road + Rail +
Marine
Weigkricht and Fedra
(1995)DSS
Routing
Local Routing
and Scheduling
(on Road)
Chang et al. (2005), Meng et al. (2005),
Zografos and Androutsopoulos (2004)M , Zo-
grafos and Androutsopoulos (2002)M , Miller-
Hooks and Mahmassani (2000)S,T , Bowler and
Mahmassani, (1998)T , Miller-Hooks and Mah-
massani (1998)S,T , Sulijoadikusumo and Noz-
ick (1998)M,T , Nozick et al. (1997)M,T , Smith
(1987)M , Cox and Turnquist (1986)
Global Routing
Road
Carotenuto et al. (2007a,b),
Diaz-Banez et al. (2005),
Dell’Olmo et al. (2005),
Akgu¨n et al. (2000),
Marianov and ReVelle
(1998), Lindner-Dutton et
al. (1991), Gopalan et al.
(1990a,b), Zografos and
Davis (1989)
Marine Iakovou et al. (1999)
Combined
facility
location
and routing
Alumur and Kara (2007), Cappanera et al. (2004), Berman et
el. (2000), Giannikos (1998)M , Helander and Melachrinoudis (1997),
List and Turnquist (1998), Current and Ratick (1995)M , Jacobs and
Warmerdam (1994), Boffey and Karkazis (1993), Stowers and Palekar
(1993), List and Mirchandani (1991)M , List et al. (1991)U , Revelle et
al. (1991), Zografos and Samara (1989), Peirce and Davidson (1982),
Shobrys (1981)
Network
design
Erkut and Gzara (2007), Berman et al. (2007), Dell’Orco (2006),
Floros et al. (2006), Erkut and Alp (2005), Verter and Kara (2005),
Huang et al. (2005), Kara and Verter(2004)
C : with security consideration; DSS : Decision Support System model; G :
using GIS; M : Multiobjective; S : Stochastic; T : Time-varying; U :
Survey/Annotated Bibliography
According to Erkut, Tjandra and Verter [80], we believe in a simple classification
that can be useful in providing some structure to the rest of the chapter. One
possible classification is that in Table 4.3.3.
Although we have offered this simple classification, it is fair to say that numerous
papers deal with problems that lie at the intersection of the above areas and such
problems are receiving increasingly more attention in the literature. Table 4.3.3
suggests that the HAZMAT transportation problems on highways received the
most attention from the operations researchers. In contrast, HAZMAT trans-
portation via air or pipeline, as well as intermodal HAZMAT transportation has
received almost no attention.
4.4 Literature review of problems and models
In Tab. 4.3.3 we suggest a schematic classification of the academic literature of
HAZMAT that now we review. Rather than giving a detailed separate presen-
tation of each work, we outline the most relevant guidelines emerging from the
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literature. We consider separately risk assessment, routing, combined facility
location and routing, network design.
4.4.1 Risk Assessment for HAZMAT
Risk is an integral part of the hazardous materials transportation literature.
The majority of articles are operations research studies for minimizing risk on
a transport route. The risk equations in the OR studies tend to be relatively
simple and are often variations on the release probability or the product of
release probability and consequences.
Other articles focus on calculating risk as part of QRA studies. These latter
articles are typically written by environmental, civil, and chemical engineers who
incorporate demographic, meteorological, and chemical databases in calculating
risk. These OR and QRA studies are focused on releases that occur on the road
or along railways.
There is not a focus on transport-support activities, such as loading or un-
loading of containers. Although there are differences in the accident scenarios
surrounding these two activities, many of the variables and associations and
hence the general Bayesian network structures are the same.
The great majority of existing studies attempt to minimize or calculate the
risk of potential future occurrences. The HAZMAT literature does not seem
interested in modeling the past release incidents to determine the influence of
the relevant variables.
One notable exception is a study by Burns and Clemen (1993) [36] in which
various sociological, behavioral, and perceptual variables affect the impact of
an HAZAMAT release, was depicted using an influence diagram. From this
perspective, the decision model suggested by Burns and Clemen is unique within
the HAZMAT transport literature by virtue of its exploratory, statistical nature.
In general, this literature lacks a focus on data-driven analysis of outcomes
relative to the influencing variables. A possible reason of this lack is owed to
the fact that past data are not very reliable. Using general truck accident data
for HAZMAT trucks overestimates the accident probabilities.
What makes matters worse is that there is no agreement on general truck
accident probabilities and conflicting numbers are reported by different re-
searchers.
Furthermore, applying national data uniformly on all road segments of simi-
lar type is quite problematic since it ignores hot spots such as road intersections,
highway ramps, and bridges.
Researchers need to have access to high quality accident probability data
and empirical or theoretical research that leads to improvements in the quality
of such data should be welcome.
Brown and Dunn (2007) [33] describe a quantitative risk assessment ap-
proach for hazardous materials transportation that employs considerable sta-
tistical data from past incidents. They illustrate application of this method to
evaluating distances to which the public should be protected immediately fol-
lowing an accidental release of toxic materials that pose an inhalation hazard.
While this paper focuses on emergency response aspects of the problem, the
framework that they describe has applications to societal risk estimation and
routing optimization for a wide variety of hazardous materials.
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Typically, accident and release probabilities have been estimated for a given
road and area type using averaged values, which have limited sensitivity in
specific situations (Harwood et al, 1993) [115].
Differently, some recent empirical works suggest the use of fuzzy logic to
determine the accident frequency (see, e.g., Bonvicini et al, 1998) [28].
Additional exploratory work on accident probabilities is still needed. There
is a lack of agreement [47, 82] on how HAZMAT transport risk should be
represented. Risk is described at least from seven different perspectives:
• Accident or Release Probability [3]
– Probability of a vehicular accident of the HAZMAT truck [5]
– Probability of a vehicular accident that leads to release [115]
– Probability of a release [72]
• Consequences [81]
• Consequence Probability [216]
– Individual Risk [155]
– Societal Risk ([86]
• Numerical Indices [199]
• Exposure and Product of Exposure [76]
• Expected Value [82]
• Variations on Expected Value [126]
However, as already described in Section 4.2 risk is usually assessed in terms of
the following high-level variables:
• accident or release probability,
• consequence level,
• population count, and
• exposure amount, such as amount of HAZMAT transported.
Several authors whose risk equations are limited to these high level variables
characterize their risk models as simple (see e.g. ReVelle et al., 1991, Current
et al 1995) [57, 200]). More complex formulations (see e.g. Akgn et al. 2007 [9]
for risk assessment include the above high-level variables along with variables
such as
• wind probability or
• fatality probability, also known as vulnerability.
In turn, the latter variables are often specified in terms of sub-variables, or input
parameters [58]. However, the numerical relationships of the sub-variables to
the higher level variables or outcomes are not provided to the reader and are
therefore not a discussion focus [155].
For example, Leonelli et al., 2000 [153] suggest that the release probability
calls for the use of vehicle type and material type as sub-variables. However,
they neither discuss or provide in the article the exact numerical relationship of
vehicle type or material type to release probability.
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4.4.2 Route Optimization for HAZMAT
In the following we briefly introduce some of the most relevant work dealing with
route optimization, i.e. network design, combined facility location and routing,
for HAZMAT relevant aspects mentioned in previous research studies. Karkazis
and Boffey (1995) [135] focus on the damage induced to the population in case
of an accident. In this research study attention is given to the dispersion of
the HAZMAT through air. Therefore, the impact area is not defined by a given
bandwidth, but is a function dependent on the type of material transported and
the meteorological conditions at the moment of the accident.
Akgu¨n et al. (2000) [8] consider the problem of finding a number of spa-
tially dissimilar paths between an origin and a destination in a transportation
network. A number of dissimilar paths can be useful in solving capacitated
flow problems or in selecting routes for hazardous materials. In this research,
a critical discussion of three existing methods for the generation of spatially
dissimilar paths is offered, and computational experience using these methods
is reported. As an alternative method, the generation of a large set of candidate
paths, and the selection of a subset using a dispersion model which maximizes
the minimum dissimilarity in the selected subset is proposed. Computational
results with this method are encouraging.
Berman et al. (2000) [24] point out the possibility of a significant improve-
ment via relocation of the existing specialized teams, currently stationed at the
shipment origins.
Frank et al. (2000) [91] made research study that has considered a simplified
approach to quantify risk. This research study focuses in the development of
a spatial decision support system for the selection of route for the transport of
HAZMAT within the United States of America. The element at risk considered
is the population located in the impact area of the possible accident. The impact
area is located alongside the route and it extents to both sides of the route up
to a predefined bandwidth.
Leonelli et al. (2000) [153] introduce a methodology based on the quantifica-
tion of individual and societal risk indexes for the selection of optimal route for
the transport of HAZMAT. The hazard considered is the accident probability of
a HAZMAT transport unit, and the population is considered as the element at
risk, being affected in the case of an accident. The population value results from
aggregating the population travelling on the transport network and the popula-
tion located adjacent to the transport network. In a previous article Leonelli et
al. (1999) [155] mention that the use of individual and societal risk can give an
accurate indication of risk, however to calculate these values, a great amount
of data and programming effort is required. Due to this, a number of other
simplified risk quantification techniques have been adopted in other research
studies some of these are mentioned above.
Zografos and Androutsopoulos (2004) [238] consider the population as the
element at risk. In this study the population located inside the impact area
is assumed to have the same vulnerability value, namely one. The risk for the
population is then defined as the product of the individual risk and the total
population. The individual risk is assessed only on hazards, vulnerability, and
element at risk. The previous results could be generalized assessing the individ-
ual risk on the basis of also the accident probability of a HAZMAT transport
unit, and the population is considered as the element at risk, being affected in
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the case of an accident as proposed by Leonelli et al. (1999).
Chang et al. (2005) [50] describe a method for finding non-dominated paths
for multiple routing objectives in networks where the routing attributes are un-
certain, and the probability distributions that describe those attributes vary by
the time of day. This problem is particularly important in routing and schedul-
ing of shipments of very hazardous materials. The method developed extends
and integrates the work of several previous authors, resulting in a new algorithm
that propagates means and variances of the uncertain attributes along paths and
compares partial paths that arrive at a given node within a user-specified time
window. The comparison uses an approximate stochastic dominance criterion.
Diaz-Banez et al. (2005) [64] study the problem of determining a path for a
shipment of hazardous materials between a pre-specified origin-destination pair
on the plane taking into account minimization of risks during the transportation
and cost of the path. Given a source point a, a destination point b, a set S of
demand sites (points in the plane) and a positive value I, the authors want to
compute a path connecting a and b with length at most I such that the mini-
mum distance to the points in S is maximized. They propose an approximate
algorithm based on the bisection method to solve this problem and the tech-
nique reduces the optimization problem to a decision problem, where one needs
to compute the shortest path such that the minimum distance to the demand
points is not smaller that a certain amount r. To solve the decision task, Diaz-
Banez, Gomez and Toussaint transform the problem to the computation of the
shortest path avoiding obstacles. This approach provides efficient algorithms to
compute shortest obnoxious paths under several kinds of distances.
Huang and Fery (2005) [119] study the determination of optimal routes for
hazardous material transportation trying to find trade-off solutions among many
conflicting objectives in the analysis, such as travel cost, population exposure,
environmental risk or security concerns. The authors use as generalized objec-
tive the product of the different objective functions and solve a complex shortest
path problem that often present several “efficient” solutions. A case study with
8 objective functions has been carried out on a road network in Singapore. A
geographical information system is used to quantify road link attributes, which
are assumed linear and deterministic for the sake of simplicity. The proposed
algorithm derives four significantly different routes, which conform to intuition.
Meng et al. (2005) [170] propose a novel vehicle routing and scheduling
problem in transporting hazardous materials for networks with multiple time-
varying attributes. It actually aims to identify all non-dominated time-varying
paths with fixed departure times at the origin and fixed waiting times at inter-
mediate nodes of the paths for each given pair of origin and destination. Three
kinds of practical constraints must also respected: limited operational time pe-
riod, limited service time, and limited waiting time window at each node. Based
on the assumption of linear waiting attributes at a node, the proposed prob-
lem can be transformed into a static multiobjective shortest path problem in an
acyclic network reconstructed by the space-time network technique. An efficient
dynamic programming method is then developed.
Boulmakoul (2006) [30] analyzes the possible use of telegeomonitoring in
HAZMAT transportation. The author proposes a telegeomonitoring system that
uses a geographic information system to represent civil infrastructure (urban
network, land use, industries, etc.) and a decision support systems technology
to asses the risk and to evaluate the K-best paths that minimize transportation
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risk. To this end, routing algorithms on graphs are extended to deal with fuzzy
risk. In particular, the K-best fuzzy shortest paths.
Dell’Orco (2006) [62] proposes a model of flow propagation, assuming “pack-
ets” of vehicles and uniformly accelerated movement. Such an approach allows
the author to propose a mesoscopic model of the HAZMAT vehicles movements
that appears lifelike in the representation of outflow dynamics and easy polino-
miale to solve.
Floros, Ziliaskopoulos and Chang (2006) [88] study the problem of routing
hazardous material on a multimodal network with time-varying link travel times
and intermodal options. The problem is formulated as a Dynamic Program and
an intermodal/multimodal shortest path algorithm is modified to compute min-
imum risk paths by combining the available transport modes, while accounting
for transfer delays and transportation costs. The algorithm is implemented
on a test network to observe changes in the solution under different scenar-
ios. Computational performance is evaluated on networks of different sizes and
the algorithm’s efficient running time makes it appropriate for use on realistic
networks for both planning and real-time operations.
Akgn et al. (2007) [9] focus on the effects of weather systems on HAZMAT
routing. They start by analyzing the effects of a weather system on a vehicle
traversing a single link. This helps characterize the time-dependent attributes
of a link due to movement of the weather systems. This analysis is used as a
building block for the problem of finding a least risk path for HAZMAT trans-
portation on a network exposed to weather changes. Several methods are offered
to solve the under-lying problem, and computational results are reported. Two
conclusions are drawn from this paper: (1) it is possible to determine the time-
dependent attributes for links on a network provided that some assumptions on
the nature of the weather system are made; (2) heuristics can provide effective
solutions for practical size problems while allowing for parking the vehicle to
avoid weather system effects. technologies (4) how to route waste residues to
disposal centers. The model has the objective of minimizing both the total cost
and the transportation risk.
Alumur and Kara (2007) [11] propose a new multiobjective location-routing
model that is object of a large-scale implementation in the Central Anatolian
region of Turkey. The aim of the proposed model is to answer to the following
questions: (1) where to open treatment centers and with which technologies, (2)
where to open disposal centers, (3) how to route different types of hazardous
waste to which of the compatible treatment technologies (4) how to route waste
residues to disposal centers. The model has the objective of minimizing both
the total cost and the transportation risk. The model proposed is manageable
for a realistic problem in the Central Anatolian region of Turkey. Given that
the hazardous waste management problem is a strategic one that will be solved
in-frequently, the authors believe that the computational effort is reasonable for
problems with up to 20 candidate sites and that the application is a few orders
of magnitude better than other applications in the literature. Most of the pa-
pers present applications for small problems such as with 10 or 15 generation
nodes and with 3 or 4 candidate sites, whereas Alumur and Kara applied their
model with 92 generation nodes and with 15 and 20 candidate sites. As another
research direction, the authors suggest that they can include other objectives
of the hazardous waste management problem in their model. For example, one
can maximize the energy production after the incineration process. Differently,
112
one can minimize the risk due to the location of the treatment facility. When
multiple objectives are considered, the model can be managed with different
multi-objective solution techniques. Alumur and Kara propose a relatively sim-
ple multi-objective solution technique for ease of application. Apart from the
different objectives, one can expand the mathematical model so that the loca-
tions of the recycling facilities and the corresponding routing strategies are also
determined. Lastly, a multi-period version of the model can be used to sched-
ule the processing of different types of waste. In this case, the compatibility
constraint will gain more importance. That is, any new model should not allow
wastes that are not compatible with each other to be transported or incinerated
at the same time.
Berman et al. (2007) [25] study how undesirable consequences of hazardous
materials incidents can be mitigated by quick arrival of specialized response
teams at the accident site. They present a novel methodology to determine
the optimal design of a specialized team network so as to maximize its ability
to respond to such incidents in a region. They show that this problem can be
represented via a maximal arc-covering model. They discuss two formulations
for the maximal arc-covering problem, a known one and a new one. Through
computational experiments, the authors establish that the known formulation
has excessive computational requirements for large-scale problems, whereas the
alternative model constitutes a basis for an efficient heuristic. The methodology
is applied to assess the emergency response capability to transport incidents,
that involve gasoline, in Quebec and Ontario.
Carotenuto et al. (2007a) [40] study the problem of managing a set of
HAZMAT requests in terms of HAZMAT shipment route selection and actual
departure time definition. For each HAZMAT shipment, a set of minimum
and equitable risk alternative routes from origin to destination points and a
preferred departure time are given. The aim is to assign a route to each HAZ-
MAT shipment and schedule them on the assigned routes in order to minimize
the total shipment delay, while equitably spreading the risk spatially and pre-
venting the risk induced by vehicles travelling too close to each other. This
HAZMAT shipment scheduling problem is modeled as a job-shop scheduling
problem with alternative routes. No-wait constraints arise in the scheduling
model as well, since, supposing that no safe area is available, when a HAZMAT
vehicle starts travelling from the given origin it cannot stop until it arrives at the
given destination. A tabu search algorithm is proposed for the problem, which
is experimentally evaluated on a set of realistic test problems over a regional
area, evaluating the provided solutions also with respect to the total route risk
and length.
Erkut and Alp (2007a) [74] consider the problem of designating HAZMAT
routes in and through a major population center. Initially, they restrict the
attention to a minimally connected network (a tree) where we can predict accu-
rately the flows on the network. They formulate the tree design problem as an
integer programming problem with an objective of minimizing the total trans-
port risk. Such design problems of moderate size can be solved using commercial
solvers. Then they de-velop a simple construction heuristic to expand the solu-
tion of the tree design problem by adding road segments. Such additions provide
carriers with routing choices, which usually increase risks but reduce costs. The
heuristic adds paths incrementally, which allows local authorities to trade off
risk and cost. Erkut and Alp use the road network of the city of Ravenna, Italy,
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as a case study.
Erkut and Alp (Erkut et al. 2007b) consider an integrated routing and
scheduling problem in HAZMAT transportation when accident rates, population
exposure, and link durations on the net-work vary with time of day. They
minimize risk subject to a constraint on the total duration of the trip and allow
for stopping at the nodes of the network. The authors consider four versions of
this problem with increasingly more realistic constraints on driving and waiting
periods, and propose pseudo-polynomial dynamic programming algorithms for
each version. They use a realistic exam-ple network to experiment with theirs
algorithms and provide examples of the solutions generated. The computational
effort required for the algorithms is reasonable, making them good candidates
for implementation in a decision-support system. The en-route stops allow us
to take full advantage of the time-varying nature of accident probabilities and
exposure and result in the generation of routes that are associated with much
lower levels of risk than those where no waiting is allowed.
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Chapter 5
A Risk Analysis Model for
HAZMAT Transportation
on Motorway
In this section will be presented a model for the calculation of the Individual
and Societal risk derived from transport of HAZMAT by road, and on motorway
in particular.
5.0.3 What is the risk derived from transport of HAZ-
MAT by road
Both historical evidence and provisional calculations have shown that the risks
arising from the transportation of HAZMATS are often of the same magnitude
of those ones due to fixed installations, and thus need to be taken into account
with the same attention in order to keep them under control and to reduce
them.
Among the different means used to transport hazardous materials, the road
system represents an increasingly pressing problem due to the constant increase
of the amount of HAZMAT shipments.
Transportation of HAZMAT on road actually represents a potentially high
risk with regard to:
• the nature of the HAZMAT carried by trucks and the physiochemical
events associated with these materials (radioactivity, explosion, toxicity,
corrosion etc.)
• the nature, the localization and the density of the stakes (population, eco-
nomic activities, buildings, networks, infrastructures, natural areas etc.)
• the characteristics and state of the roads (topography, layout, presence of
tunnels etc.)
• the density of the traffic, and the environmental conditions (weather, nat-
ural events etc.)
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HAZMAT type, quantity, itinerary and delivery time are not precisely known
by the public authorities, the highway companies, the territorial collectivities,
the population.
One of the main objectives of research in this field is to provide appropriate
answers to the safety management of HAZMAT shipments, in collaboration with
the principal parties involved in the goods transportation process.
5.0.4 How to characterize the risk in transport of HAZ-
MAT by road
As presented in Section 4.4, research in this area focuses on two main issues:
1. to assessing the risk induced on the population by HAZMAT vehicles
traveling on various segments of the road network;
2. to involve the selection of the safest routes to take.
A lot of work in risk assessment has already been done by modeling risk proba-
bility distribution over given areas, for example, by taking into account the risk
related to the transported substance and the transport modality [1] as well as
the environmental conditions [189].
Moreover, as useful tools, map algebra techniques from Geographic Informa-
tion Systems (GIS) allow us to combine mathematically the concentration of
HAZMAT releases into the environment with population distribution in order
to estimate the risk when airborne contamination happens [236].
Given the incident probabilities on unit segments of a network, an analysis
of different risk models associated to a route is given in [82]. In that paper, it
is highlighted that one of the most popular risk model used by researchers and
practitioners is the societal risk, this being the product between the incident
probability per unit length and the incident consequence, which is evaluated as
the population in the impact area.
One widely used assumption, based on the λ-neighborhood concept, is that
the impact area is a circle centered in the incident location with a substance-
dependent radius λ [20].
The main problem related to this issue is that of finding minimum risk routes
while limiting and spreading the risk equitably over any zone. As a matter
of fact, risk equity has to be taken into account whenever several HAZMAT
shipments take place from a given origin to a given destination.
In this situation, the planning effort not only has to be directed toward min-
imizing the total risk, but also has to be devoted to distributing risk uniformly
over all the zones of the geographical crossed region.
This concept is well defined by Keeney in [136], where a measure of the
collective risk is determined with explicit reference to equity.
5.1 The Model and its Parameters
Motorway is a term for both a type of road and a classification or designation.
Motorways are high capacity roads designed to carry fast motor traffic safely.
In the E.U. they are predominantly:
• dual-carriageway roads;
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• with a minimum of two lanes in each direction;
• all have grade-separated access.
Motorways are comparable with North American freeways as a road type,
and interstates as a classification.
The model derives from the application of the quantitative risk assessment
methodology presented in Figure 5.1.
Network
characterization
Likelihood
estimation
Release/scenario
analysis
Consequence
Estimation
Risk estimation
Utilization of
risk estimation
Transport Risk Analysis
Figure 5.1: The Transport Risk Assessment Methodology
We must take into consideration the following cause-effect chain which can be
associated to a vehicle transporting one or more dangerous substances i.e. HAZ-
MATs:
1. the vehicle may be subject to a road accident (accident);
2. the accident may cause the release of material transported (release).
3. the release may cause a series events (incident).
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4. the incident has an effect in the area surrounding the point accident.
The model refers to damage to persons and in particular to death.
The model of risk assessment derived from road transport of HAZMAT is
presented by a schematic representation in Figure 5.2. Risk assessment is typi-
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SocialRisk IndividualRisk
Dangerous
Substance
R le ease
Parameters:
transport network
Accident
HazMaT

mobilesourceofrisk
geographicalarea
Figure 5.2: The Risk Assessment Model
cally structured as a process resulting from the interaction between:
1. the transportation network (in this case motorway);
2. the vehicle (or better the traveling risk source);
3. the impact area.
5.1.1 QRA Model of HAZMAT Transportation by road
The main purpose of the QRA model is to assess the risks relative to the trans-
port of HAZMAT in a quantitative way. The model evaluates simultaneously
the consequences and the frequencies of occurrence of possible scenarios.
This makes it possible to assess quantitatively the individual riskand the
societal risk (if the distribution of the people liable to be exposed is at hand).
A complete assessment of the risks due to HAZMAT by road would require
to consider:
• all the possible weather situations;
• all he kinds of accidents, with
• all the types of vehicle partially or fully loaded.
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Such an evaluation is completely impossible and some simplifications have to
be introduced. The QRA model is based on the following steps:
• Choice of a restricted number of HAZMATs.
• Choice of some representative accidental scenarios implying those HAZ-
MAT with their usual packagings.
• Identification of physical effects of those scenarios for an open air or a
tunnel section.
• Evaluation of their physiological effects on road users and local population.
• Taking into account of the possibilities of escape/sheltering.
• Determination of the yearly frequency of occurrence for each scenario.
F/N curves and their expected values are the major outputs of the QRA model.
They are defined as follows:
• Frequencies / Gravity curves (F/N curves): stand for the annual fre-
quency of occurrence F to have a scenario likely to cause an effect (gen-
erally, the number of fatalities) equal to or higher than N .
• Expected value (EV): number of fatalities per year, obtained by integration
of a F/N curve.
Figure 5.3: Example of F(N) curve for a given route
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5.1.2 Frequency evaluation of an hazardous event
For an effective approach to risk modeling, a proper evaluation of the expected
frequency is the starting point. The frequency of an accident on the i-th road
stretch can be expressed by the followings (?? and (5.2):
fi = γiLini (5.1)
γi = γ0
6∑
j=1
hj (5.2)
where:
γi is the expected frequency on i-th road stretch (accident km−1 per vehicle);
Li is the road length (km);
ni is the vehicle number (vehicle);
γ0 is the basic frequency (accident km−1 per vehicle);
hj is the local enhancing/mitigating parameters.
The frequency of an accident evolving according to a scenario S, on the i-th
road stretch, can be expressed as in (5.3):
fi,S = γiLiniPSPI (5.3)
where:
PS is is the probability of evolving scenarios of type S, following
the accident initializer (i.e. collision; roll-over; failure etc.);
PI is the ignition probability for flammable substances involved
in the accident.
In dealing with the magnitude of the accident, it seemed important to include
both the motorists on the road and the off-route population. The number of
fatalities NS caused by the accident evolving according to a scenario S, on the
i-th road stretch, can be calculated according to following equations:
NS = NS1 +NS2 (5.4)
NS1 = k (νAL,1) (5.5)
NS2 = D (AL,2) (5.6)
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where:
NS1 is the fatality number (fatalities);
ν is the vehicle density on the road area (vehicle m−2);
k is the average vehicle occupation factor;
AL,1 is the road lethal area (m2;)
NS2 is the off-road fatality number (fatalities);
(AL,2 is the lethal area (km2);
D is the population density (inhabitants x km−2).
When considering the different concurrent scenarios y and j (i.e. toxic release
and delayed ignition), in order to avoid overestimation, the total lethal area will
be considered as
AL,t = Ay +Aj −
[
Ay
⋂
Aj
]
(5.7)
5.1.3 The transportation network characterization
We assume that the transport network, i.e. the motorway, can be considered
as a set of arcs (links) and nodes (nodes). When performing the transportation
risk analysis each link has to be characterized by some properties.
According to Leonelli et al. (1999) [155], let Nlink a set of links of the
motorway network and l a generic link. The “link properties” to take into
account are the following.
1. The geographical position in the impact area; to do this a Cartesian ref-
erence frame X/Y with origin OX/Y has to be arbitrarily overlapped on
the impact area.
2. The transportation network typology to which the link belongs (in this
case the road network otherwise rail, inland waterway or pipeline).
3. The amount of the yearly shipments Nship(l, ν) traveling on each link l of
the motorway for each “vehicle typology” ν, i.e. on a specific conveyance
means carrying a specific substance;
4. The incident frequency λinc(l), expressed in events/(km.vehicle), for each
road; this variable is generally a function of the route features, the traffic
conditions, the environmental conditions, and driver status [86, 114]. The
release frequency λrel(l) of a traveling vehicle could be evaluated as the
product of the incident frequency of the link and the release probability
from the vehicle traveling on that link.
In the calculation procedures here presented each link has to be straight and
each link must have uniform properties at all its points; this condition can
easily be obtained without any loss in generality by adding fictitious nodes to
the network.
In a motorway, each stretch is characterized by substantially rectilinear link
from toll to toll station. As a consequence, it is possible to consider the access
/ exit points of the motorway as network nodes .
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Since link properties can have considerable changes over the year, the cal-
culation procedure will subdivide the year into smaller periods (Nseas), which
we refer to as “seasonal situations” (j = 1, Nseas) and will assign different link
property values for each season.
As an example, road shipments can be limited to daylight hours, or the
incident frequency can be greater in fall and winter. In this way λinc(l), λrel(l)
and Nship(l, ν) become a function of the seasonal situation j too. They are
marked, respectively, with:
λinc(l, j) i.e. the probability of accident;
λrel(l, j) i.e. the probability of release;
Nship(l, ν, j) i.e. the amount of the yearly shipments;
pwind(i, k, ϑ) i.e. the density of probability of wind direction
5.1.4 The vehicle or traveling risk source characterization
As already mentioned in Section 4.2, a transportation route can be viewed as a
linear risk source, since a release can occur at each of its points.
This means that each of its points can be considered as a point risk source,
or, in other words, the generic vehicle has to be considered as a traveling risk
source.
Therefore, in transportation risk analysis the second step is the vehicle or
traveling risk source characterization.
In order to perform this description, the concept of “vehicle typology” has
to be introduced.
“Vehicle typology” is a certain kind of vehicle conveying certain kind of HAZ-
MAT which could caused hazard if a release occurs during the transportation.
For example, a truck tanker conveying ammonia is a kind of vehicle typology.
A generic “vehicle typology” ϑ and Nveh(l) different typologies traveling on
each link l are considered.
More pairs “link-vehicle typology” can be generally defined for each link,
since more “vehicle typologies” can travel on it. For each traveling risk source
the following parameter has to be evaluated:
• the release probability prel(l, ν) for each road “vehicle typology”, that is
the probability of having a release once an incident has happened (p(R|A)).
Vehicle construction standards are obviously different for different trans-
portation modalities, and, for a single transportation mode, strongly de-
pend on the features of the transported substance; in other words the
release probability depends on the “vehicle typology”. Furthermore it can
also depend on the link l, since, for instance, it can be greater on high
speed than on low speed route segments.
It is worth noting that coupling the transportation characterization of road links
with proper release probabilities allows us to calculate each frel(l, v, j), i.e. is
the frequency of having a release from a specified “vehicle typology” ν on a
specified link (l) in a specified season (j). In fact it results in (??):
frel(l, ν, j) = Nship(l, ν, j) · λinc(l, j) · prel(l, ν) (5.8)
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In order to identify and quantify accidental scenarios referred to each traveling
risk source the following parameters are required.
1. The transportation conditions for each substance, i.e., the temperature
and pressure values at which the substance is stored in the transportation
vehicle and the vehicle capacity.
2. The sizes of the equivalent holes which have been chosen to describe all
possible releases from each “vehicle typology”. For each “vehicle typology”
and for each rupture size a physical aspect of the outcome and a release
rate, or a release quantity in case of instantaneous release, have to be
evaluated. Each vehicle typology can lead to Nout(ν) final outcomes (i is
the generic one).
3. The final outcomes to which each hole size of each “vehicle typology”
typology can lead, that is if:
• a toxic cloud arises;
• an explosive one (BLEVE (Boiling Liquid expanding vapor explosion,
UCVE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion);
• a pool flame;
• a jet-fire and so on.
4. The probability of having the final outcome i once a release has occurred,
Pout(i), i.e., the product of the probability of the release being of a specific
equivalence size, once the release has occurred, and the probability of
having final outcome, once the release of this specific equivalence hole has
occurred.
Examples of vehicle characterizations can be found in [154, 220] and in Advisory
Committee on Dangerous Substances (1991)[185].
5.1.5 The impact area characterization
The impact area characterization includes both the definition of some param-
eters which influence the release effects evaluation and the description of the
population distribution.
5.1.5.1 Parameters influencing the effects evaluation
To perform the release effects evaluation it is necessary to define:
• some physical parameters, like the air temperature and air humidity; the
average terrain roughness, the terrain typology, the grade of confinement
and so on;
• meteorological conditions characterizing the impact area, given by Nmet
pairs “atmospheric stability classwind speed”, (the generic one is marked
with k);
• the wind probability density distribution pwind(j, k, ϑ), that is the wind
rise in the impact area, for each meteorological condition k and seasonal
situation j. The angle θ is used to mark a generic wind direction.
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All the parameters influencing the effects evaluation can vary from zone to
zone of the impact area, especially when considering very large areas, and the
procedure takes into account these variations.
5.1.5.2 Population distribution
The distribution of the population on the impact area is an essential input for
calculating societal risk.
The described procedure very accurately describes the people living in the
impact area, and, furthermore, takes into account that people can be indoors
at the occurrence of a release, being somewhat sheltered from the accident
consequences.
A generic “population map”, which is an input to the procedures, is com-
posed of zones, where people may be considered uniformly distributed, and of
aggregation centres, where people are clustered.
Zones with uniform population density can have rectangular shape or can be
linear; rectangular areas describe, for example, residential quarters where the
off-route population is living, while linear zones represent the road network, on
which motorists, which constitute the on-route people, are present.
The total number of rectangles and the generic rectangle are marked, re-
spectively, with NA and n; the total number of lines and the generic line with
NL and m.
For each zone it is necessary to know the geographical position, the uni-
form population density (ρAn , persons/m
2 for rectangles; ρLm , persons/m for
segments), and, for each zone, the fraction of people being indoors (xAn , for
rectangles and xLm for segments).
Centres of particular interest from the risk analysis point of view, like schools,
hospitals, commercial centres are better described as points in the impact area
where people may be considered as clustered.
Properties of aggregation centres are the geographical position, the number
of persons and their probability of being indoors.
The generic aggregation centre is marked, with o; the total number of such
centres with NC ; the fraction of persons being indoors with (xCo ; and the total
number of persons in each centre with PCo).
The population distribution can change dramatically over the year: for ex-
ample, on-road population can be higher on day than on night; schools and
commercial centres are empty during the night; schools are furthermore empty
in summer; bathing villages have high population density only in summer.
To describe such changes the societal risk code can handle different “popula-
tion maps”, one for each season: this means that the previously defined variables
ρAn , ρLm , PCo , xAn , xLm and xCo are a function of the seasonal situation j.
AS there was inability to obtain data of a certain relevance and significance
about the traffic and the population density on the traditional roads in the geo-
graphical reference, in this thesis only links that form the network are considered
as linear zones.
Furthermore, as a motorways are high capacity roads with a minimum of
two lanes in each direction, we consider each link as a pair of links.
Furthermore, we consider each carriageway of the two directions character-
ized by its specificity (i.e. traffic, building sites, geometric characteristics, etc..).
Ultimately, we take into account the following:
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ν is a generic “vehicle typology” on each link l;
Nveh(l) is a different typologies traveling on each link l;
prel(l, ν) is the the release probability for each “vehicle typology” i.e that
is the probability for each traveling risk source
of having a release once an incident has happened;
frel(l, ν, j) is the frequency of having a release from a specified
“vehicle typology” on a specified link in a specified season;
Nout(ν) are the final outcomes foe each “vehicle typology” (i is the generic one);
Pout(i) is the probability of having the final outcome once a release has occurred.
5.1.5.3 Preliminary input data evaluation
The procedures for evaluating individual and societal risks require the input data
described above. Data usually have to be derived from very different sources,
for instance:
• “population maps” can easily be constructed once census data are known;
• meteorological parameters can be derived from the data gathered at me-
teorological stations;
• accident frequencies and the final outcomes probabilities from data banks
or open literature;
An exhaustive list of data sources about the link and vehicle characterization
can be found in [43].
5.1.6 “Vulnerability Maps” construction
Input data are, among others, the “vulnerability maps”, whose construction is
described in this section.
The vulnerability is the probability of suffering a certain typology of damage,
which can be a minor injury, a major one or even a lethal one; in this thesis
we well refer to the vulnerability as the probability of incurring death after a
release has occurred.
As explained in Section 5.1.4, all the release cases that a “vehicle typology”
can have are described by taking into account a discrete number of equivalent
holes.
Each equivalence hole can produce different Nout(ν) final outcomes which
can take place at all Nmet(j) meteorological conditions possible for the impact
area.
This means that each “vehicle typology” produces different pairs “final out-
come meteo condition”, the distribution of effects of which has to be evaluated
using consequences models [224]. These effects can be, depending on the final
outcome they refer to toxic gas concentrations, thermal radiations and blast
over-pressures, and they have to evaluated both outdoor and indoor.
An exhaustive discussion about this topic can be found in [43]. To perform
these effects evaluations, each “vehicle typology” has to be considered as a point
risk source at a generic point Q(t), where t is a straight route abscissa drawn
along the link.
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Let us consider a Cartesian reference ξ/η with the origin Oξ/η at Q(t) and ξ
as the downwind direction, and an arbitrary grid on this reference, in order to
evaluate the effects at its points. Combining these effects with proper exposure
times the corresponding received doses are obtained, and doses are converted
into vulnerabilities through probit equations.
In this way for each “outcome meteo pair” a vulnerability distribution around
Q(t) is obtained and stored in “vulnerability maps”. Probit equations give
exactly zero vulnerability values only at infinite distance from the risk point
source; since in reality there is no harm probability indeed at a finite distance
from the accident location, vulnerability values less than a fixed limit value
(equal to 1025 events/yr, for instance) can be considered as negligible. In Figure
5.4 a representation of a “vulnerability map” is given. For each “outcome meteo
Figure 5.4: X/Y and ξ/η frames and “vulnerability map representation”
pair”, “vulnerability maps” do not depend on the population distribution, but
only on the vehicle characterization and on the physical parameters of the impact
area. As a consequence the total number of “vulnerability maps” for each
“vehicle typology” is given by the product of Nout(ν) and Nmet(j).
Note that the grid on which the vulnerability is evaluated need not be the
same for all “outcomemeteo pair”, and furthermore, it need not be regular.
In order to handle the vulnerability as a continuous point function, vulnera-
bility values in points not belonging to the grid are obtained through a linear
interpolation procedure.
In a Motorway Services area both fixed plants and transportation networks
involving hazardous materials can be present.
Risks on these areas due to both risk sources can be done with the procedures
just presented.
Point risk sources can be really considered as very short linear risk sources,
for instance, as links having a length of 1 m.
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Therefore, special “vehicle typology” can be defined for these special links.
For instance, referring to a petroleum pump and its storage plant of a Motorway
Service Areas, each specific vessel storing a specific substance can be considered
as a “vehicle typology”.
It means that, through some simple intuitive tricks, the evaluation at the
same time of the risks of all risk source typologies can be performed.
5.2 HAZMAT transport on motorway: Individ-
ual Risk associated calculation
According to [126] individual risk (IR) is defined as the probability that an
average unprotected person permanently present at that point location, would
get killed due to an accident at the hazardous activity [29].
5.2.1 The single link single vehicle typology IR evaluation
It is very important to notice that IR is additive with respect to the risk source
[42].
As a consequence the IR at a point P is given by the sum of the risks created
there by each risk source Q(t).
Furthermore each risk source Q(t) creates at P a risk given by the risks due
to each “vehicle typology” releasing a hazardous material at Q(t).
Translating this concept in transportation risk analysis means that the risk
of a single link is given by the sum of the risks created by all “vehicle typologies”
traveling on that link, and that risk values of single links can be summed to give
the risk of the whole network.
In addition, when evaluating individual risk, only the outdoor vulnerability
has to be considered.
5.2.2 The “rotation algorithm” and the “unit risk map”
construction
According to [155], the first step of the procedure is to evaluate the risk created
on an impact area by a single “vehicle typology” ν travelling on a single link l.
Let the impact area represented by a vector or raster maps using Geograph-
ical Information System (GIS) software.
On the Cartesian plane X/Y (overlapped with the impact area) the exam-
ined link l is drawn and on this link a generic point risk source Q(t) is considered
which is the origin of the ξ/η plane where the vulnerability distribution has been
evaluated, ξ being the downwind direction and θ the angle between X and ξ.
An intermediate variable called “unit risk” is evaluated for all area points
around Q(t).
In order to do this, a third Cartesian reference frame ξ
′
/η
′
is introduced,
having its origin Oξ′/η′ at Q(t) and axes parallel to those of the geographical
reference frame X/Y .
In ξ
′
/η
′
a grid is chosen automatically on the base of the smallest distance
step of the “vulnerability map” grids related to the “vehicle typology” in exam-
ination.
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On the points of the ξ
′
/η
′
grid an algorithm, called “rotation algorithm”,
constructs the “unit risk map”.
First of all it is necessary to evaluate the vulnerability at a point S of the
ξ
′
/η
′
frame due to a single “outcome meteo pair” (i, k) possible at Q(t) in
the seasonal situation j, but taking into account the wind probability density
distribution pwind(j, k, θ)) for the meteorological case and seasonal situation in
examination, that is taking into account the fact that the wind can blow in each
direction θ) with different probability values.
To obtain this “wind direction averaged death probability”, the “vulnerabil-
ity map” has to be rotated around its origin and the vulnerability VQ(t)ν→S(i, k, ϑ)
which the map assigns at the point coinciding with S at each rotation grade θ),
has to be weighted with the wind probability.
Thus the integration of (5.9) must be performed:∫ 2pi
0
pwind(j, k, ϑ) · VQ(t)ν→S(i, k, ϑ)dϑ (5.9)
The co-ordinates of S in the ξ
′
/η
′
frame have to be converted into co-
ordinates (ξs, ηs) of the “vulnerability map” reference scheme ξ/η for each ro-
tation grade θ. The vulnerability at point (ξs, ηs) is VQ(t)ν→S(i, k, ϑ) since the
co-ordinates of S in the ξ/η frame depend on θ, it depends on θ too.
In the implemented numerical procedure the integration of (5.9) is performed
with a fixed step Simpson rule [198] taking into account 360 possible wind
sectors, each of amplitude equal to 1 degree.
Performing the calculation for all meteorological conditions a sort of wind
direction and meteo averaged death probability is obtained for a single final
outcome i and for each seasonal situation.
If this is done for all final outcomes possible at Q(t), taking into account
their final outcome probabilities once a release has occurred pout(i), the “unit
risk” at point S during the season j for the “vehicle typology” ν is obtained.
The “unit risk” URQ(t)→S(j, ν) due to the point risk source Q(t) at a generic
point S of the “unit risk” is defined by (5.10):
URQ(t)→S(j, ν) =
Nout(ν)∑
i=1
pout(i) ·
Nmet∑
k=1
∫ 2pi
0
pwind(j, k, ϑ)VQ(t)ν→S(i, k, ϑ)dϑ
(5.10)
Due to the finite dimensions of “vulnerability map”, non-zero “unit risk” values
are surely confined inside a circumference centre in Q(t) with radius r equal to
the maximum “vulnerability map” dimension, that is to the maximum effect
distance, of all “outcome meteo pairs” possible at Q(t). A representation of the
“unit risk map” is reported in Figure 5.5.
Once the “unit risk map” has been constructed, it is possible to evaluate the
“unit risk’ value at a generic point P (XP , YP ) due to point Q(XQ, YQ) by simply
overlapping the “unit risk map” on the impact area. Resorting to (5.11):
ξ
′
= XP −XQη′p = YP − YQ (5.11)
the co-ordinates of P in the X/Y frame (XP , YP ) are converted in co-ordinates
on ξ
′
/η
′
frame (ξ
′
P , η
′
P ): the “unit risk” value at (ξ
′
P , η
′
P ) represents the “unit
risk” value at point P .
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Figure 5.5: Unit risk map representation
5.2.3 The “translation algorithm”
Until now the vehicle has been assumed to be standing at Q(t), as if it were a
fixed storage vessel from which a release has occurred.
Thus the successive step is to describe the vehicle movement along the link
l, since an accident can occur at each point of the link. This can be made by
translating the “unit risk map” along the link.
This means making a linear integration along the route of the “unit risk”
value created by Q(t) at an area point P of the X/Y plane, that is evaluating
the integral shown in (5.12): ∫
Ll
URQ(t)→P (j, ν)dt (5.12)
where Ll is the route of link l. The value of the integral evaluated in (5.12)
represents the death probability at P having taken into account the fact that
the vehicle is moving along the link.
In the numerical procedure the integration is performed by means of an
adaptive step size Simpson rule, which automatically chooses the number of
link points to be taken into account [198].
Once the distance d of point P from the link and the radius r of the “unit
risk map” are known, the procedure can identify the segment ab of the link that
contributes to the risk at point P , as shown in (5.6), and then it performs the
linear integration (5.12) taking into account the ab segment only; in this way
the time effectiveness is improved without reducing the accuracy.
By considering the release frequency of the “link vehicle pair” in examination
and summing up at all seasons, the individual risk at P created by link l when
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Figure 5.6: “Unit risk map” integration along the route
the “vehicle typology” ν is traveling on it is given; (5.13 is obtained:
IRP (l, ν) =
Nseas∑
j=1
frel(l, ν, j)
∫
Ll
URQ(t)→P (j, ν)dt (5.13)
5.2.4 The all links all vehicle typologies individual risk
evaluation
The sum of IRP (l, ν) values extended at all “vehicle typology” and all links
gives the total individual risk created by the whole transportation network on
a point P of the impact area. Its expression is detailed in (5.14):
IRP =
Nlinks∑
l=1
Nveh(l)∑
ν=1
seas∑
j=1
frel(l, ν, j)
∫
Ll
Nout(ν)∑
i=1
pout(i)
Nmet∑
k=1
∫ 2pi
0
pwind(j, k, ϑ)VQ(t)ν→S(i, k, j)dϑ (5.14)
5.3 HAZMAT transport on motorway: Societal
Risk associated calculation
As noted in the previous Section 4.2.4 an alternative way to describe the Societal
Risk (SR) is the use of the so-called F (N)-curves [126], a powerful index of the
risk created by a transportation network over an impact area.
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Such F (N)-curve are drawn by computing the probability that a group of
more than N persons would be impacted due to an HAZAMAT accident, for
each (reasonable) value of N .
F is the cumulative frequency of an accident capable of causing the death
of N or more persons (in other cases N or more evacuated people).
To calculate F (N) curves, is required , an accurate description of the indoor
and outdoor population living in the impact area is required.
As with IR, SR too is additive with respect to the risk source.
Consequently, on an impact area created by a motorway network the SR
is given by the sum of risks created on that impact area by each link of the
network.
In addition, the risk due to a single link is given by the sum of the risks
created by each “vehicle typology” traveling on it.
This leads to a procedure which calculates first the risk created by each
“vehicle typology” on each link and then sums all these values.
As the SR is given by a curve, summing societal risk measures implies the
sum of F values corresponding to the same abscissa values N .
5.3.1 The concept of “scenario”
The calculation procedure explained in this section is based on the concept of
“scenario”. at the point risk Q(t) on a generic link l a scenario is given by the
combination:
Q(t) point risk
i final outcome
k meteorological condition
j seasonal situation
θ wind direction
5.3.2 The “scenario fatalities and frequency”
Resorting to the “outcome meteo pair” introduced above, a scenario can be
viewed also as a combination “Q(t) outcome/meteo pair (i, k) seasonal situation
j wind direction θ.
That means to each scenario a “vulnerability map” is assigned, the one
corresponding to the “outcome meteo pair” (i, k) of the scenario, and that all
scenarios having the same “outcome meteo pair”refer to the same “vulnerability
map”.
To evaluate the number of people involved in a scenario, the ξ/η frame of
the correspondent “vulnerability map” has to be positioned on the impact area,
with its origin at Q(t) and the ξ axis positioned as to form with the X axis the
exact angle θ of the scenario under examination.
Geographical information systems (GIS) provide an effective framework for
estimating these risk parameters [56, 118, 120, 156, 163, 230, 236].
In this way the “vulnerability map” represents exactly the impact zone of
the scenario, and the people involved in it are those of the “population map”
elements belonging to the scenario impact zone.
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The fatalities involved are given by the area integration over this impact
zone of the product of the vulnerability at each point with the people density
at this point, taking into account also the probability of being indoors.
By rotating the “vulnerability map” around Q(t), all the scenarios referring
to the same “Q(t) final outcome i meteo condition k seasonal situation j” are
taken into account.
A schematic representation of this procedure is shown in Figure 5.7. The
Figure 5.7: Overlapping of a “vulnerability map” with a “population map”
element
number of fatalities NscenQ(t)l,ν (i, j, k, θ) due to each scenario when an accident
occurs at Q(t) is evaluated according to the following (5.15:
NscenQ(t)l,ν (i, j, k, θ) =
NL∑
m=1
ρLm(j)
[
XLm(j)
∫
Lm
V inQ(t)ν (i, k, ϑ)dLm + (1− xLm(j))
∫
Lm
V outQ(t)ν (i, k, ϑ)dLm
]
+
NA∑
n=1
ρAn(j)
[
XAn(j)
∫
An
V inQ(t)ν (i, k, ϑ)dAn + (1− xAn(j))
∫
An
V outQ(t)ν (i, k, ϑ)dAn
]
+
NC∑
o=1
PCo(j)
[
XCo(j)V
in
Q(t)ν
(i, k, ϑ) + (1− xCo(j))uV outQ(t)ν (i, k, ϑ)
]
(5.15)
where V inQ(t)ν and V
out
Q(t)ν
represent, respectively, the indoor and outdoor vulnera-
bilities; the meaning of the other symbols has already been explained in Section
5.1.5.2.
In Figure 5.7 the contributions to the number of fatalities of all the “popu-
lation map” elements are taken into account in a different way.
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In fact for those “population map” elements, like roads, where people are
linearly distributed, a linear integration is performed using an adaptive step size
Simpson rule [198]; while for rectangular zones, where population is uniformly
distributed, a surface integration is made.
In the numerical procedure the performance of this surface integral repre-
sents the slowest step in evaluating (5.15); in order to accelerate this evaluation
without reducing the accuracy, the procedure resorts to a mathematical theo-
rem [198] which allows the quick calculation of surface integrals by performing
first a line integration in the ξ direction and then to linearly integrate in the η
direction the integral just obtained.
The linear integration in the ξ direction may be performed once for each
“vulnerability map” with an adaptive step size trapezoidal rule [198]. First this
evaluation is made for grid points and then, through a parabolic interpolation
procedure, also for points not belonging to the grid.
In fact the use of a parabolic interpolation, rather than a linear one, avoids
increasing the error due to the already performed linear interpolation of the
vulnerability values in grid points to obtain vulnerability values in points not
belonging to the grid. To warrant accuracy the evaluation of the “scenario
fatalities” should be performed for all 360 wind directions considered and for
each combination “Q(t) final outcome i meteo condition k seasonal situation j”.
The “scenario frequency” is the frequency of having a number of fatalities
equal to the “scenario fatalities” NscenQ(t)l,ν (i, j, k, θ) it is defined by (ref)
fscenQ(t)l,ν (i, j, k, ϑ) = frel(l, ν, j) · pout(i) · pwind(j, k, ϑ) (5.16)
It is worth noticing that the “scenario frequency” is a frequency per unit length
and unit angle, expressed in events/(kmyrgrade).
Furthermore, since a scenario depends on an “outcome meteo pair”, the “sce-
nario frequency” depends on the “release frequencies” defined for this “outcome
meteo pair” for the seasonal situations in examination.
5.3.3 The “wind direction cumulated scenario frequency”
Once NscenQ(t)l,ν (i, j, k, θ) and f
scen
Q(t)l,ν
(i, j, k, ϑ) are known for all scenarios refer-
ring to the same “Q(t) final outcome i meteo condition k seasonal situation j”
combination, it is necessary to evaluate for this combination the frequency of
having N or more fatalities by taking into account all wind directions.
This frequency we call the “wind direction cumulated scenario frequency”
and we indicate it as FQ(t)l,ν (N(i, j, k)).
Then for a selected number of values N∗ of the number of fatalities N , those
frequency values which refer to a scenario with fatalities equal or greater than
N∗ have to be summed to give the value of FQ(t)l,ν (N(i, j, k)) corresponding to
N∗.
The following (5.17) is used to evaluate FQ(t)(N(i, j, k)):
FQ(t)(N(i, j, k)) =
∫ 2pi
0
δNscen(i, j, k, ϑ)dϑ (5.17)
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where:
δNscen(i, j, k, ϑ) = f
scen
Q(t)l,ν
(i, j, k, ϑ) for NscenQ(t)l,ν (i, j, k, θ) ≥N∗;
δNscen(i, j, k, ϑ) = 0 for N
scen
Q(t)l,ν
(i, j, k, θ) < N∗.
As a consequence of having evaluated the “scenario frequencies” for 360 wind
directions, the integral in (5.17) is just a sum extended to all these wind direc-
tions.
5.3.4 The simulation of the traveling risk source
To simulate the change in the position where accidents can occur, the evaluation
of FQ(t)(N(i, j, k)) has to be performed for all points of the link in examination.
The evaluation of the line integral of FQ(t)(N(i, j, k)) for each fixed number of
fatalities N∗ along the link allows a “cumulated link frequency” F (N(i, j, k, ))l,ν
to be obtained, as shown by (5.18):
F (N(i, j, k, ))l,ν =
∫
Ll
FQ(t)l,ν (N(i, j, k))dt (5.18)
In the numerical procedure, in order to reduce the number of link points Q(t)
to be analyzed, an adaptive step size algorithm can be conveniently used.
5.3.5 The societal risk reassembling procedures
In order to obtain the link F (N)l,ν curve for the “vehicle typology” ν traveling
on the examined link l, it is necessary to evaluate (5.18) for all the combinations
“final outcome i meteorological condition k seasonal situation j” possible for l,
and then to sum them at constant N values.
The outlined F (N)l,ν calculus is performed for each pair (l, v), and eventu-
ally the F (N)l,ν curves are summed at constant N values to obtain the F (N)
curve for the whole network.
To make a pre´cis of the whole procedure, the SR created by the whole
network on an impact area is given by (5.19):
F (N) =
Nlink∑
l=1
Nveh(l)∑
ν=1
Nout(ν)∑
i=1
Nseas∑
j=1
Nmet∑
k=1
∫
Ll
∫ 2pi
0
δNscen(i, j, k, ϑ)dϑ (5.19)
being δNscen(i, j, k, ϑ) defined as in 5.16.
5.4 Tolerable or acceptable risk (ALARP)
The characterization of the objectives of safety and reliability involves the def-
inition of acceptable levels of risk. This acceptability may be related to the
possible consequences of adverse events in humans, on the environment or on
the system object of the study, depending on the scope.
At international level, there is no uniformity of approach to the definition
of criteria of acceptability of risk. The definition of criteria is associated to
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economic considerations and social reality in which the source of risk will be
placed reflecting the importance that is placed on issues of security. Below are
briefly presented some of acceptability criteria commonly adopted as interna-
tional standards.
We assume the following basics definitions
• Acceptable risk: a risk which everyone impacted is prepared to accept.
Action to further reduce such risk is usually not required unless reasonably
practicable measures are available at low cost in terms of money, time and
effort.
• Tolerable risk: a risk within a range that society can live with so as to
secure certain net benefits. It is a range of risk regarded as non-negligible
and needing to be kept under review and reduced further if possible.
• ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) principle: Principle which
states that risks, lower than the limit of tolerability, are tolerable only
if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is grossly in disproportion
(depending on the level of risk) to the improvement gained.
• F (N) curves: curves relating the probability per year of causing N or
more fatalities F to N . This is the complementary cumulative distribution
function. Such curves may be used to express societal risk criteria and to
describe the safety levels of particular facilities.
• Societal risk: the risk of widespread or large scale detriment from the
realization of a defined risk, the implication being that the consequence
would be on such a scale as to provoke a socio/political response.
5.4.1 ALARP demonstration of requirements
As already mentioned in Section 3.4.8, ALARP stands for “As Low As Rea-
sonably Practicable”, and is a term used in the analysis of safety-critical and
high-integrity systems.
The ALARP principle is that the residual risk shall be as low as reasonably
practicable0(forms part of a Nuclear Safety Justification) is derived from legal
requirements in the UK’s Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 and is explicitly
defined in the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999.
The ALARP principle is part of a safety culture philosophy and means that
a risk is low enough that attempting to make it lower would actually be more
costly than any cost likely to come from the risk itself.
This is called a tolerable risk. The ALARP principle arises from the fact
that it would be possible to spend infinite time, effort and money attempting
to reduce a risk to zero. It should not be understood as simply a quantitive
measure of benefit against detriment. It is more a best common practice of
judgment of the balance of risk and societal benefit.
The following factors are likely to be considered when deciding whether or
not a risk is tolerable.
• Health and safety guidelines.
• The specification.
135
Figure 5.8: ALARP Diagram.
• International standards and laws.
• Suggestions from advisory bodies.
Another factor that comes into the ALARP principle, is the cost of assessing
the improvement gained in an attempted risk reduction. In extremely complex
systems, this can be very high, and could be the limiting factor in practicability
of risk reduction.
Determining that a risk has been reduced to ALARP involves an assessment
of the risk to be avoided, of the sacrifice (in money, time and trouble) involved
in taking measures to avoid that risk, and a comparison of the two. This is a
Cost Benefit Analysis. The meaning and value of the ALARP tolerability risk
triangle show in Figure 5.8(see figure 1 above) is that the triangle represents
increasing levels of “ risk for a particular hazardous activity, as we move from
the bottom of the triangle toward the top”. The triangle can be divided into
three broad regions:
1. The zone at the top represents an unacceptable region. For practical pur-
poses, a particular risk falling into that region is regarded as unacceptable,
whatever the levels of benefit associated with the activity. Any activity
or practice giving rise to risks falling in the uppermost region would, as
a matter of principle, be ruled out unless the activity or practice can be
modified to reduce the degree of risk so that it falls in one of the regions
below, or there are exceptional reasons for the activity or practice to be
retained.
2. The zone at the bottom represents a broadly acceptable region. Risks
falling into the region are generally regarded as insignificant and ade-
quately controlled. Regulators would not usually require further action
to reduce risks unless reasonably practicable measures are available. The
levels of risk characterising this region are comparable to those that peo-
ple regard as insignificant or trivial in their daily lives. They are typical
of the risk from activities that are inherently not very hazardous or from
hazardous activities that can be, or are, readily controlled to produce very
low risks. Nonetheless the UK government HSE would take into account
136
that duty holders must reduce risks wherever it is reasonably practicable
to do so or where the law so requires it.
3. The zone between the unacceptable and the broadly acceptable region is
the tolerable region1. Risks in that region are typical of the risks from
activities that people are prepared to tolerate in order to secure benefits,
in the expectation that:
• the nature and the level of risks are properly assessed and the results
used properly to determine control measures,
• the residual risks are not unduly high and kept as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP),
• the risks are periodically reviewed to ensure that they still meet
ALARP criteria.
5.4.2 Individual Risk
The individual risk (IR), as used by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning and Environment (VROM), is defined as the probability that an aver-
age unprotected person, permanently present at a certain location, is killed due
to an accident resulting from a hazardous activity IR = Pf · P ()d|f .
To limit the risks, there are many criteria such as ALARA, Risk Matrix, AFR
(Annual Fatality Risk), AIR (Average Individual Risk) and AI (Aggregated
Indicator) etc.
The tools used to demonstrate ALARP will vary depending on the levels of
risk. However, the measures in place to prevent or limit major accidents should
be described in the safety report and be at least to “ Relevant Good Practise”.
The assessor will need to focus on these measures to be satisfied they do
represent good practice etc. The regulator will regard relevant good practice to
have met the (AMN) All Measures Necessary requirement when:
• the societal risks can be shown (subject to uncertainty) t be acceptable,
e.g. by use of an approximate risk integral (ARI) or other societal risk
methodology; and
• no group, or individual, is subject to relatively high individual risks that
are not ALARP.
Risk assessment techniques range from a simple qualitative approach to a de-
tailed quantitative assessment. Fully quantified risk assessments are very costly
and time consuming exercises, and there is within the chemical industry resis-
tance to adopt such practices. One method which may help to bridge the gap
between purely qualitative and full QRA approaches is to use a risk matrix.
This type of approach has been widely used by many operators in their Control
of major accident hazards (COMAH) safety reports.
Risk is interpreted as the combination of consequence (severity) and like-
lihood (frequency). Both these are minimum requirements of COMAH safety
reports. A risk matrix enables this combination to be represented graphically.
It is a reasonably quick and easy method to visualize the spread of risk and
consequently is commonly used during (or after) hazard identification studies
(such as a HAZOP), to screen hazards or to conduct a simple risk analysis. The
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Figure 5.9: ALARP Risk Matrix Limits.
main advantage of the matrix is its easy representation of different risk levels,
and the avoidance of more time consuming quantitative analysis where this is
not justified.
The basis for the risk estimate is usually qualitative, although it can be
quantitative (for either the consequences or the frequencies or both). The ma-
trix, as illustrated in Figure 5.9, typically comprises a square divided into a
number of boxes, with each box representing a different underlying risk level.
Another approach suggested by the UK’s Health & Safety Executives Method-
ology and Standards Development Unit (MSDU) is to use a non cumulative fn
(frequency, numbers of people killed) plot to visualize the spread of risk and
guide the proportionality to be used for examining risk reduction options.
The HSC suggested, moreover, to assume what level of risk to “acceptable”
to 10−6 / year and the values 10−4 and 10−3/ year what level of risk to them-
selves “ not acceptable”, respectively, for the operators concerned and for the
population.
5.4.3 Societal Risk
Societal risk reflects the societys point of view. In this perspective, risks having
low hazard and high consequence are taken into account.
For individual and societal risk, the unit of risk is the loss of life/yr. Societal
risk is generally expressed by F (N) (sometimes indicated as f − N or F − N
curves.
When the frequency of events which causes at least N fatalities is plotted
against the number N on log log scales, the result is called F (N) or F−N curves.
If the frequency scale is replaced by annual probability, then the resultant curve
is called f−N curve (logf = a+blogN). F (N) curves are constructed based on
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Figure 5.10: Curves F (N) in the United Kingdom
historical data in the form of number of landslides and related fatalities. They
in fact represent current situation i.e. the situation we live now.
F (N) curves form the basis of developing societal acceptability and tolera-
bility levels. The F (N) curves can be constructed for various geographical units
such as country, province, state etc. The number of landslides and related fa-
talities within the considered geographical unit determine the acceptability and
tolerability criteria.
The General Guidelines for Tolerable Risk Criteria Establishment presume
incremental risk from a hazard to an individual should not be greater than the
one which is exposed to in everyday life of a person. The incremental risk from a
hazard should be reduced wherever reasonably practicable (ALARP Principle).
If the possible life loss is high, the risk should be low. Individuals tolerate
higher risks than they regard as acceptable, when they are unable to control or
reduce the risk due to financial or other limitations. Higher risks are likely to be
tolerated for existing slopes than for planned projects. Tolerable risks are higher
for natural slopes than engineered ones. If the slope is under monitoring or risk
mitigation measures are implemented, tolerable risk approaches to engineered
slopes. Tolerable risks depends on countrys experience with landslides.
As to assess the acceptability of individual risk is necessary to compare
the size (number) of that risk with the thresholds, to determine if the societal
risk is acceptable it is necessary is to compare the curve F (N) obtained from
analysis of risk (usually rectilinear) by the curves F (N) threshold reported in
the figures below. In particular, in Figure 5.10 are shown the curves F (N)
which identify the three areas of risk (acceptable, not acceptable ALARP) in
the United Kingdom. [126].
We can identify the following possibilities:
139
Figure 5.11: How were establish and select Risk Assessment Criteria
• societal risk is acceptable if the curve F (N) is calculated entirely below
the curve F (N) straight out that the threshold of acceptable risk;
• risk ALARP if the curve F (N) is calculated entirely below the curve F (N)
straight out that the threshold of risk is not acceptable and partially or
entirely above the curve F (N) which defines the threshold acceptable risk;
• risk is not acceptable if the curve F (N) is calculated in part above the
curve F (N) straight out that the threshold of risk is not acceptable.
5.4.4 Perceived risk
In the model for calculating the IR and the SR discussed above we assume
that the company is neutral to risk, i.e. events with equal likelihood (product
of probability for damage) are considered equivalent.
This means that, for example, a single incident that causes hundreds of
deaths is equivalent (or equally undesirable) to 100 accidents causing the death
of each individual, and this because in both cases the number deaths is the same
and therefore the two events are perceived by society in the same way.
However, it is widely believed that an event characterized by low probabil-
ity but high consequences (LPHC) is the most undesirable features of a high
probability but low consequences (HPLC), although the expected consequences
of the two events are the same.
Therefore, many “decision makers” tend to show an aversion to risk when
they have to make decisions about LPHC events such as accidents in the trans-
port of dangerous goods. The Figure 5.11 shows the subjectivity in determining
the risk assessment criteria depending on the perception of the risk.
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The Figure 5.12 shows the probability of an event occurring based on the
number of deaths caused from the same depending on the propensity to take
risks:
• the solid line indicates a neutral position toward the risk (events with
equal probability for product damage, are considered equivalent);
• the dotted line indicates a position of risk aversion (the population is more
adverse events with low probability and high damage, but very rare events
are more easily accepted).
The change of perception depends on the probability of occurrence and can be
described by a correlation function, shown for the first time by Starr (1969)
[221]: when the events are very familiar, objective risk and perceived match.
When the events are less frequent, there is a perception in excess, and when
the events are extremely rare, the perception is failing. In oder to incorporate
the propensity to take risks with the models of risk, a simple way is to use an
exponent α to be applied to the values of the consequences or vulnerabilities.
Real probability
Perceived 
Figure 5.12: Examples of Perceived Probability
The previous model is modified as in (5.20) for IR and as in (5.21) for SR to
take into account the perception of risk.
Individual Risk
IRP =
Nlinks∑
i=1
Nveh(l)∑
ν=1
Nseas∑
j=1
frel(l, ν, j) ·
∫
Ll
Nout(ν)∑
i=1
pout(i)·
·
Nmet(j)∑
k=1
∫ 2pi
0
pwind(j, k, ϑ) · VQ(t)ν→S (i, k, ϑ)αdθ (5.20)
Societal Risk
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NscenQ(t)l,ν (i, j, k, ϑ) =
Nl∑
m=1
ρLm(j)
[∫
Lm
VQ(t)ν (i, k, ϑ)
αdLm
]
+
+
Na∑
n=1
ρAn(j)
[∫
An
VQ(t)ν (i, k, ϑ)
αdAn
]
+
NC∑
0=1
PC0(j)
[
VQ(t)ν (i, k, ϑ)
α
]
(5.21)
whereas for α=1 the model is neutral to risk, for α>1 the model is with risk
aversion and for α<1 you have the model with propensity to take risks. The
higher the value of α, the higher the calculated risk.
Figure 5.13: Relationship between risk and number of victims according to the
type of willingness to take risk
According to [209], the main factors influencing the acceptability of risk and in
particular its perception are:
• the number of people participating in dangerous;
• the comparison with the natural mortality;
• the real or supposed benefit resulting;
• the voluntary nature of risks;
• the irreversibility of the consequences;
• the geographical location of the source of danger with respect to receptor;
• the inherent characteristics of individuals, in particular the cultural level
and social status.
The nature of subjectivity that characterizes the perception of risk does not
permit the application of mathematical models, or at least objective, that will
uniquely define the distance between real risk and perceived risk.
The only instrument that is normally used is a sample survey conducted
by sociologists and psychologists in which you are asked to evaluated, through
questionnaires or oral interviews, to give an opinion on the perceived seriousness
of a given event.
Finally, we will have a vision of how the event object of investigation is
perceived by the population. Therefore, we can estimate the distance between
real risk and objective and in addition find αl enabling the transition from a
calculated risk that received the population).
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Chapter 6
A Real Time DSS for
HAZMAT Transportation
in a sustainable oriented
motorway environment
In this chapter, some important concepts are introduced about Hazardous Ma-
terials Transportation by road. Section 6.1 gives background informations and
introduces the problem and the proposed solution related to a series of obliga-
tions to which must meet motorway companies under the ADR, civil protection
agencies and managers of road infrastructure. Section 6.2 presents the proposed
real-time monitoring system as the basis for assessing the risk derived from the
HAZMAT transport. In Section 6.3 a brief presentation of the system architec-
ture id offered and a simulation of the application of the risk assessment model
and corresponding values are carried out in Section 6.4. Finally, Section6.5
summarizes results and conclusions.
6.1 The en-route HAZMAT
Today, a great amount of Hazardous Materials are carried “on the road” and this
fact can be very important for the continuance of strong and effective national
and international economies.
Hazardous material transportation on road represents a relevant risk for
the people, their properties and the environment. Sustainability in HAZMAT
transportation on road has often been addressed as the requirement to include
integrated risk analysis as well as prevention measures in the distribution plan-
ning activities of the transportation companies.
In all these processes road pavement can play a crucial role, but many aspects
still need answers on this topic. For example to test Hot Mix Asphalt chemical
resistance and the assessment of relationships in order to estimate how much a
transported fluid can be dangerous depending on mix characteristics (effective
porosity, etc.).
On the other end, quantification of risk of the “en-route” hazardous materials
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accidents is difficult because probabilities for traffic accidents are low and those
involving hazardous materials are even lower.
The en-route hazardous materials (involuntary) accidents have low proba-
bility: Gheorghe [95] estimate as a typical accident rate the value of 3.0× 10−6
accidents/vehicle-km.
Nevertheless, the potentially catastrophic impacts attributed to such inci-
dents and the large number of hazardous shipments raise serious fears to all
stakeholders involved in and affected by the HAZMAT process i.e. governmen-
tal authorities, carriers, the local societies and social groups, and shippers.
Yet some risk is imposed on the population living along the major highways,
who are asked to assume the risk with no clear benefits to them. For this reason,
if the same main route segment is selected for shipments from multiple origins,
the objection of people living along this route would increase considerably.
These people are likely to prefer alternate routings that would spread the
risks. Public opposition to HAZMAT shipments has increased in recent years,
due to fears of terrorist attacks on HAZMAT vehicles.
6.1.1 European Road HAZMAT Transport Legislation
The principal step of Legislation on road of carriage of dangerous goods are
presented in the following paragraph.
• Commission Directive 2006/89/EC of 3 November 2006 adapting for the
sixth time to technical progress Council Directive 94/55/EC on the ap-
proximation of the laws of the Member States with regard to the transport
of dangerous goods by road (Text with EEA relevance).
• Council Directive 94/55/EC of 21 November 1994 on the transport of
dangerous goods by road (`‘ADR framework directive´’). The first general
directive covering land transport was Directive 94/55, commonly known
as the “ADR framework directive”. This directive makes the provisions
of the ADR agreement uniformly applicable to road transport nationally
and between Member States, adopting in particular the technical annexes
to the ADR agreement. These annexes set standards for the classification,
packaging and labeling of dangerous substances and the construction of
vehicles used to transport them.
• Council Directive 95/50/EC of 6 October 1995 on uniform procedures for
checks on the transport of dangerous goods by road. This provides for
a common list of points to be checked and the issuing of a copy of the
report on the road check carried out. This is for the information of any
authorities carrying out a second road check, either in the same Member
State or another one.
• Council Directive 96/35/EC of 3 June 1996 on the appointment and voca-
tional qualification of safety advisers for the transport of dangerous goods
by road, rail and inland waterway. Under this directive “the activities of
which include the transport or the related loading or unloading of dan-
gerous goods by road, rail or inland waterway, (must) each appoint one
or more safety advisers”. Since this definition includes loading and un-
loading activities, it is also applicable to port undertakings which carry
144
out these operations for the different modes of land transport. The role
of safety advisers is to help prevent the risks which these activities entail
to individuals carrying out the work, other persons of the environment.
The directive also stipulates that the job of safety adviser may be done by
an individual from outside the undertaking or by an employee already en-
gaged on other duties. The Commission sets great store by this directive,
given the importance of the human factor in the risk of accidents and the
part to be played by the safety adviser.
• Directive 2000/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
April 2000 on minimum examination requirements for safety advisers for
the transport of dangerous goods by road, rail or inland waterway. With
this directive Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure
that safety advisers for the transport of dangerous goods are examined in
such a way that they satisfy these minimum requirements.
• Directive 98/91 of the European Parliament and of the Council, relating
to motor vehicles and their trailers intended for the transport of danger-
ous goods by road, and amending Directive 70/156/EEC relating to the
type-approval of motor vehicles and their trailers (OJ L11 of 16 January
1999). This directive is concerned with the type-approval of motor vehicles
used to carry dangerous goods. It incorporates the technical requirements
laid down by the ADR agreement and provides for the issuing of an EU
certificate to facilitate vehicle registration in the various Member States.
• Council Directive 1999/36/EC on transportable pressure equipment. This
is concerned with receptacles and tanks used to transport Class 2 gases.
The proposal seeks to introduce a system of EU conformity markings for
new equipment and EU markings for periodic inspections, with a view
to free transport and use, including refilling, in all Member States of the
European Union.
• During 2004-2005 the Commission carried out an evaluation of its pol-
icy in the field of the transport of dangerous goods. The work was done
by an external group of consultants. Final Report on the Evaluation of
EU policy on the Transport of Dangerous Goods since 1994. Launched
an impact study on a possible European directive to improve intermodal
transport security. The study was commissioned in December 2004 to a
consortium chaired by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Consulting and iden-
tifies risks, possible security measures including a cost benefits analysis,
a transport infrastructure plan and possible EU coordination. The final
report was published on 1 December 2005. It does not contain the opinion
of the European Commission.
6.1.2 Problem definition
Transport steps are linked by many important cultural and social progress that
have made this area more and more strategic for the development of contempo-
rary society.
Transport networks and their supporting infrastructure assure efficient and
safe mobility of persons and transport of goods in the EU, and represent the
largest part of the built environment.
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In Italy about 80% of road traffic is represented by the delivery of goods, and
the overall trend in Europe seems to predict an increase of 30% within 2010.
About 18% of this freight traffic is currently represented by HAZMAT Trans-
port, but a clear awareness of HAZMAT Transport world flows on road and on
the other transport modes - as well as of the related security and safety aspects
- is not present yet, at least from a social and economic point of view.
Intelligent Transportation System technologies has also made possible the
gradual reduction in journey times and thus opening up new economic horizons,
with the conquest of markets wider.
The freedom gained by the ease of movement, however, had a cost in terms
of environmental impact, quality of life and safety.
The risk is that the increasing demand for current and especially future can
make that cost is no longer sustainable.
In addition, several thousands of trucks HAZMAT circulate within European
roads on daily basis. They utilize urban roads, rural roads, highways, tunnels
and long bridges and in some case they are not allowed in some of them.
The risks connected to the operation and maintenance remains one of the
major issues regarding the European transport systems. Safety and security of
these systems is of major concern to society.
The transport of hazardous materials is a specific concern which can be
associated with approximately 8% of all European shipments.
However, the actual accident risk and impact is not calculated. In addition,
when, due to unforeseen events (traffic jams, accidents, etc.), they need to
change route, they do not have any particular guidance on the safest alternative
nor are consequences of road choice to the business chain and societal risk
calculated.
Safety and security are especially crucial here, as these shipments not only
present an additional inherent hazard potential in case of accidents, but also
present an opportunity for intentional misuse to criminals and terrorists.
As a consequence, accident prevention and consequence mitigation are be-
coming a common practice at large manufacturing (e.g. chemical companies)
and service firms (e.g. transportation of dangerous goods).
The benefits of improving safety performance and reduced costs associated
with potential accidents or pollution risks are compelling.
However, most such efforts are still being carried out as special programs
or projects, layered on top of ongoing business operations (e.g. production,
storage, transportation, etc.).
Recent experience shows that the full benefits of accident and pollution
prevention and consequence mitigation will only be realized when such activities
are fully integrated into a core approach or into the company core business
practice.
In view of the increasing concern in transportation security, there is an urgent
need to review and improve, if necessary, the way trucks carrying HAZMATs
are being routed on urban and suburban road networks.
Routing of such vehicles should not only ensure the safety of travelers in
the network, but should also consider the risk of the HAZMAT being used as
weapon of mass destruction.
In Italy, according to [45], HAZMATs transport by road requires constant
monitoring (tracking and tracing) of vehicles cargo handled. This requirement
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involves a series of obligations to which must meet companies under the ADR,
civil protection agencies and managers of road infrastructure.
As a consequence, motorways concessionaires must adopt real-time systems
to monitor HAZMATs carried and to support the decisions on the transport
(MAS Monitoring - Alarm - Alerts).
6.1.3 The proposed solution
We propose an innovative real-time decision support system (DSS) model for
monitoring and routing of HAZMAT Vehicles, aiming at solving the above stated
problems.
Such systems should aim to calculate and evaluate in real time the individual
and societal risk related to the transit of HAZMAT on the motorway network.
Then, they should allow:
• a monitoring in real-time means of the means transporting HAZMAT;
• a risk assessment derived from the carriage;
• the alert and notification of emergencies;
• a reporting anomalies for a subsequent planned intervention.
As outlined in Section 5.1.3, in a motorway, each stretch is characterized by
substantially rectilinear link from toll to toll station. As a consequence, routes
for HAZMATs transport shall be considered as a linear type source of risk
consisting of a number of points that are also source of risk.
This substantially increases the computational load required to obtain the
final measure of risk. Consequently, according to [230] GIS-systems need to use
through the overlapping of the layer and the query space.
6.2 The real-time monitoring
Real-time monitoring system is the basis for assessing the risk derived from the
HAZMAT transport. The main objective of monitoring phase is to collect by
sensors a set of data to be input into the model for calculating the risk.
GPS technology it is not possible to precisely locate vehicles carrying dan-
gerous goods because the vehicles not at all have this technology on board.
Furthermore, it is not possible to access the data location for the absence
of agreements or technological infrastructures that enable the data transfer be-
tween the vehicle and the motorway’s concessionaires.
Nevertheless, the identification of vehicles can only be done through the
use of vision systems (cameras), positioned at the toll station and along the
motorway.
These systems make it possible to identify the tank cars and tank container
carrying HAZMAT and the substance transported through reading the ADR
Hazard Identification Number (HIN) (Kemler Code) with the materials UN
number on placards.
Consequently, we can still determine the link of the motorway traveled by
the generic trucker in spite of the exact position, moment to moment, of the
vehicle. So, for every stretch (link) of motorway we can identify the dynamic
data (which vary over time) such as:
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• the presence on link of vehicles carrying HAZMAT;
• the types of substances carried;
• the weather conditions (wind direction, wind speed, rain, snow, fog, ice,
atmospheric stability, etc.).
• the traffic conditions (vehicle flow);
as well as static data (which do not vary over time) such as:
• characteristics and type of road (the presence of curves, number of lanes,
etc.);
• distribution and population density nearby the link;
• services and infrastructure around it.
In the calculation procedures that we present each link is considered straight
and have uniform properties along its entire length. These conditions can be
obtained easily without loss of generality, adding fictitious nodes to the transport
network.
In the case of the motorway network, characterized by substantially rectilin-
ear road stretch from toll to toll, it is possible to consider the nodes as points
of access / exit of the motorway.
6.2.1 Risk Assessment derived from HAZMAT transport
In order to assess the individual and societal risk derived from the HAZMAT
transport, we reference to the model discussed previously in Section 5.1 adapted
to real-time event. In particular, we take into account the following:
1. N is a set of links (the road stretches of motorway);
2. l is a generic link of the motorway network;
3. ν is a type of hazardous substance;
4. λinc(l, jt) is the accident frequency calculated through historical analysis
[114] expressed in events/(vehicle ∗ km). This size can be amplified or
diminished to change some values that can be static (e.g. for the tortuous
path, the slope, the number of lanes and the presence of a tunnel or a
bridge) or dynamic (in particularly the weather, the flow and vehicle speed,
and the presence of work) that depends on the type of road in particular
the geometry of the route, traffic conditions and weather conditions [86].
5. N tveh(l) is a different typologies (ν) traveling on each link l at moment t;
6. N ttype(l, ν) is the number of vehicles carrying the dangerous substance ν
currently in transit on the link l at instant t;
7. prel(ν) the release probability due to the accident (P (R|A)) that depends
on the characteristics of the vehicle transporting the hazardous substance
ν (mechanical strength, possible internal partitioning, presence of double
walls and insulation) and the type of accident where the vehicle is involved;
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8. Nout(ν) is the number of all types of effects caused by different types of
HAZMATs released since the accident for a given type of substance ν (as
e.g. jet fire, pool fire, flash fire, fireball, BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding
vapor explosion), UVCE (unconfined vapor cloud explosion);
9. Pout(i) is the probability P (X|R,A) of a type of effects once a release i
has occurred;
10. Ctmet(l) is the weather condition on the link l (wind speed and atmospheric
stability)at instant t;
11. ϑt(l) is the current direction of the wind on the link l at instant t;
12. n the generic rectangular area of rectangular NA areas (for each area are
known the uniform population density (ρAn [persons/m
2 for rectangles],
the geographical position;
13. m is the generic linear zone of the total linear numberNL (for each zone are
known the is the population density ρLm [persons/m] and the geographic
location);
14. o is the generic aggregation of the total number of such centres NC ; the
fraction of persons being indoors (xCo and the total number of persons in
each centre PCo) are known;
15. VQ(x)→S(i, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t(l)) is the measure of vulnerability in S given the
incident in Q(x) which depends on the result i, the weather condition
Cmet and the wind direction ϑ on the link l at the moment t;
16. α is the perception of risk (α=1 risk-neutral, for α>1 risk aversion and for
α<1 propensity to take risks) given as input to the system and depends
on the “decision maker” willingness to risk.
6.2.2 IR Assessment
In Sections 4.2 and 5.1.4 the individual risk was presented additive with respect
to the source of risk and therefore risk to themselves at a point P is given by
the sum of the risks posed by individual Q(x).
As a result each source of risk Q(x) produced in P is a risk given by the
possible release of each vehicle carrying HAZMAT ν in Q(x).
The relative risk to a single link is the sum of the risks arising from all
vehicles N ttype(l, ν) that are currently in transit on that link. This measure of
risk, related on the individual link), can be added on all the link to obtain the
total risk of the network.
6.2.2.1 Unit risk
As the model is in real time, its purpose is to calculate the risk in time at any
moment. Consequently, is not necessary to take into account the probability
density of the wind pwind(j, k, ϑ) and that the wind can blow from all directions
with different values of probability, because the weather conditions and wind
direction data are instantly measurable at the moment t.
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As a consequence, there is no need to rotate the map of vulnerability around
the origin Q(x) weighed at each step of rotation for the probability that the
wind blow in that direction.
To evaluate the vulnerability at any point P related to a single triplet - final
outcomes i - weather condition Ctmet(l) - substance transported ν is sufficient
overlap the map of vulnerability and the Cartesian system ξ / η (in which the
origin coincides with the source of risk Q(x) and the axis ξ coincides with the
wind direction whereas ϑ is the angle between ξ and X) on the system X/Y
and in particular to the system ξ ’/ η’ origin in Q(x) and with axes parallel to
the reference Cartesian general X/Y .
This is the unit risk map.
The evaluation of unit risk map is even simpler using a GIS software (e.g.
MapInfo) because it is sufficient to overlap the layer of the map of vulnerability
directed in accordance with the direction of the wind on the link at instant t on
the layer of the motorway network.
We make the previous result for each possible final ν relative to the substance
that is in transit on link l, obtaining (6.1).
URtQ(t)→S(ν) =
Nout(ν)∑
i=1
pout(i) · VQ(x)ν→S(i, Ctmet(l), ϑt(l)) (6.1)
6.2.2.2 Total Unit Risk on link
So far, the vehicle was considered as stationary in Q(t). The next step is to
describe the vehicle traveling on the ( link) as a traveling source of risk to which
assimilate the possible accidents that can happen in any point of the l.
In addition, previous expression is modified as in (6.2, considering the rel-
ative frequency of the possible HAZMAT release for the vehicle carrying the
substance on the ν ( link) l.
IRPt(l, ν) = frel(l, ν, jt) ·
∫
Ll
URtQ(x)→P (ν)dt (6.2)
whereas:
frel(l, ν, jt) = λinc(l, jt) · prel(ν) (6.3)
and where Ll is the link and
∫
Ll
URQ(t)→P (j, v)dt is the translation of unit risk
map on link.
It is also important to notice the following:
• the frequency of release is a static data as result of historical data analysis;
• jt means the current season (frequency analysis of release may refer to
different time periods, i.e. “ seasons”, to take into account of its seasonal
phenomena so we must use the data on the current season in which it is
carrying out the calculation of risk).
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6.2.2.3 Total Unit Risk
Finally, adding the individual risks calculated in the previous paragraph on all
vehicles that are dangerous through the link (N ttype(l, ν)) and all link in order
to obtain the individual risk to be attributed to the point P as in (6.4).
IRPt =
Nlinks∑
i=1
Ntveh(l)∑
v=1
N ttype(l, v) · frel(l, v, jt)·
·
∫
Ll
Nout(v)∑
i=1
pout(i) · VQ(x)v→S(i, Ctmet(l), ϑt)
(6.4)
Taking into account the perceived risk (6.5) is obtained.
IRPt =
Nlinks∑
i=1
Ntveh(l)∑
v=1
N ttype(l, v) · frel(l, v, jt)·
·
∫
Ll
Nout(v)∑
i=1
pout(i) · VQ(x)v→S(i, Ctmet(l), ϑt)α
(6.5)
6.2.3 Societal Risk Assessment
As individual risk, the societal risk is additive with respect to the source of risk.
Consequently, on an area of the motorway network under consideration we
can determine the societal risk adding the risks arising from individual link of
the network whereas the risk due to a single ( link) is the sum of risks due to
all vehicles transporting HAZMATs currently in transit on that route of the
motorway.
As noted in the previous Section 4.2.4 an alternative way to describe the
Societal Risk (SR) is the use of the so-called F (N)-curves [126], a powerful
index of the risk created by a transportation network over an impact area.
The curves F (N) report values of the cumulative (per year) frequency F )
which, as a result of all possible accidents, we have seen in the damage of a
reference area not less than N (and therefore a number of deaths greater than
or equal to N units).
Therefore, add societal risks means the addition of frequencies F for the
same abscissa value of N .
For each scenario, defined by:
• final outcomes i depending on the substance ν;
• point source Q(x);
• current weather conditions on the link l Ctmet(l);
• current direction of the wind on the link ϑt(l);
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• current season jt;
We start with the map of vulnerability ξ/η describing the impact or exposure
map for a scenario; we overlap the map of vulnerability on population map.
The number of possible deaths is from integrating on the product between
each point in vulnerability and population density at that point.
As in the Individual Risk case, it is not necessary to rotate the map of
vulnerability around Q(x) in order to weigh up all the scenarios that refer to
the same Q(x), to the same final outcome i, to the same weather conditions
Ctmet(l), but to different wind directions ϑ diverse.
Only the actual scenario at moment t is evaluated, scenario for which the
following parameters:
• Ctmet(l)
• ϑt(l)
• jt
are fixed at the moment t in which risk is assessed.
Number of deaths for each scenario is given in (6.6).
NscenQ(t)l,ν,t(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t) =
Nl∑
m=1
ρLm
[∫
Lm
VQ(x)ν (i, C
t
met(l), ϑ
t)dLm
]
+
Na∑
n=1
ρAn
[∫
An
VQ(x)ν (i, C
t
met(l), ϑ
t)dAn
]
+
Nc∑
0=1
PC0
[
VQ(x)ν (i, C
t
met(l), ϑ
t)
]
(6.6)
Taking into account the perceived risk we get in (6.7).
NscenQ(t)l,ν,t(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t) =
Nl∑
m=1
ρLm
[∫
Lm
VQ(x)ν (i, C
t
met(l), ϑ
t)αdLm
]
+
Na∑
n=1
ρAn
[∫
An
VQ(x)ν (i, C
t
met(l), ϑ
t)αdAn
]
+
Nc∑
0=1
PC0
[
VQ(x)ν (i, C
t
met(l), ϑ
t)α
]
(6.7)
Frequency of the scenario
fscenQ(t)l,v,t(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t) = frel(l, ν, jt) · pout(i) (6.8)
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6.2.3.1 Societal Risk derived from traveling risk source
As when we calculate the individual risk, for the societal risk is necessary to
consider a possible incident that may occur with equal probability in any of the
generic links l taken into account.
Therefore, for a given value of N ∗ deaths in the field of N , the values
of the frequencies related to the scenarios of each of the point source Q(x)
(fscenQ(t)l,v,t(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t)) with a number of deaths of at least N∗ must be
added together to obtain the value of F (N(i, jt, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t))l,v,t related to N∗.
F (N(i, jt, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t))l,ν,t =
∫
Ll
δNscen(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t)tdLl (6.9)
δNscen(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t)t ={
fscenQ(t)l,v,t(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t) if NscenQ(t)l,v,t(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t) ≥ N∗
0 if NscenQ(t)l,v,t(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t) < N∗
}
(6.10)
6.2.3.2 Total Societal Risk
Next step is to calculate the total curve F (N)l,ν,t at moment t, on the link l
related to the vehicle ν.
To perform this is necessary evaluate F (N(i, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t(l)))l,ν,t of previous
step for each type of final outcome i adding the amount so found for values of
N constants, given the current weather conditions on the link Ctmet(l) and the
the current season jt.
Last step of the procedure, finally, is to determine the curve F (N) of the
network always adding to values of N different constants F (N)l,ν,t for all ( link)l
and all vehicles carrying dangerous goods that are going on generic ( link ).
F (N)t =
Nlink∑
i=1
Ntveh(l)∑
v=1
N ttype(l, ν) ·
Nout(ν)∑
i=1
∫
Ll
δNscen(i, j
t, Ctmet(l), ϑ
t) (6.11)
6.2.4 Emergency Alert and Notification Systems
After completing the calculation of individual and societal risk on the motorway
network at the generic instant t, we must take into consideration whether these
measures of risk are acceptable and possibly, if they were not, notify the situa-
tion through messages warning to take appropriate action[187]. As example, in
Figure 6.1 are shows the levels of Risk Tolerability in Great Britain.
For example, if the societal risk is unacceptable, “crisis manager” can choose
to implement policies of homogenization and dilution of risk in the area. As
point out in Section 5.3, there is no uniformity of approach in the definition of
risk acceptability criteria, but there are eligibility criteria commonly adopted as
“International Standards”.
The best known is the “ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) [126]
showed in Figure [? ].
153
Figure 6.1: Levels of Risk Tolerability in G.B.
Figure 6.2: The curves F (N) and ALARP thresholds
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Figure 6.3: The curves F (N) threshold for a range in the United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Denmark
This criterion is related to the individual or societal risk, and correlates the
levels and thresholds of tolerability of risk at the best reasonably available tech-
nology [169]. It can also be expressed as “the degree of risk where further
reduction in risk would cost too much more than the benefit obtained by re-
ducing the same”. These two definitions are complementary and represent two
possible (opposite) objectives of assessing the acceptability of risk. In Figure
6.3, the curves F (N) threshold for a range of countries, particularly the United
Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark.
In Figure 6.4 are presented data for curves F(N) for different Countries.
The HSC recommends taking what level of risk to “ acceptable”the value 10−6/year
and the values 10−4/year and 10−3/year what level of risk to “ not acceptable”,
respectively for operators of the test and for the population [92]. Figure [? ]
shows these HSC levels of acceptability.
6.3 System Architecture
The DSS shall be a part of an automated system that aims at reducing the
overall risk of HAZMATs transportation through European motorways.
Several subsystems (telematic modules, on-board units, sensors, real-time
data providing modules, etc.) cooperate toward the goal of maximizing the
safety of such transportation, while also taking into account business demands,
network efficiency and conflicts resolution.
An advanced and well documented risk assessments for the transportation
of HAZMAT on motorway must take into account:
• statistics-based loss of road tankers frequencies;
• specification of potential consequences for a given release situations (for
example, using event tree methodology as an organizational tool;
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Figure 6.4: Values for F (N) curves in different Countries
Figure 6.5: Thresholds of acceptability of individual risk (HSC)
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Figure 6.6: The proposed System Architecture
• consequence calculation models to determine individual and societal risk
Such procedures for the risk assessment (including for example decision-making
on preventive measures) may offer only a limited insight into the causes and se-
quences leading to an accident and do not allow for any kind of predictive anal-
ysis. Literature review in Section 4.3 about risk analysis relative to industrial
systems and HAZMAT transportation is wide and its know like Quantitative
Risk Analysis (QRA).
This approach is applied in many projects to analyze risk relative to fixed
systems (ARIPAR, SIMAGE, Canvey Island, Rijmond, ARTIS, ARIPAL, GRI-
PAL).
The evolution of the QRA for transport activity is known like Transporta-
tion Risk Analysis (TRA). Literature about TRA is recent and relative models
are in evolution. Risk analysis relative to HAZMAT is applied to realize Deci-
sion Support System (DSS) to plan and to manage system (FLAG, OPTIPATH,
TRAMP e RELAMP). Risk relative to dangerous goods transport is estimated
generally in an aggregate way. In other cases systems of models to estimate
single components of the risk (probability, vulnerability and exposure) are pro-
posed.
In this thesis, a model for estimating road accident probability involving
HAZMAT and to access individual and societal risks have been proposed in
Section 6.2
The System Architecture to implement the DSS is proposed in Figure 6.6
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The architecture take in account the proposed model and is based on a
structure representing a set of macro-events that characterize the incident:
• a vehicle is involved in a road accident with or without dangerous goods;
• a vehicle with dangerous goods or its components is failed;
• a dangerous good generates a consequence on surrounding environment.
In the approach proposed, single event can be represented by different com-
ponents and for a road accident the conditioned probability components are
following.
• an heavy vehicle is involved;
• a vehicle carrying dangerous goods is involved (alone or with other vehi-
cles;
• a release of dangerous goods is verified.
Singles probabilities relative to these components are estimated with descriptive
model calibrated based on the official data [123] relative to the years 2000-2001.
Models to estimate these probabilities depends on human factors and environ-
mental characteristics. For a failure of vehicle, the probability components are
the follows:
• an element of container of dangerous good is failed;
• a a release of dangerous goods is verified.
A software module that must be situated in the Control Centre of the in-
frastructure. It communicates with the other modules of the system through
web services. It considers individually every HAZMAT transport traveling on
the motorway.
For every HAZMAT transport, software module calculates either the min-
imum risk, the minimum cost, or the minimum combined-cost route. It takes
into account the individual and societal risk cost, in addition to the economic
cost, and calculates the optimum route by eliminating the combination of them.
The inputs to the system include the road network, population distribution
data, sensitive “ hot spots” (e.g. hospitals, schools) real-time as well as sta-
tistical traffic and weather data, statistical accident data, road characteristics,
real-time vehicle and cargo status.
Those data are, whenever possible, time-dependent, with the day being di-
vided into a certain number of time intervals, each of which corresponds to a
different value of the time-dependent data.
Singles probabilities relative to these components are estimated with de-
scriptive model available in literature (CCPS, 1995); models to estimate these
probabilities depends on vehicle characteristics; - for an effect generates from
a dangerous good (for example dispersion, fire or explosion), the probability is
estimated with a model calibrated based on the official data relative to the inci-
dents involving dangerous goods in Italy relative to the years 1995-2005 (APAT,
2006).
The architecture introduces an enhanced solution, and a related software
platform, which attempts to integrate loss of containment causes and conse-
quences with system’s infrastructure and its environment.
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Figure 6.7: HAZMAT Transport Comparative Risk Assessment
In Figure 6.7 and in Figure 6.8 are shown two block diagrams relative to
risk assessment and risk management in motorway environment used as logic
reference for implement the architecture.
The solution features:
• the use of a detailed Master Logical Diagram, including fault/event tree
analysis to determine a loss of containment frequency based on different
initiating events, scenarios and specific basic data;
• the characterization of a resulting source term following a release situation,
and
• the calculation of various potential impacts on the neighboring site. Re-
sults are wrapped into a CCDF format for each selected traffic segment.
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Figure 6.8: Model of Risk Management Motorway
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Figure 6.9: Model of Integrated transportation and Environmental System
The risk-related results are integrated on a software platform, structured
as a decision support system using intelligent maps and a variety of GIS
(Geographical Information System) data processing procedures.
In order to take in account of the sustainability problems another subsystem is
proposed and shown in Figure 6.9.
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6.4 Case study
This section will be offered an example of application of real-time model pro-
posed in Section 6.1.3 for the calculation of the Individual and Societal Risks.
6.4.1 The transport network
With regard to the transport network, was considered the motorway network of
S.p.A. Autovie Venete, including the A4 (Venice - Trieste), A28 (Portogruaro -
Godega SU) and A23 (Palmanova - Udine Sud).
The network under consideration has been modeled as a arcs and nodes
network in which nodes represent exits / junctions of the motorway and ( link)
the stretches (sections) of motorway between two exits / junctions.
For each ( link) thus identified were obtained the following data:
1. length [Km] ;
2. average population density [inhabitants / Km], around link.
Figure 6.10: Motorway network of the case study
As for the average population density, it was calculated as follows.
1. the geographical map of the municipalities has been overlapped on the mo-
torway network of S.p.A. Autovie Venete through Google Earth software
in order to identify common cross each textit (link).
2. for each ( link) we have identified the municipalities involved and measured
the kilometers of infrastructure that pass through each town in order to
identify the weights for calculating the average density on the ( link) in
question. These weights are derived by dividing the kilometers of infras-
tructure that affect each municipality with the total length of the ( link).
3. Note the density of population in each Italian municipality, using data
on the census in 2001 [? ], we shall calculate the weighted average with
weights determined in step 2.
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Link Municipalities Population
Density
(inhab/Km2)
Munici-
palities-
Weight
Length-
(Km)
Average-
Population-
Density-
(inhab/Km2)
A4
Quarto d’Altino –
Venezia Est
Roncade(TV) 192 0,9 5,5 198,5
Quarto d’Altino (VE) 257 0,1
Venezia Est - S.Don di Pi-
ave
Meolo (VE) 228 0,2 11,4 197,22
Roncade (TV) 192 0,26
Annone Veneto (VE) 136 0,2
Fossalta di Piave (VE) 185 0,26
Noventa di Piave (VE) 330 0,08
S.Don di Piave - Cessalto Cessalto (TV) 111 0,4 7,7 266,6
Noventa di Piave (VE) 330 0,4
S.Don di Piave (VE) 451 0,2
Cessalto - S.Stino di
Livenza
Cessalto (TV) 111 0,7 6,6 129,6
S.Stino di Livenza (VE) 173 0,3
S.Stino di Livenza - Por-
togruaro
S.Stino di Livenza (VE) 173 0,15 12,8 214,35
Annone Veneto (VE) 136 0,15
Portogruaro (VE) 240 0,7
Portogruaro - Latisana Portogruaro (VE) 240 0,18 13,5 166,05
Fossalta di Portogruaro
(VE)
185 0,47
S.Michele al Tagliamento
(VE)
102 0,3
Ronchis (UD) 106 0,05
Latisana - S.Giorgio di
Nogaro
Ronchis (UD) 106 0,09 17,6 112,66
Palazzolo dello Stella
(UD)
88 0,17
Teor (UD) 118 0,12
Pocenia (UD) 108 0,06
Muzzana del Turgnano
(UD)
109 0,14
Castions di Strada (UD) 113 0,22
Porpetto (UD) 137 0,2
S.Giorgio di Nogaro –
Raccordo Palmanova
Porpetto (UD) 137 0,67 6,9 168,68
Gonars (UD) 233 0,33
Raccordo Palmanova -
Palmanova
Gonars (UD) 233 0,3 1,6 350,6
Palmanova (UD) 401 0,7
Palmanova - Villesse Palmanova (UD) 401 0,05 10,2 164,55
Bagnaria Arsa (UD) 180 0,15
Aiello del Friuli (UD) 167 0,45
Campolongo al Torre
(UD)
122 0,2
Tapogliano (UD) 91 0,05
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Villesse (GO) 134 0,1
Villesse - Redipuglia Villesse (GO) 134 0,45 4,9 219,4
S.Pier D’Isonzo (GO) 208 0,45
Ronchi dei Legionari
(GO)
655 0,1
Redipuglia - Trieste Lis-
ert
Ronchi dei Legionari
(GO)
655 0,5 8,8 970,5
Monfalcone (GO) 1286 0,5
A23
Raccordo Palmanova -
Udine Sud
Palmanova (UD) 401 0,1 13 175,7
Santa Maria la Longa
(UD)
118 0,36
Pavia di Udine (UD) 158 0,24
Pozzuolo del Friuli (UD) 184 0,3
A28
Portogruaro - Sesto al
Reghena
Potogruaro (VE) 240 0,3 3 174,95
Gruaro (VE) 156 0,45
Sesto al Reghena (PN) 131 0,25
Sesto al Reghena - Vil-
lotta
Sesto al Reghena (PN) 131 0,15 4 142,85
Cinto Caomaggiore (VE) 148 0,65
Chions (PN) 135 0,2
Villotta - Azzano Decimo Chions (PN) 135 0,35 5 215,65
Azzano Decimo (PN) 251 0,5
Fiume Veneto (PN) 286 0,15
Azzano Decimo - Cim-
pello
Azzano Decimo (PN) 251 0,9 3 254,5
Fiume Veneto (PN) 286 0,1
Cimpello - Pordenone Fiume Veneto (PN) 286 0,4 5 885,4
Pordenone (PN) 1285 0,6
Pordenone - Porcia Pordenone (PN) 1285 0,5 2 873,5
Porcia (PN) 462 0,5
Porcia - Fontanafredda Porcia (PN) 462 1 4 462
Fontanafredda - Sacile
Est
Porcia (PN) 462 0,6 3 366,4
FontanaFredda (PN) 205 0,3
Brugnera (PN) 277 0,1
Sacile Est - Sacile Ovest FontanaFredda (PN) 205 0,2 4 487,4
Sacile (PN) 558 0,8
Sacile Ovest - Godega Sacile (PN) 558 0,3 9 361,8
Cordignano (TV) 244 0,1
Orsago (TV) 337 0,25
Godega di S.Urbano
(TV)
245 0,35
Table 6.1: Average population density and link length under test
Table 6.1 illustrates the link in discussion with the relevant data.
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6.4.2 The accident probability
We use (4.1) and the Truck Accident Rate of Harwood [114, 115] in order
to calculate the accident probability (λincl) in terms of events/(vehicle ∗ km),
supposed be uniform throughout the ( link).
We can also calculate in (6.12) the rate of accidents on a single stretch of
length unit road by using the number of accidents in a time period of ten years
and the total distance traveled by heavy vehicles during the same period, data
provided by AISCAT (Associazione Italiana Societ Concessionarie Autostrade
e Trafori) [7].
TARa =
Aa
V KTa
(6.12)
where TARa = average accident rate for trucks events/(vehicle ∗ km) on the
Italian motorway network; Aa = number of accidents involving trucks in a year
on the Italian motorway network; V KTa = total distance traveled (vehicle-
kilometers) by trucks on the network under consideration.
Table (6.2) shows the number of accidents involving heavy vehicles, the total
distance traveled and the Truck accident rate year by year from 1997 to 2007
and the summary data for the years under consideration.
ROUTES ACCIDENTS TAR
YEAR ESTENSION (veh.− km ∗ 106)
KM Heavy Heavy Heavy
1997 5.371 14.428 7.825 5,42E-07
1998 5.380 15.161 8.854 5,84E-07
1999 5.380 15.974 10.024 6,28E-07
2000 5.380 16.790 9.681 5,77E-07
2001 5.388 17.254 9.647 5,59E-07
2002 5.388 17.836 9.691 5,43E-07
2003 5.388 18.359 9.198 5,01E-07
2004 5.391 19.059 8.841 4,64E-07
2005 5.432 19.184 9.005 4,69E-07
2006 5.441 19.764 9.000 4,55E-07
2007 5.446 20.229 8.613 4,26E-07
194.038 100.379 5,17E-07
Table 6.2: Accidents, TAR and the total distance traveled by heavy vehicles
year by year from 1997 to 2007
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6.4.3 The HAZMAT
In the next step, obtained the information discussed above, we select the HAZ-
MATs that are to be considered in calculating the risk. In particular, we have
been selected substances that are more frequent or more significant on the net-
work under consideration.
For each of these goods were obtained the following data.
• The probability of releases due to the accident (P (R|A)) depending in
general on the characteristics of the vehicle transporting the HAZMAT
(mechanical strength, possible internal partitioning, presence of double
walls and insulation) and on the type of accident where the vehicle is
involved. This probability was derived from the study published by Brown
and Dunn [33].
• The types of possible releases classified in relation to the size of the leakage
hole and consequently the rate of release or the amount of material spilled
(Nreltype(ν)).
• The consequences types of incident caused by different types of releas of
HAZMAT since accident for a given type of substance (Nout(ν, r)).
• The likelihood of occurrence a final result given the incident (pout(i)).
This probability was derived for each triplet [substance - means of escape
- type of final outcome] from the information relating to incidents involving
HAZMAT from 1997 to 2008 contained in the HMIS database [184]. This
database contains detailed information on accidents involving dangerous
substances in the U.S., such as the type of event or the final result that
has occurred (explosion, toxic cloud, fire, etc.).
• The lethal area radius of each pair [type of release - final outcome] calcu-
lated using the free software RMPComp distributed by U.S. EPA (Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency).
• The frequency on the occurrence of a given scenario:
fscenν,t (i, r) = λinc · prel(ν) · preltype(r) · pout(i) whereas:
λinc is the accident probability (TAR in Section 6.4.2),
prel(ν) is the probability of having a release of the substance ν since the
accident (P (Release/Accident)),
preltype(r) is the probability of having a release type r given a release and
a accident (P (ReleaseType/Relase,Accident)),
pout(i) is the probability that there is a particular incident given the type of
release, the release and the accident (P (Incident/ReleaseType,Release,Accident)).
The logic diagrams (Event Tree) on the release types and the consequences final
outcome with their probabilities are shown below for each substance examined.
These data are then summarized in tabular form.
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Figure 6.11: Event Tree Diagrams - GPL, Chlorine
HAZMAT prel Release
Type
prelt Incident
Type
pout Incident
Prob.
Scenario
Fre-
quency
Lethal
area
radius
(Km)
GPL 0,025 Small
Spillage
0,74 Vapor
Cloud
Fire
0,04 7,40E-04 3,83E-10 0,16
0,025 0,74 Vapor
Explo-
sion
0,01 1,85E-04 9,57E-11 0,05
0,025 Medium
Spillage
0,21 Vapor
Cloud
Fire
0,15 7,88E-04 4,07E-10 0,16
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0,025 0,21 Vapor
Explo-
sion
0,03 1,58E-04 8,15E-11 0,2
0,025 Large
Spillage
0,05 Vapor
Cloud
Fire
0,11 1,38E-04 7,11E-11 0,16
0,025 0,05 Vapor
Explo-
sion
0,33 4,13E-04 2,13E-10 0,5
Cloro 0,01 Small
Spillage
0,94 Toxic
Cloud
1 9,40E-03 4,86E-09 1
0,01 Medium
Spillage
0,04 Toxic
Cloud
1 4,00E-04 2,07E-10 2,8
0,01 Large
Spillage
0,02 Toxic
Cloud
1 2,00E-04 1,03E-10 5,6
Ammoniaca 0,025 Small
Spillage
0,93 Toxic
Cloud
1 2,31E-02 1,20E-08 0,2
0,025 Medium
Spillage
0,05 Toxic
Cloud
1 1,33E-03 6,88E-10 1
0,025 Large
Spillage
0,02 Toxic
Cloud
1 5,32E-04 2,75E-10 2,1
Acido Nitrico 0,015 Small
Spillage
0,93 Toxic
Cloud
1 1,39E-02 7,19E-09 0,3
0,015 Medium
Spillage
0,06 Toxic
Cloud
1 8,82E-04 4,56E-10 0,5
0,015 Large
Spillage
0,01 Toxic
Cloud
1 2,21E-04 1,14E-10 1,9
Acido
Cloridrico
0,015 Small
Spillage
0,92 Toxic
Cloud
1 1,38E-02 7,13E-09 0,3
0,015 Medium
Spillage
0,05 Toxic
Cloud
1 7,37E-04 3,81E-10 0,8
0,015 Large
Spillage
0,03 Toxic
Cloud
1 4,81E-04 2,49E-10 2,6
Table 6.3: Frequency scenarios
Table 6.4 shows the situation of the network under consideration (for each ( link)
it shows the dangerous and the number of vehicles in transit).
Link Substance type Num. of Vehicles
A4
Quarto d’Altino - Venezia Est Ammonia 1
Chlorine 1
Venezia Est - S.Don di Piave Nitric Acid 2
Hydrochloric Acid 1
S.Don di Piave - Cessalto GPL 1
Chlorine 2
Cessalto - S.Stino di Livenza GPL 2
Hydrochloric Acid 2
S.Stino di Livenza - Portogruaro Chlorine 2
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Portogruaro - Latisana Ammonia 2
Latisana - S.Giorgio di Nogaro Hydrochloric Acid 2
Nitric Acid 2
S.Giorgio di Nogaro - Raccordo Palmanova GPL 1
Raccordo Palmanova - Palmanova Chlorine 1
Nitric Acid 2
Palmanova - Villesse GPL 1
Villesse - Redipuglia Chlorine 2
Redipuglia - Trieste Lisert Ammonia 1
Nitric Acid 2
A23
Raccordo Palmanova - Udine Sud Chlorine 2
Ammonia 2
A28
Portogruaro - Sesto al Reghena GPL 2
Sesto al Reghena - Villotta Nitric Acid 1
Villotta - Azzano Decimo Ammonia 1
Chlorine 2
Azzano Decimo - Cimpello Hydrochloric Acid 2
Cimpello - Pordenone Nitric Acid 2
Pordenone - Porcia GPL 2
Porcia - Fontanafredda Chlorine 1
Ammonia 2
Fontanafredda - Sacile Est Ammonia 1
Nitric Acid 2
Sacile Est - Sacile Ovest GPL 1
Chlorine 2
Sacile Ovest - Godega Hydrochloric Acid 1
Nitric Acid 2
Table 6.4: Vehicles and substances on testedlink
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Figure 6.12: Event Tree Diagrams - Ammonia, Nitric Acid
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Figure 6.13: Event Tree Diagrams - Hydrochloric Acid
6.4.4 Assumptions
In the simulation carried out have been taken the following assumptions.
1. λinc(l) uniform throughout the link and constant for all links taken into
consideration: λinc;
2. exposure area of type danger circle centered at the point of the incident
with a radius depending of nature of the substance, the type of release
and the type of final outcome;
3. any person within the exposure area is suffering from the same injury
(death) in the same way regardless of the choice position, while the people
who are outside that area are not affected by incident;
4. the seasons (j) are not taken into account and the weather conditions on
link Ctmet(l) and wind direction ϑ
t(l);
5. the simulation is performed on a single moment in time;
6. use the model to the risk neutral (α = 1).
6.4.5 Individual Risk Calculation
The simulation were carried out on three adjacent ( links) between ones of net-
work under consideration.
As Individual Risk is the annual probability of an individual placed in a
designated point of interest is affected by some degree of damage as a result of
a specific incident [126], four points were chosen as “ hot spots” at which to
calculate the individual risk.
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show respectively the links with the relevant substances
circulating and the geographical coordinates of the points chosen for the calcu-
lation of individual risk.
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Link Substance type Number of Vehicles
A4
S.Stino di Livenza - Portogruaro Chlorine 2
Portogruaro - Latisana Ammonia 2
Latisana - S.Giorgio di Nogaro Hydrochloric Acid 2
Nitric Acid 2
Table 6.5: HAZMAT and Number of Vehicles carry them on links under test
Point Location Latitude Longitude
Portogruaro Centro 45,78 12,83
Area di Servizio Fratta Nord 45,8 12,88
Latisana Ospedale 45,77 13
Muzzana del Turgnano Centro 45,82 13,13
Table 6.6: Geographical coordinates of the points chosen for Individual Risk
calculation
Figure 6.14: Representation of points and the network portion under
consideration
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According to 6.2.1, for the calculations have been used (6.5) suitably modi-
fied to highlight the different types of release.
Consequently, we made explicit that each event i belongs to the N(out)(ν) of
the general model may consist of a pair type of release - final outcome (incident)
as in this case.
IRPt =
Nlinks∑
i=1
Ntveh(l)∑
v=1
Nreltype(v)∑
r=1
N ttype(l, v)·frel(v, r)·
∫
Ll
Nout(v,r)∑
i=1
pout(i)·VQ(x)v→S(i)
(6.13)
frel(v, r) = λinc · prel(v) · preltype(r) (6.14)
where VQ(x)ν→S(i) is equal to:
1 if the point S is inside the danger circle centered at the point of possible
accident Q related the triplet substance - release type - final outcome;
0 if the point S is external the same danger circle.
Line integral was calculated using the method of Cavalieri-Simpson, dividing
each of the three link in 10 intervals of equal length.
Table 6.7 shows the results of the simulation.
Point Individual Risk
Portogruaro Centro 2,28E-09
Area di Servizio Fratta Nord 5,78E-09
Latisana Ospedale 0
Muzzana del Turgnano Centro 1,75E-09
Table 6.7: Simulation results - Individual Risk
From the evidence we can establish that the Individual Risk in the four issues
examined is acceptable according to the British ALARP threshold as the value
of that risk is much lower than the limit value of 10−6 6.2.4.
6.4.6 Societal Risk Calculation
In order to calculate the Societal Risk for each ( link) knowing the vehicles that
are going through, we use the the curves F (N) representation.
According to [? ], the values of F cumulative frequency (per year) are given
with the curves F (N) as a result of all possible accidents.
The values of F refer towe have seen in the damage of a reference not less
than N (and thus, as has been described as the damage of reference, a number
of deaths greater than or equal to N units) cite () Spadoni1999.
In correspondence to the values of F is considered a damage in the area of
reference not less than N (and thus, as has been described as the damage of
reference, a number of deaths greater than or equal to N units ).
To construct such a curve is necessary to derive, for each scenario defined
by:
• link ;
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• HAZMAT on link ;
• release type;
• final outcome (incident);
the scenario total frequency and the number of possible deaths.
The scenario total frequency is derived by multiplying the frequency of the
scenario discussed in the Table 6.3 by the number of vehicles on the same link
carrying the test substance.
In order to calculate the number of possible deaths we need to obtain the
area of exposure on all the link fixed bandwidth and then to the scenario under
consideration.
We obtained this translating the danger circle, whose radius depends on the
triplet substance type, release type, final outcome, along the ink.
Areaν,r,i,l = raggio2ν,r,i · pi + raggioν,r,i · Llink (6.15)
where:
• ν is the substance type;
• r is the release type;
• i is the type of event caused by the outcome (incident);
• Llink is the length of link under consideration.
Finally, in order to calculate the number of deaths related to each scenario
we multiply the area value obtained in (6.15 by average population density of
the link.
In Figure 6.15 is drawn the curve F (N) relative to the simulation with
different thresholds of acceptability as presented in Section 6.2.4.
The graph can be seen that the societal risk at moment of the simulation
is ALARP zone, according to the British acceptability thresholds, of while it is
not acceptable according to Dutch and Danish thresholds.
6.5 Conclusions
The main objective of this part of the thesis has been the development of a prac-
tical and efficient method of Quantitative Risk Assessment for the HAZMAT
transportation, with particular reference to transport by motorway.
Using this approach it is possible to scientifically and quantitatively assess
the risk derived by the transport of such goods in transit on the infrastructure
and in addition to implement a Decision Support System in Management Sys-
tem of HAZMAT transportation on a motorway sustainable oriented motorway
environment.
After a brief digression about the dangerous goods, the international clas-
sifications and the ADR legislation, the methodology of Quantitative Risk As-
sessment has been illustrated and developed.
This technique is characterized by a series of sequential steps to obtain a
quantitative assessment and scientific risk.
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Figure 6.15: Simulation results - Individual Risk
By following this procedure, the main techniques for assessing the probability
of an accident (accident, incident, release) and shape areas of impact or exposure
have been studied.
These elements are the input model to calculate the risk that considers the
interaction among the transport network, the vehicle or mobile source of risk
and the area of impact.
In addition, as people or rather the decision makers are not usually neutral
to risk facing the possibility of accidents involving dangerous goods, we have
analyzed numerical models to measure the individual and societal risk taking
into account the perception of risk.
Finally, in order to assess the acceptability of risk, the last step of the proce-
dure makes it possible identifying situations of risk not acceptable and, therefore,
highlight the need for remedial and mitigation of risk.
ALARP thresholds have been introduced to developed the last step of the
procedure.
It is important to stress that this methodology is very general, can be applied
in the assessment of risk in the transport of dangerous goods on other modes of
transport.
Calculation and assessment of risk make a distinction among the different
procedures, because each mode of transport has its distinctive characteristics
that must be taken into account in the calculation model of individual and
societal risk.
However, it was found that the developed procedures, and in general all
the techniques of Quantitative Risk Assessment, suffer from some problems.
Essentially they are based on analysis of data contained in the various public
and private database of accidents which are not always available.
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As a consequence, only an abundant availability of data allows to improve
the accuracy and practicality of the methodology.
However, in recent years especially since September the 11th 2001, many
institutions, agencies or private organizations have also made public their acci-
dent databases allowing researchers to access a wider source of information and
therefore easier to develop research on theme.
The developed risk assessment methodology has been integrated into a De-
cision Support System to calculate in real time the individual and societal risk
related to the transit of dangerous substances on a motorway network.
The aims is to assess whether these risks are acceptable and possibly, if they
were not, notify the situation through alert messages in order to take appropriate
action.
The need to integrate the proposed methodology, and in particular the model
for calculating the risk, with the modern GIS is one of the emerged elements in
this work.
In order to achieve an accurate QRA, the knowledge of information relating
to the territory, or rather which analysis must be developed, are of enormous
importance.
In particular, it is necessary to know the distribution of the population, the
rates of accidents and the weather conditions.
By using this software, it is possible to integrate these information in a
more simple way and to do the calculations rapidly. Consequently, shorter
response times facilitate the implementation of real-time applications, such as
the proposed DSS. A developable graphical interface user friendly will allow a
easier use of the system.
With regard to possible developments, a next step will be the practice im-
plementation of the DSS using the proposed methodology at the operational
level.
A further development could be to extend the procedure of QRA methodol-
ogy, regarding in particular the model for calculating the individual and societal
risk, to other situations which transport of HAZMAT by road outside a motor-
way or other modes of transport.
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Chapter 7
Synthesis, Conclusions and
Possible Further
Developments
7.1 Synthesis and Conclusions
In this section we provide a synthesis of the topics presented in the thesis. For
a more detailed summary we suggest to refer to Section 2.7 and Section 6.5.
7.1.1 Synthesis
During the last few decades there has been a shift in transport planning ob-
jectives from economic efficiency toward strategic policy goals, such as cohe-
sion or environmental issues, intimately linked with the “sustainable transport”
paradigm.
However, the treatment of these strategic aspects is uneven and scarce among
sustainable assessment methodologies. As a consequence, the development of
harmonized methodologies for the strategic assessment of large scale transport
infrastructure investments, in a sustainable vision, is a current challenge for the
research community.
In spite of these perspectives, business has a responsibility, beyond its ba-
sic responsibility to its shareholders, to a broader constituency that includes
its key stakeholders: customers, employees, government and the people of the
communities in which it operates.
Organizational ethics, values and Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives
are becoming increasingly important value drivers in companies and have im-
plications right across the organization in the sector of transport.
As ethics are not a substitute for a fundamentally sound business strategy,
it is important to provide value-added tools for companies to help them manage
all aspects of sustainable and socially responsible business practices most of all
in the road and motorway environment.
As a consequence, the sector of transport needs methodologies capable of ad-
dressing strategic effects of transport infrastructure plans, which are not usually
covered by traditional assessment methodologies.
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This doctoral thesis was just aimed to develop methodologies with an original
approach in making an attempt to encompass both professional experience and
theoretical knowledge with application oriented studies from disparate areas
related to the commercial transport of hazardous materials on motorway.
In order to address this challenge, we present two methodologies to perform:
1. the objective of a Sustainable Value Added in a Strategic Plan for Cor-
porate Social Responsibility in the sector of Build-Operate-Transfer, road
operators and motorway concessionaires;
2. the individual and societal risk assessment related to HAZMAT transport
in a sustainable oriented motorway environment.
We suggest to refer to Section 2.7 and Section 6.5 for more detailed conclu-
sions.
The first proposed methodology constitutes a strategic approach, based on
an original idea to use the Balanced Scorecard model in the specific sector of
motorway concessionaires to estimate its corporate efficiency and to evaluate
environmental and social performance.
We analyzed the key features and principles of sustainable development by
examining emerging needs, available capitals, and productivity capacities of
motorway environment.
We have developed a performance measurement program based on outcome
measures related the activities a concessionaire undertakes to its strategic goals.
The proposed performance measurement system includes the common per-
formance measurements in a number of measures limited to those that are re-
ally important to a motorway company as the followings: system condition and
preservation, safety, accessibility and traffic conditions-mobility.
In addition, a user satisfaction index is reported which may be estimated
from customer surveys.
As protection of environment and sustainability are important goals for most
transportation agencies, public or private, around the world, there is a common
desire to be able to measure performance in this regard. The Balanced Scorecard
proposed model can really to be useful to estimate corporate efficiency and to
evaluate environmental and social performance in a motorway company.
Finally, we proposed a model for sustainable development for a motorway
concessionaire completed with the four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard,
the vision and the mission customized for S.p.A. Autovie Venete.
The second proposed methodology constitutes a practical and efficient method
of Quantitative Risk Assessment for the HAZMAT transportation, with partic-
ular reference to motorway environment.
HAZMAT transportation problems which consider all involved parties (gov-
ernment and the carriers) are a relatively young research topic.
In general, the studies in the HAZMAT transport literature do not have an
exploratory modeling focus. Nevertheless various analytical equations for risk
are used in route optimization or quantitative risk assessment research.
In this research we take a novel approach to analyze hazardous materials
transportation risk.
Previous studies analyzed this risk from an operations research (OR) or
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) perspective by minimizing or calculating
risk along a transport route.
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Further, even though the majority of incidents occur when containers are
unloaded, the research has not focused on transportation-related activities, in-
cluding container loading and unloading.
The proposed methodology constitutes a strategic approach, based on the
utilization of spatial impact analysis tools supported by a Geographical In-
formation System (GIS). The assessment criteria, based on the “sustainable
transport” paradigm, are structured into efficiency, cohesion and environmental
criteria.
Using this approach it is possible to scientifically and quantitatively assess
the individual and societal risks derived by the transport of dangerous goods in
transit on the infrastructure. In addition, it is possible to implement a Deci-
sion Support System in Management System of HAZMAT transportation on a
sustainable oriented motorway environment.
The aims is to assess whether these risks are acceptable and possibly, if they
were not, notify the situation through alert messages in order to take appropriate
actions.
Two new numerical procedures have been presented: these procedures allow
the calculation of individual and societal risk values in the case of hazardous
material transportation on motorway environment with the same accuracy used
when examining fixed plants.
These procedures take into account the different transport methods and haz-
ardous materials, different equivalence holes for each vehicle, different meteoro-
logical conditions and seasonal situations, a non uniform wind rose distribution
and a very precise description of the outdoor and indoor population, both on-
route and off-route.
When performing transportation risk assessments, some simplifying hypoth-
esis are introduced, which are mainly due to the necessity of bypassing compu-
tational difficulties.
Finally, we offered an example of application of the proposed real-time model
for the calculation of the Individual and Societal Risks. The case study involves
a stretch of A4 motorway managed by S.p.A. Autovie Venete.
In spite of a limited number of trucks transporting HAZMAT on the motor-
way, the results of the application point out the concrete possibility to exceed
the thresholds of the ALARP limits for the societal risk.
7.1.2 Conclusions and Possible Further Developments
Road traffic injuries and deaths are a major public health issue worldwide.
Unless appropriate action is taken urgently, the problem will worsen globally.
This will particularly be the case in those developing countries where rapid
motorization is likely to occur over the next two decades. A sizable portion of
the burden of injury will continue to be borne by vulnerable road users.
The transportation of dangerous goods on congested motorways is becoming
an area of increasing concern for public safety and environmental awareness.
The risk to population and damage to environment is a major concern to the
general public and government policy makers.
There is hope, though, that the devastating loss of life and health entailed
in such a worsening scenario can be avoided.
Over the last forty years the science of traffic safety has developed to a point
where the effective strategies for preventing or reducing crashes and injuries are
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well known. As a scientific systemic approach to the problem of road safety is
essential, this aspect is not yet fully accepted in many places. Several studies
on the transportation of hazardous materials have been reported in the litera-
ture. They relate aspects such as database development, selecting criteria for
designating HAZMAT motorway routes.
Researchers need to have access to high quality accident probability data
and empirical or theoretical researches that lead to improvements in the quality
of such data. Applying national data uniformly on all road segments of similar
type is quite problematic since “hot spots” such as road intersections, highway
ramps, and bridges are frequently ignored. There is no agreement on general
truck accident probabilities and conflicting numbers are reported by different
researchers.
Given the limitation of QRA, and the fact that public opposition is a function
of perceived risks, perhaps more attention should be paid to quantifying and
modeling of perceived risks. We believe more work is needed to improve our
understanding of how perceived risks change as a function of the hazardous
substance, the distance to a hazardous activity, and the volume of the activity.
Geographic information systems make it possible to use more precise pop-
ulation information. However, using census-based population data for daytime
HAZMAT movements makes little sense since census data is residence-based
and most residents are not at home during the day.
Researchers need to take the next step and incorporate day versus night
population distributions, as well as high-density population installations such
as schools and hospitals. While this is done relatively easily for QRA of a
single route, it is more complicated to generate the necessary data for an entire
transportation network.
In addition, the formidable challenge of reducing the level of human loss
on the roads and to favor a sustainable development requires the following to
be developed: increased capacity for policy-making, research and interventions,
in both the public and private sectors, national strategic plans, incorporating
targets where data allow, good data systems for identifying problems and eval-
uating responses, collaboration across a range of sectors, including the health
sector, partnerships between public and private sectors.
Finally, we believe that there are still many important OR problems in
HAZMAT transportation for instance: intermodal HAZMAT transportation,
HAZMAT transportation via air or pipeline, HAZMAT transportation network
design problem which considers all involved parties (government and the carri-
ers), and HAZMAT logistics management involving decisions based on multiple
criteria (e.g., cost, risk, equity).
However, we think the focus will shift from a priori optimization toward
real-time adaptive decision making for several reasons, such as the availability
of the necessary technology and data, as well as security concerns.
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